

UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
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CONTENTS

LIST OF WITNESSES

Wednesday, March 23, 1966:		
Rubin, Dr. Leslie, professor of government, Howard University, Washington, D.C.		255
Van den Haag, Dr. Ernest, adjunct professor of social philosophy, New York University, New York.		271
Thursday, March 24, 1966:		
Carter, Hodding, editor and publisher, Delta Democrat-Times, Green- ville, Miss.		328
Maddox, Dr. William, director of administration, Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, N.Y.		342
Marshall, Gen. S. L. A. (U.S. Army retired), witness for South Africa before the International Court of Justice.		311
Wednesday, March 30, 1966:		
Goldmark, Charles, international affairs vice president, U.S. National Student Association.		305
Kulick, Gilbert, assistant for African student affairs, U.S. National Student Association.		385
Ntibati, Rev. Gladstone Mxolisi, Harvard University Divinity School, Cambridge, Mass.		355
Stevens, Dr. Richard, Lincoln University (former chairman of Polit- ical Science Department at Pius XII University College, Basuto- land), Lincoln University, Pennsylvania		371

STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement on policies and purposes of the American-African Affairs Asso- ciation, Inc.		290
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UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1966

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Barratt O'Hara (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. O'HARA. The subcommittee will come to order.

The House is in session now, and there is a possibility of a rollcall vote, and if there is we will take a recess to permit the members to respond to the rollcall.

The subcommittee has as its witnesses today Dr. Leslie Rubin, professor of government, at Howard University, and a former member of the legislative body of South Africa. And I think presenting the other side of the picture, Dr. Ernest Van den Haag, adjunct professor of social philosophy, of New York University.

The subcommittee will be privileged today to hear two sides of the question.

You will proceed, Dr. Rubin.

STATEMENT OF DR. LESLIE RUBIN, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, HOWARD UNIVERSITY

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to say at the outset, firstly, how deeply appreciative I am of the fact that your committee has decided to hold these hearings in order to create an informed awareness of the present situation in South Africa, and, secondly, to say how grateful I am personally for the privilege of testifying before this committee.

As you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, I appear here as a South African, I was born in South Africa. I grew up there. I was educated there. I went on to teach at one of the universities, the University of Cape Town, and, as you also indicated, I did for some time participate in the public life of the country.

I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that in my opinion apartheid, the system which this committee is here to consider, to try to understand, to evaluate, is morally indefensible and politically disastrous. In my view apartheid is the neo-Nazi creed of our time. I say that, Mr. Chairman, because while I know of many countries where there is discrimination based on race or color, I know of no country since the Germany of Hitler disappeared where racial discrimination has been raised to the level of a national philosophy, and has become the

very foundation on which the whole social and political structure in the country rests.

In South Africa, Mr. Chairman, the right of a man to participate in the life of his country, the right of a man to share in the economic opportunities that are offered in the country, is determined not by his character, his ability, his experience, his wisdom, all the other factors that are regarded as relevant and as the only relevant factors in the Western World, but by his color or his race.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have had the good fortune of looking at some of the memorandums which have been put before your committee, and I thought that I could best be of assistance to your committee by trying to formulate as crisply and as clearly as possible my views on the present situation in South Africa, particularly as they concern the United States, without going into unnecessary detail.

I decided that perhaps the best way I could do this was to deal briefly with a pamphlet I prepared, the first edition of which appeared in 1959, with the express purpose of indicating, or trying to indicate, by an examination of the laws of South Africa, what apartheid is, and what it does to human beings.

This pamphlet, which I call "This Is Apartheid," first published in 1959, in London, went into 13 printings, and a second revised edition in the preparation of which my son, who teaches at London University, has collaborated, and which appeared last year, has now gone into its second printing.

I would like, if I may, Mr. Chairman, at this stage—I have brought some copies with me—to make available some copies for the members of the committee, because I propose to comment shortly on some of the contents of this pamphlet.

Now, this pamphlet, Mr. Chairman, if members of the committee would look at page 4, contains a short statement by me and my son, the authors of it, indicating what we had in mind. I would like to read that:

The purpose of this pamphlet is to provide an authentic description of apartheid in simple terms. It contains a number of statements which set out and illustrate the effect of some of the laws passed by the present Government of South Africa since it came to power some 17 years ago. A footnote refers to the specific provision in the law upon which each statement is based, but all comment (except when considered necessary to clarify a statement) has been deliberately excluded. The pamphlet is thus designed to state what the race laws in fact are, not to argue what they should be.

I was privileged, Mr. Chairman, as members of the committee will see when they look at this pamphlet, to have a foreword written by Alan Paton. I would like to read two or three extracts from his foreword, because he provides what I would describe as informed comment, I have decided that the purpose of my pamphlet was to avoid comment but to reproduce as accurately as possible the simple effect of these laws.

At page 5, Alan Paton states:

Senator Leslie Rubin's pamphlet sets out to do one very simple thing: It does not try to say what apartheid is, nor to argue whether it is magnificently benevolent or unspeakably inhumane, nor whether it is evil or merely impossible. It merely gives 40 examples of what it can do to human beings.

Senator Rubin nowhere states, such not being the purpose of his pamphlet, what apartheid actually is doing. It is therefore left for me to say that these

things happen to human beings in South Africa, and further, that even where they do not happen, the threat of them hangs over those who are subject to these laws.

A little lower down on the page he goes on :

I could give many examples of the indignities and injustices that are suffered by nonwhite people under the apartheid laws. I could tell of African landowners who have lost their freehold rights, and will get no others, because the land they owned has been declared to be "white." I could tell of Indian traders who have lost businesses more than 50 years old, because the area where they did business has been declared to be "white." I could tell of a man who lived as "white," and then was declared to be "colored," who lost not only his job and his wife, but also his children who fled from him in hatred and anger; yet they cannot really flee from him, for they are now "colored," too.

And he concluded on page 6 of the pamphlet :

Of course Senator Rubin—and I too—will be accused of "blackening the name of our country abroad." The charge would be untrue. All we have done is to show how the name of our country has been blackened at home.

Mr. Chairman, statement No. 1 in the pamphlet illustrates the effect of what is, in my opinion, certainly one of the most vicious laws on the statute book of South Africa, and perhaps one of the most vicious to be found anywhere in the world today.

It illustrates the operation of section 10 of the amended 19 Urban Areas Act. "An African who was born in a town and lived there continuously for 50 years, but then left to reside elsewhere for any period, even 2 weeks, is not entitled as of right to return to the town where he was born and to remain there for more than 72 hours. If he does he is guilty of a criminal offense and subject to a fine not exceeding 10 pounds, or, in default, imprisonment for a period not exceeding 2 months, unless he has obtained a permit to do so."

Mr. MORSE. Is this the exact language of the statute you are reading?

Dr. RUBIN. No. What I have done, Mr. Chairman—I am a lawyer, and I analyze these laws, I prepared illustrations which bring out the effect of the provisions of these different laws.

Mr. MORSE. I see. Thank you.

Dr. RUBIN. As a footnote, members of the committee will see, I have given a precise reference to the act and the provision of the act on which the illustration is based.

Mr. O'HARA. Doctor, I notice you state here "is not entitled as of right."

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. I will explain that, sir. That does emerge from other illustrations. He is entitled to receive a permit from an official in special circumstances, depending entirely on the discretion of the official, to remain in that area.

Mr. O'HARA. Would he find it difficult ordinarily to get a permit?

Dr. RUBIN. Most difficult, Mr. Chairman. In fact, as I was about to illustrate later, these provisions have in fact been superseded by a further amendment to the law last year, the effect of which is now to remove this period of 72 hours as a period during which an African can remain in an urban area without interference at all, and to substitute for it a provision the effect of which is to enable the Minister of Bantu administration and development, the man in charge of the activities of Africans in South Africa, to remove an African no matter how long he has been in an area, whether he was born there

or not, from that area, at any time his presence in the area is in excess of the labor requirements of the area.

Mr. O'HARA. Is the intent of the act to keep him from returning?

Dr. RUBIN. The intent of the act I would say—

Mr. O'HARA. Or merely to give the Government the option of deciding whether he shall return or not?

Dr. RUBIN. The intent of the act, I would say, is twofold, sir. It is partly designed to fit in with the whole theory of separate development. That is, the theory in terms of which the Africans are to be confined to their own homelands, their own separate areas.

The other motive underlying this provision is to enable the Government to control very, very rigidly the supply of labor in the towns of South Africa.

Mr. O'HARA. The Chair would suggest that if any members of the subcommittee have questions, ask the questions without addressing the Chair.

Mr. ADAIR. Doctor, are these illustrative cases, or actual cases, that you are presenting to us now? Do you have specific individuals in mind of each of these, or are these just illustrative?

Dr. RUBIN. What I have done—may I explain it by making two points, Mr. Chairman?

What I have done is to set out in simple language what the effect of the law is. The answer to I think the implied question that has come from you now is that these are not laws that simply remain on the statute book and are not enforced. In fact, there is a mass of statistical information to show that tens of thousands of Africans have been charged with offenses under precisely these provisions, as I have described them, have been sentenced, and have served terms of imprisonment. I have no hesitation in saying that—I think it is a statement I can safely make at the present time—in South Africa there are thousands of Africans who are serving sentences of imprisonment for having contravened provisions of the kind I describe in this pamphlet.

Mr. ADAIR. Then, in effect, what you are giving us here is your interpretation of the specific points of law?

Dr. RUBIN. I am giving my interpretation of these apartheid laws.

Mr. MORSE. Your interpretation, as a lawyer who has practiced in South Africa and served in the Parliament of South Africa?

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. And I might say this pamphlet has been in existence since 1959, and although I have on more than one occasion—I did it while I was in Parliament, I published it while I was still a Senator, to challenge the Government to dispute any of the statements—they have failed to do so.

Mr. MORSE. Doctor, if I may interrupt, I think the subcommittee and our guests here would be interested to find out how long you served in the Parliament.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes, I was elected, Mr. Chairman, to represent the Africans of the Cape Province in the Senate. I was one of four Senators. They were required by law to be white—who represented the 12 million Africans of South Africa. One Senator for the Transvaal and the Free State Province, one for Natal, one for the Transkei, and one for the rest of the Cape. I represented the rest of the Cape.

One aspect of my representation which might interest members of the committee, since they are legislators, is that the constituency I represented was a little more than three times the area of the whole of the United Kingdom, and I represented approximately 2 million people.

One other significant aspect of this representation was that in a Senate of 54 when I was first elected, four Senators represented the 12 million Africans. The remainder, 50, represented 3 million whites.

May I say, at once, that representation, as meager as it was, was too much for the digestion of the present government, and it was abolished in 1960. At the present time the Africans have no representation whatsoever in the Parliament of South Africa.

Mr. MORSE. They did that with a vengeance.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes.

Mr. ADAIR. How were you elected, Doctor?

Dr. RUBIN. I was elected in terms of what was known as the Separate Representation of Natives Act, and I was elected on an electoral college system, based on a number of voting units. And a voting unit could be either what was known as a native advisory board, a consultative body in the urban locations or townships, or a chief, or a rural council. The objective of the system was to enable the African people throughout the country, both in rural and in urban areas, to choose representatives through their committees or their chiefs.

Mr. MORSE. Would it have been possible for them to have chosen an African or a colored person?

Dr. RUBIN. No. By law only white people could sit in the South African Parliament.

Mr. ADAIR. But at that time you were chosen by Africans and/or colored?

Dr. RUBIN. No, just Africans. I represented the Africans.

Mr. O'HARA. That system has been abolished or changed?

Dr. RUBIN. That system was abolished by a law passed in 1959, which was called the—the title may sound a bit strange to the members of this committee—this law which abolished the representation available to the Africans is called the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act. The reason for the use of that term was that another part of the same law envisaged at some date in the future the provision for separate representation, or some separate kind of government for the Africans in their own areas.

Mr. MORSE. With no date certain?

Dr. RUBIN. No.

Mr. O'HARA. You were a Member of the Senate?

Dr. RUBIN. I was a Member of the Senate, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. Is there another body, the Assembly?

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. The lower House in South Africa, the Assembly, I think—

Mr. MORSE. Hero we call it the other House.

Dr. RUBIN. The other House. We observed that practice in South Africa, too, sir.

In the other House, the House of Assembly, there was provision there for representation only of the Africans of the Cape Province. They were entitled to choose three representatives in the lower House. And they were elected in a broadly similar way, there were certain dif-

ferences in the system of election which I do not think I need to bother the committee with.

So in the lower House, just to complete the picture of the representation of Africans, until it was abolished, at the time, it had 153 Members, and there were three who represented the Africans of the Cape. The remaining 150 represented the 3 million whites of South Africa, and, of course, all the Members of that House were white.

Mr. MORSE. Why were these Africans of Cape Province so preferred?

Dr. RUBIN. That is a good question, if I may say so, sir. It goes back to the history of South Africa. The Cape Colony, which is one of the four colonies that combined to become the Union of South Africa, was the one colony that applied liberal principles under the influence of British ideas at the time, and it was the only colony at the time that the union came into existence where the African had a vote.

In the Transvaal and the Free State, some members of the committee may know, there was a constitution which said boldly, "There shall be no equality between black and white, in church or state." And in those colonies, the former Boer Republics, there was no question of any rights at all for the Africans.

In the Cape Colony there was a completely nonracial franchise. Anybody satisfying certain prescribed qualifications could vote, whatever the color of his skin or his race. And a part of the compromise reached in 1936 was to allow this special representation of Africans to continue in the Cape only.

Mr. O'HARA. I have in my hand, Doctor, a clipping from the Washington Star of today, Associated Press dispatch, from South Africa, about Helen Suzman. Do you know her?

Dr. RUBIN. I know her well, yes.

Mr. O'HARA. She is the only member of the opposition to apartheid in the Parliament now?

Dr. RUBIN. That is so. Whether she will continue to be able to speak for the Africans—she has been the only voice in the South African Parliament for the African people—I think is subject to considerable doubt. There is a general election due on the 30th of March, and all the indications are she will not be returned. She has done a magnificent job in South African Parliament.

Mr. O'HARA. Will you proceed, Doctor?

Mr. ADAIR. Could I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman.

Under what circumstances did you leave South Africa? Voluntarily?

Dr. RUBIN. Yes, I did leave voluntarily, Mr. Chairman. I in fact gave myself the pleasure of resigning from the senate, rather than waiting—it would have been a period of 6 months—to be kicked out like my colleagues were, because an opportunity presented itself. I was in fact invited by the Government of Ghana, at the beginning of 1960, to go to Ghana and to be the first director of an Institute of African Law and to take an appointment at the University there. It wasn't an easy decision, but I finally decided to do this, and I resigned from the senate in order to go to Ghana, and I was in Ghana for 18 months.

Mr. ADAIR. Then what brought you here?

Dr. RUBIN. From Ghana, I took an appointment at a university in the United Kingdom, the Queen's University of Belfast, and in 1961 I came over to the United States to read a paper on Ghana at a conference in New York, and it was while I was there that I was offered the appointment that I have since taken, the Chair of Comparative Government at Howard University. I accepted that appointment since 1962, and I have been there since then.

Mr. MORSE. You retain South African citizenship, sir?

Dr. RUBIN. No; I am a British subject.

Mr. O'HARA. Will you proceed, Doctor.

Dr. RUBIN. Lower down on page 7, Mr. Chairman, another illustration of the same provision of the same law:

An African who has, since birth, resided continuously in a town, is not entitled, as of right, to have living with him in that for more than 72 hours, a married daughter, a son who has reached the age of 18, a niece, a nephew, or a grandchild.

Let me emphasize here, Mr. Chairman, there have been numerous cases of prosecution of young men for committing the offenses of living with their parents without having the necessary permission to do so.

Then at page 9, statement No. 16, which touches on the point I made a moment ago:

Any policeman is entitled, without warrant, to enter and search, "at any reasonable time of the day or night," premises in a town on which he has reason to suspect that an African boy 18 years of age is committing the criminal offense of residing with his father without having the necessary permission to do so.

No. 17, on the following page:

In a township established for occupation by Africans in 1937, any policeman may, whenever he wishes, for any reason whatsoever, to inspect the dwelling occupied by a resident of the township, enter that dwelling at any time of the day or night.

No. 20:

A white person living in a town who employs an African to do any carpentry, bricklaying, electrical fitting, or other skilled work in his home, commits a criminal offense unless special exemption has been granted by the Minister of Labor; so also does any African who performs such skilled work in a town elsewhere than in an area set aside for occupation by Africans. Each is liable to a fine not exceeding 100 pounds, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 1 year, or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

No. 22 deals with the pass laws that members of the committee probably have heard of:

Any policeman may at any time call upon an African who has attained the age of 16 years to produce his reference book.

The reference book is a book which incorporates a vast number of what is known as passes, documents which control the man's right to move, right to seek work, right to be in an area, right to move from one area to another, and I have mentioned only a few of them:

If a reference book has been issued to him but he fails to produce it because it is not in his possession at the time, he commits a criminal offense and is liable to a fine not exceeding 10 pounds or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 1 month.

The jails of South Africa are filled with Africans who have been imprisoned for this offense, of being unable to produce a reference book.

No. 28, on page 12:

It is unlawful for an African worker to take part in a strike. If he does so he is liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding 500 pounds, imprisonment for a period not exceeding 3 years, or both such fine and imprisonment.

No. 30, Mr. Chairman, illustrates the principle of separate and unequal, that underlies South African race legislation:

If there is only one waiting room on a railway station, it is lawful for the stationmaster to reserve that waiting room for the exclusive use of white persons, and any nonwhite person willfully entering it commits a criminal offense and is liable to a fine not exceeding 50 pounds or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 3 months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

No. 37, on page 14:

No African, lawfully residing in a town by virtue of a permit issued to him, is entitled, as of right, to have his wife and children residing with him.

The point, if I may just try to make that clear, is that where an African has succeeded in obtaining a permit for himself it does not follow that his wife and children can accompany him. As a matter of fact, I think I can safely say in most cases she is not permitted to do so because the application of verwoerdian theory of separate homelands, is that if an African is allowed to have his wife with him in the white area, this will make him believe that he is entitled to be in the white area, whereas in terms of the theory of separate development his permanent home is in these homelands that have been set aside for him.

No. 38, Mr. Chairman, relates to what was one of the basic laws passed soon after this government came into power, on which the whole structure of racial separation rests. I suppose it is a matter of simple logic that if you plan to divide a society into rigid ethnic compartments you have to define the different ethnic groups.

I include in No. 38 this definition, this is simply an extract from the act, itself, the Population Registration Act:

A white person is "a person who (a) in appearance obviously is a white person and who is not generally accepted as a colored person, or (b) is generally accepted as a white person and is not in appearance obviously not a white person, but does not include any person who freely and voluntarily admits that he is by descent an African or a colored person, unless it is proved that the admission is not based on fact."

I inserted that definition, Mr. Chairman, because I think it is a fairly good indication of the kind of insanity that one is driven to in formulating definitions when one tries to build up a society in our day, in the 20th century, which is based on this compartmentation of human beings into watertight areas.

Mr. MORSE. In reading a portion of item No. 38, "A white person is a person who in appearance obviously is a white person," how do we reconcile that with the reference in Alan Paton's foreword: "I can tell of a man who lived as white and was then declared to be colored, who lost not only his wife but also his children." If general acceptance and appearance is controlling, how could this happen?

Dr. RUBIN. The answer is you have borderline cases. In order to enforce these provisions, the South African Government had to set up a board under the Population Registration Act, which consists of people whose tasks—

Mr. MORSE. To administer this quota portion?

Dr. RUBIN. Not only to determine whether a man is a member of one race or another, but where there is dispute to declare him—

Mr. MORSE. The test goes beyond general acceptance and obvious appearance, then?

Dr. RUBIN. No. You would have cases, a number of cases that came before the courts, where a man has concealed the fact that he in fact had a nonwhite ancestor, let us say, and he has succeeded in passing as white. But he is rather dark in appearance. What has happened in a number of cases that came before the board, and before the courts, is that sometimes for reasons of personal spite, someone made a report to the board, this man was called up, and a man who had lived as a white was declared by this board to be colored, and as Mr. Paton mentioned in his example, this has had the most tragic consequence.

I may say, of my own knowledge, that there are at least two cases I can recall of people who committed suicide when they were reclassified by a board, or in one was a case where it was anticipated there would be a reclassification.

Mr. MORSE. African blood must be very powerful blood to have this kind of effect.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. I think one is tempted to ask why if it is inferior, it is necessary to build a structure of laws of this kind.

Mr. O'HARA. Is the board subject to judicial review?

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. They are subject only to review on those limited grounds where they have shown a lack of bona fides, and that kind of thing, which in effect gives the board virtually a final discretion.

Mr. O'HARA. I am told in the United States we have a certain number of white Negroes, people in some cases their families keep away from them. And they continue to move in our society as whites.

If that should be the case in South Africa, would one go before this board, and would the finding of the board be final one way or the other?

Dr. RUBIN. It would be final to this extent, sir. It would declare the position to be that in the light of the information available. But one of the more vicious provisions of this law is one which entitles a board, at any time in the future, to review a decision it has made in the light of facts that have become available since.

Mr. MORSE. Are there any arithmetic tests established, I mean one-sixteenth, one sixty-fourth, one twenty-eighth?

Dr. RUBIN. No, this is excluded by the very reason that the criteria exclude ancestry, but rest entirely on acceptance or appearance.

Mr. MORSE. Which may be in fact inconsistent with what the facts actually are?

Dr. RUBIN. Correct. And, of course, to make it even more confusing, it has been held by courts that have been appealed to in some of these cases, that in deciding whether a man is white, on the basis of acceptance or appearance, the fact there is evidence of colored ancestry can be taken into account as a factor looked to by the court in coming to its conclusion.

Mr. MORSE. Even though the concept has no place in the law?

Dr. RUBIN. That is right.

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. O'HARA. Doctor, would you find it difficult to return to South Africa?

DR. RUBIN. Oh, I have no doubt, sir, that I would be refused a visa. Some of my less kind friends have suggested that the government would be delighted to have me back, and, of course, immediately I arrived they would apply one of their numerous laws to me and see that I was locked up.

I have been an outspoken critic of the government. Perhaps I can differentiate myself from many others, in this sense, and this is borne out by the pamphlet, that what I am saying today is what I have said consistently, I think almost since I started thinking about the situation in South Africa, and it is certainly what I said openly while I was a Member of the Parliament.

MR. O'HARA. You intimated, I think, and there was an article in the New York Times of March 20, this year, pointing out Helen Suzman might be defeated. Do you think she may be defeated?

DR. RUBIN. Oh, I think it is very likely she will be, sir, because all the indications at the moment are, and I think this is perhaps one of the frightening aspects of the situation in South Africa, that more and more whites are under the influence of the process of intimidation, being persuaded to support Dr. Verwoerd.

MR. O'HARA. Well, in the event she is defeated, is it likely that the government of South Africa will take legal action against her, or will attempt to exile her?

DR. RUBIN. They probably haven't the power to exile her since she is South African by birth. That is one of the few things they are not allowed to do in terms of the laws they have passed. But they could certainly restrict her activities in a number of ways. I think members of this committee will know, for instance, that Alan Paton is unable to leave South Africa because his passport was taken away from him.

Albert Lutuli, who has written a foreword to the second edition of my book, is a Nobel Peace Prize winner, a devout Christian, a man who has tried to live his whole life on the principles preached by Ghandi, is restricted to a tiny area, and it is a criminal offense for anyone to publish or disseminate in any way anything he says or writes.

MR. MORSE. Is a member of the legislature privileged in what he says in Parliament?

DR. RUBIN. Yes.

MR. O'HARA. Doctor, it is my understanding Harry Oppenheimer, who owns diamond mines in South-West Africa, is also an outspoken critic of the party; is that your understanding?

DR. RUBIN. I would qualify the word "outspoken." I happen to know Harry Oppenheimer, I used to see something of him when I was in Parliament. He, himself, was a Member of Parliament for some time. I would say he is gravely concerned about the situation in South Africa, but on the other hand he is closely associated with the group, the South African Foundation, which spends a great deal of its time trying to justify the situation in South Africa, although I understand from what I have read that it declined an opportunity to do so before your committee.

MR. O'HARA. Then you would describe him perhaps as a cautious critic?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, I might be prepared to accept that. I do know, I believe strongly, that he is gravely concerned about the future of the country, and he is known—may I add this, he is known to be a strong supporter of the Progressive Party, which is the party represented by Mrs. Suzman.

Mr. O'HARA. Proceed, Doctor.

Mr. CULVER, any time you have questions, ask the witness without addressing the Chair. We are proceeding informally.

Mr. CULVER. All right; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. RUBIN. The last statement in this little pamphlet, Mr. Chairman, that I wanted to read—the last two, Nos. 41 and 45—these relate to a law that went on the statute book in 1962, called the Sabotage Act. One mustn't be misled by the term "sabotage," there it is defined in very wide terms, and these two illustrations relate to that definition.

No. 41:

Any person who paints on the wall of any building (including a private residence) words which call for the grant of increased political rights for the African people, is guilty of the offense of sabotage and is liable, on conviction, to a sentence of imprisonment which must be for a period of not less than 5 years.

The law makes it mandatory for the judge to pass a sentence of not less than 5 years.

No. 45:

An African over the age of 14 found in possession of firearms may be convicted of the offense of sabotage, and is liable, on conviction, to the death penalty or to a sentence of imprisonment which must be for a period of not less than 5 years.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that these few illustrations that I have quoted and commented on will serve to give this committee some idea of the effect of this system of apartheid, to use the language of Alan Paton, on human beings.

An obvious question that might follow at this stage is, What has been the reaction of the African people to this kind of situation?

This progressive denial of civil rights and economic opportunities to the nonwhites, has led, in recent years, to violent resistance. If I may just comment shortly there: I would like to say that in my view the 12 million Africans in South Africa have shown almost unbelievable patience and tolerance in dealing with the situation. It was only in 1961 that you got the beginning of a movement out of the phase of what you might call negotiation, demonstration, nonviolent opposition, into a phase of violence and sabotage. And the response of the Government to that situation was not to try and come to terms with this resistance, but to counter it by building a powerful military force and setting up the apparatus of a police state, and the effect, in my view, of this action by the Government has been not to destroy this resistance, but to drive it underground.

I think the record shows quite clearly that most of the African resistance organizations, if not all of them, have been banned. Most of their leaders are either in jail or under restriction, like Albert Lutuli, or in exile. But, on the other hand, there are facts which show that resistance is continuing. Without spending a great deal of time on that, in 1965 there were two cases of Africans found in possession of explosives, and it was in 1965 that the Minister of Justice, Mr.

Vorster, himself, in effect, acknowledged the truth of what I am saying, by indicating that the Government had to take very serious steps to see that this resistance didn't break out again.

So, Mr. Chairman, in my considered view there is in South Africa today, a dangerous situation in which I see three dominant elements: Firstly, there is no dialog between the 3 million whites and the 14 million nonwhites in that country. I do not think I need add comment on that, Mr. Chairman. I am sure that the members of the committee will agree with me, that that in itself is a dangerous situation.

Secondly, there is the determination on the part of the present Government in South Africa, which I find frightening, to ignore utterly the bitter hostility of independent black Africans. The hostility, Mr. Chairman, of 800 million people.

And, thirdly, and this might perhaps be for the purposes of this committee the most serious of these three elements: The whole record of this Government's behavior, since it came into power in 1948, is one of deliberate defiance—I repeat those words, "deliberate defiance"—of the international community. Every effort made by the United Nations to bring about an improvement in the situation on the basis of negotiation and appeals, and so on—I am sure you, Mr. Chairman, are even more familiar than I am with this, has met with study contempt by Dr. Verwoerd and his spokesman at the United Nations.

This, Mr. Chairman, I cannot help saying, gives me a strange feeling when I think about it, because one immediately starts recalling the situation with Hitler, when he reached a stage where he decided to leave the League of Nations. Let me say, sir, in South Africa, talk, particularly in the heat of an election campaign, which you have at the moment, by nationalists, of getting out of United Nations, is by no means uncommon. The real risk, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, is that a continuance of apartheid will result in a bloody race war, which will involve the rest of Africa, and present perhaps the gravest threat mankind has known to world peace and order.

I would like the indulgence of the committee just for a minute or two longer to quote something very fresh on this question. It is from the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, which I received only yesterday, and I want to quote from an article by Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, I suppose one of the wisest and one of the most gifted African leaders.

This article called "Rhodesia in the Context of Southern Africa," touches on the South African situation, and I think it is important to have the views of an African leader of this kind.

I am quoting from page 375 of Foreign Affairs of April 1966, volume 44, No. 3, Dr. Nyerere says:

In South Africa, there is no longer even the pretense that citizens of different races are equal before the law, or in social and economic rights and duties. The separate but equal concept which was defeated in the United States in 1954 has been defeated in South Africa, too, but there inside of Africa it is the equal aspect which has been abandoned. In providing separate facilities for people of different races, the courts have ruled that the separate schools, housing, waiting rooms, and so on, do not have to be of equal standard. It is enough that they are separate. Africans can be and are treated as a subspecies of mankind. No legal or political restraint now prevents the white minority Government in the Republic of South Africa from imposing its harsh discriminatory will upon the African majority.

And then later he goes on to say:

It is conditions and attitudes of this kind which free Africa is determined to fight.

Over on the next page:

Racialism has become a self-justifying religion of survival—

This is in South Africa—

which demands ever increasing ruthlessness to protect its adherents against the hatred it has induced. Its doctrines of superiority are inculcated into the white community from the moment of birth. Its teaching of inferiorities dominates the lives of the nonwhites from a similar moment.

He goes on :

It now appears inevitable that sooner or later an overwhelming internal explosion will occur in South Africa and bring the whole present edifice of apartheid to an end. We can only pray that it is not followed by a mere reversal of the racial domination, for that would be the logic of the doctrines which are now being propagated by the South African Government.

The situation, Mr. Chairman, in my view, in South Africa today presents the United States as the leading power in the world today with an urgent challenge at two distinct levels. One, the level of morality, and, second, the level of international responsibility.

I think I have said enough on the first point. I do not think there is anybody who can question the enormity of the infringement of basic concepts of morality that is inherent in this whole system of apartheid.

As far as the second point is concerned, Mr. Chairman, the level of international responsibility, I do not know that I need say a great deal about that, either. I am talking to legislators, Members of Congress, of what is, whether we like it or not, the most powerful Nation in the world today. And where there is a threat of this kind of race war it seems to me that it is unthinkable that this challenge can be ignored. And if it is to be answered, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the only practical answer is economic sanction.

For 14 years, now, you have had repeated pleas by United Nations, as I mentioned, for negotiated change. They have fallen on deaf ears.

So in conclusion, I would say that the time has arrived for the power of international trade and investment to be used, not as the Verwoerd government falsely charges to destroy white South Africa, but on the contrary to help white South Africa, and all the other people in South Africa as well as the whites, to survive; that this power should be used to persuade the 3 million whites before it is too late, and it may even be too late, Mr. Chairman, to enter into a dialog with their 14 million fellow South Africans to participate fruitfully in the development of Africa as a whole, and to contribute to a world built on harmony, decency, and peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Doctor.

Doctor, I think you will agree with me that the United States would have no right to go into South Africa and say "Change your political system or your social customs." You would agree with me there, wouldn't you? But we do have the instrumentality of the United Nations, and if the Security Council of the United Nations should hold apartheid a threat to international peace you will agree that the United Nations would have the authority to vote sanctions?

Dr. RUBIN. I do, indeed, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. You mentioned the blood bath. You quoted my beloved and old friend, Julius Nyerere, saying unless apartheid is remedied that a blood bath is inevitable. Do you agree with that?

Dr. RUBIN. I wish I could say "No," sir, but I do agree. I am afraid all the evidence indicates there is no alternative, and I would like to add something I haven't said, that I regard this as an urgent matter. I think you have a situation in South Africa of such tension, at the present time, that a superficially minor incident, interference, and unhappily these things have occurred frequently in the past—interference by a white policeman with an African woman, in a township—can lead to violence which can within a very short time undermine law and order in a city like Johannesburg, or a city like Cape Town. I know those cities, Mr. Chairman, I have spent a great deal of time in them, and what I am saying I say with a full and deep sense of responsibility.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Adair.

Mr. ADAIR. I think, Mr. Chairman, you touched upon the thing that concerns a good many of us here, and that is the basic propriety of a committee of a legislature of one country examining into internal problems of another country. If the answer to that is that it is proper, then why ought not, for example, Britain, or other nations, undertake to do the same thing? Britain, particularly, with her background there, why shouldn't her Parliament be looking into this, and why shouldn't she be taking action?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, my immediate answer to you, sir, would be, in fact of course Britain has been doing it, but she uses machinery which differs from the machinery used in the United States.

I would suggest, with little hesitation, that barely a sitting of the House of Commons goes by without questions being put to a minister, without the matter being raised in debate, particularly in recent months, because of the Rhodesian situation. It is just that the particular machinery, which has become traditional in this country, isn't used by Britain. I haven't referred also to the large number of public bodies that are continually demonstrating and holding meetings, and so on, and so forth. There is, at the present time, a conference taking place in Oxford, dealing with South-West Africa, on the whole question as to what steps should be taken on the decision of the International Court of Justice, when the decision is handed down later this year. I think the British people are deeply concerned, and they have used their machinery in order to express their views.

Mr. ADAIR. Do you think the British people would be willing to support the British Government in strenuous action to change this situation?

Dr. RUBIN. Let me say at once, sir, the record so far indicates that the British Government, like the Government of the United States, has not been prepared to go so far as to agree to support sanctions—economic sanctions, but I would make two points on that: The one is that I think the judgment in the Southwest Africa case, if it goes against South Africa, is likely to alter that situation, because you will then have not only defiance of United Nations, if Dr. Verwoerd doesn't abide by the judgment, assuming its goes against South Africa, but you will have defiance of the judicial organ of the United Nations,

namely, the International Court, and in a way a threat to the very foundation of international order.

Mr. MORSE. I was going to observe we had that in the article 19 problem about a year ago.

Mr. ADAIR. There is precedent for that already, to the dismay of a great many of us, where the Court made that decision and the U.N. ignored it, or virtually so.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. I would say that wouldn't be quite the same situation. The circumstances are different. But I am not prepared to say there might not be a great deal in the argument you are using. Ultimately, Mr. Chairman, I suppose the answer is, Does the international community really believe, as I do, that if you do nothing in this situation you do run a grave risk of a race war which would inflame not only Africa, but certainly there is the risk that it will undermine the very nature of world order?

I haven't brought in the question of the cold war, Mr. Chairman, I deliberately didn't do that.

Mr. ADAIR. I was about to introduce that into the conversation.

Dr. RUBIN. You find Julius Nyerere puts it in his usual calm and wise way. The position of the 300 million Africans, Mr. Chairman—let me be as objective as possible at the present time—is this: They are weak, they are divided. They have God knows how many problems of their own. But, for heaven's sake, sir, let us not for a moment underestimate the emotional power of the commitment of these 300 million people to the eradication of the apartheid.

A man like Julius Nyerere, a civilized humanitarian, doesn't go to sleep at night without thinking about this gross insult, as he regards it, to the whole future of the African people.

Point No. 2, admittedly at the present time these African states are too weak to do anything about it alone.

Point No. 3, Mr. Chairman, if they cannot do it alone, they are going to seek assistance, and if they do not get assistance from us, obviously they are going to go elsewhere, and the elsewhere means Soviet Russia or Communist China. I don't think this is a matter that one needs spend a great deal of time arguing about. And there is, as I am sure members of the committee know, evidence to the effect that both Moscow and Peking have seen in this situation precisely the kind of opportunities they want for trying to further their aims and their desires.

Mr. O'HARA. Doctor, we appreciated your being with us. We want to give the other witness equal time.

Mr. CULVER, have you a question?

Mr. CULVER. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.

Doctor, are you fully persuaded that the unilateral imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S. Government would serve to weaken rather than strengthen the racial tensions that exist in South Africa today?

Dr. RUBIN. I think that is a very important question, and obviously it is a question that one must face up to. This whole question of sanctions has been gone into very thoroughly. There was a conference last year in England. United Nations, as you no doubt know, set up a committee to go into it.

There are all sorts of difficulties about sanctions, particularly in a situation where we believe that there should be the minimum of interference with private enterprise, with investment, and so on. But it seems to me that one gets back again to the very nature of the situation, that there are three things only that you can do, if you accept the fact, and I maintain the evidence on this cannot be challenged, that the South African Government is not prepared voluntarily to bring about a change.

There are three things that can be done. One is you do nothing. One is inactivity. The other is military force. And the third is economic sanctions.

It seems to me that assuming we decide it is unthinkable we should do nothing, the only thing that can be tackled is economic sanctions.

I would like to just bring out one other point. I do believe that even if it were indicated to the government of Dr. Voerwoerd in South Africa, that a nation like the United States, supported by the other countries of the Western World, was seriously considering sanctions, that that in itself might create sufficient pressure in the country to bring about this dialog that I have talked about between the whites and non-whites.

Mr. CULVER. How about a simple "yes" or "no" answer?

Dr. RUBIN. If you want my answer, "yes." Because I think there is no alternative short of allowing a situation to continue which can give rise to what I have described as something that might be the gravest race war in history.

Mr. CULVER. Do you think action for action's sake is always desirable?

Dr. RUBIN. No, I don't, no. That is not my approach at all.

Mr. CULVER. But you are fully satisfied, yourself, the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S. Government on a unilateral basis would serve to weaken rather than strengthen racial tensions?

Dr. RUBIN. I accept entirely what the chairman said, action that is taken should be taken through the United Nations. I merely dealt with the position of the United States.

Mr. CULVER. In the event diplomatic probing makes that impossible?

Dr. RUBIN. If it were impossible to do it through the United Nations.

Mr. CULVER. That is my question.

Dr. RUBIN. I would recommend that the United States should start exercising economic pressure, that it could take the form of withdrawing investment, or curbing investment. It could take the form of controlling trade. In other words, doing things that would indicate to this white minority in South Africa that the continuance of apartheid will hurt them economically. This is something that hasn't been tried yet.

Mr. CULVER. I have no further question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ADAIR. Could I just comment, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. O'HARA. Yes. After you then, Mr. Morse will have the last question.

Mr. ADAIR. I am infringing upon his time, but there is a comic strip character, that says sometimes ungrammatically "Let's you and him

fight." Would that be your position in this case, in the case Mr. Culver described where the U.N. doesn't move?

Dr. RUBIN. Oh, no, I am not thinking of it in those terms at all, Mr. Adair. I am thinking of it with a very real sense of deep responsibility.

Mr. ADAIR. Thank you.

Mr. MORSE. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you very much, doctor.

This subcommittee is conducting these hearings objectively, and perhaps the best proof of that is two witnesses today who I think take exactly opposite viewpoints.

Dr. Van den Haag, of New York University, will you give us first, Doctor, a little bit of your background?

STATEMENT OF DR. ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir. I am professor of social philosophy at New York University and I am a lecturer in sociology and psychology at the New School for Social Research, also New York.

Mr. O'HARA. What have been your activities in regard to South Africa?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I have recently visited the country in January. In fact, if I may say, one of the pleasures I had in this visit was to speak with Mr. Alan Paton, a prominent member of opposition, and one of the first questions I asked Mr. Paton was whether he is free or restricted in any way in his activities in South Africa, being perhaps the most prominent member of the most radical opposition to the Government. He said, no, he is not restricted. I asked—I asked Mr. Paton also whether his passport has been withdrawn. Mr. Paton assured me that he had not applied for a passport, therefore it couldn't have been withdrawn. He informed me furthermore he had been invited to Harvard University next year, I think, to give some lectures there, and I think he said he might consider going, in which case he will apply for a passport. But he assured me that he has not been restricted either within the country, nor has any request on his part to leave the country been denied, since he has not applied for any passport.

In this respect, I am sorry to note, that the committee has just been misinformed.

Dr. RUBIN. Might I interrupt on this, Mr. Chairman?

The fact is that Alan Paton's passport was withdrawn by the immigration authorities when he landed at the airport in Johannesburg on his return from New York in either 1960 or 1961, and he is at the moment without a passport. He may have told Professor Van den Haag he has not applied for a passport since that time. But the fact his passport was taken away is beyond any question at all.

We can settle this perhaps by referring the matter to the South African members here.

Mr. O'HARA. Well, I think the subcommittee would like to get away from personalities.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. What information I gave you comes from Mr. Paton who I thought would be an authority on his status.

If I may now, I would like to—

Mr. O'HARA. Proceed with your statement, please.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG (continuing). Refer to my statement.

I am glad, Mr. Chairman, to follow your invitation, and make available to you what information I have and what views on South Africa I have formed. My views and my information are based on reading and research and on a visit to South Africa in January 1966. During this visit I interviewed numerous South Africans, including businessmen, journalists, professors and students, as well as leaders of the opposition. Among the people I interviewed were white opposition leaders—such as Alan Paton and Anthony Delius—as well as Bantu, colored (mixed), and Indian government supporters and opposition leaders. However, I do not claim to speak for anyone but myself.

I think my views on the following questions may be of interest to you:

1. Is South African domestic policy with regard to its various population groups, and particularly the de facto and legal separation of and differentiation among them, contrary to any preexisting international norm, custom, or agreement?

2. What is the background, the purpose, and the effect of the present South African policy compared with previous and with alternative policies? Does it impair the welfare of all or part of the South African population?

3. What is the internal political situation in South Africa?

4. What is the external political situation? Do South African policies constitute a danger to peace? What are American interests and policies in South Africa, and what policies should we pursue?

1. Is South African domestic policy with regard to its various population groups and particularly the de facto and legal separation of and differentiation among them contrary to any preexisting international norm, custom, or agreement?

Essentially the present policy of the Nationalist South African Government has made formal (legalized) the policies pursued or allowed informally by all previous South African governments, namely separation and differential treatment of the various population groups. The location, the rights, and the opportunities of individuals may differ according to the population group to which they belong. This has always been the case with respect to the franchise and to jobs. In the course of legalizing this state of matters in detail, the present government has introduced it also into some situations and circumstances in which it did not exist before the present degree.

Separation of racial, ethnic, or cultural groups has been customary since biblical times, and is not contrary to any established international custom or law. Indeed, the very existence of nations testifies to it. We ourselves have discriminated in the past accordingly and do so at present, both in fact and in law. Thus, for example, Poles or Italians cannot immigrate to these shores according to their individual qualifications only, but also according to their national group membership (I presume that the Italian is equal to the Polish quota, according to the newly passed immigration law). If the Italian quota is

filled, a less qualified Englishman will be permitted, an individually more qualified Italian excluded, simply because he is an Italian. In short, we discriminate in terms of nationalities.

Mr. MORSE. Do you imply the Government of the United States has a responsibility to the nationals of another government? Does that distinguish between the two situations?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir; in this respect it does. But I will point out in a moment, if you will permit me, that we follow similar policies with our own nationals. My point here was that in international law, such discriminations have not only been allowed but have been customary.

Similar immigration policies prevail internationally: people are allowed or excluded not just individually, but also according to (national) group memberships; and in many cases once allowed to enter the country, rights such as the right to own enterprises, do business, own real estate, or pursue occupations and employments are dependent on ethnic group membership or nationality. (This is instanced in Liberia, Algeria, England, France, Cyprus, and so forth.)

Our policy toward Indians, toward Americans of Japanese extraction during the Second World War, and in other occasions, demonstrates that we have made ethnic and cultural distinctions, and located or relocated ethnic groups accordingly, when we thought ourselves justified in doing so. All nations, when the occasion arises, have behaved in similar fashion. Poland, for instance, expelled peasants of German extraction from the territory it now occupies, not on the basis of individual disqualifications, but simply because they were of German extraction.

In Africa, outside South Africa, ethnic differences did not always just lead to separation, but in some cases led to mutual, in others to unilateral, slaughter. Thus in Burundi, the politically powerful Watusi Tribe not only have separated themselves, but have totally oppressed the 85 percent of the population that consists of Bahutu (another tribe.) Recently, according to the New York Times (Mar. 10, 1966, p. 13), "The entire political leadership of the Bahutu people was exterminated" without any judicial proceedings. There is considerable danger, according to the New York Times, that Burundi may invade the neighboring Bahutu state of Rwanda, which had slaughtered its Watusi before. In some cases the attempts to integrate fairly similar ethnic groups resulted in an exacerbated hostility ending in expulsion or flight (e.g. among Greeks and Turks; or among Jews and Arabs; or in many formerly German territories).

At the present time this occurs in Iraq, where the Kurds have (vainly) complained to the United Nations.

Needless to say, on the Indian continent, a separation wisely was undertaken, leading to on the one hand Pakistan, on the other hand Hindustan. That separation was not undertaken without bloodshed; I understand about 4 or 5 million people were killed. But it probably reduced the bloodshed that would have occurred had there been no such separation. Indeed, to the extent to which the two major groups are not separated, there still are riots and bloodshed on an ethnic and religious basis. A similar situation prevails in the Sudan at the present time.

Instances of an arbitrary dictatorship depriving all or some of its subjects of human and political rights abound also in Eastern Europe and in Asia, and in Haiti (on which I understand no hearings are being held). I am somewhat puzzled as to why interest is directed almost exclusively to alleged instances of oppression and deprivation of nonwhites by whites, and not to actual instances of oppression of nonwhites by nonwhites and whites by whites. Such oppression very often has an ethnic basis, and it seems both frequent and dangerous. But in any case, oppression is bad, whether or not based on ethnic differentiation, and whether of, or by, whites, of, or by, Negroes. I am puzzled by the selectivity with which our attention is directed to comparatively isolated instances of oppression of nonwhites by whites and away from the more frequent and often more cruel oppression of nonwhites by other nonwhites. Perhaps this committee will inquire into the unacknowledged racism which bids us ignore oppression of nonwhites as long as it is done by nonwhites.

2. What is the background, the purpose, and the effect of the present South African policy compared with previous and with alternative policies? Does it impair the welfare of all or part of the South African population?

The policy of South African governments previous to the Nationalist government had been *de facto* to reserve desirable economic, educational, et cetera, advantages to whites although *de jure* nonwhites were granted equality. Even *de jure*, certain disqualifications existed. Thus, the franchise was never extended to the great majority of the inhabitants of South Africa.

The present South African government has declared it its policy to separate the various ethnic groups of the population while granting an equal if separate opportunity for cultural, economic, and social development to all of them. Thus, previously existing *de facto* and *de jure* group disqualifications are to be removed. There is no doubt in my mind that this is the actual policy of the government and not a disguise for the oppression of any one group. Indeed the South African Government has gone far on the road to implementation of this policy, as I intend to show. However it will undoubtedly take time to bring nonwhite South Africans anywhere near the economic and cultural level attained by the whites. To me it seems that the present policy is likely to shorten that time, compared to any feasible alternative, to bring the nonwhites forward to the level of the whites.

The Nationalist government has spent more than any previous government on the education, welfare and economy of the various non white groups. It has founded universities and colleges for nonwhites, where previously none existed. To be sure nonwhites previously were allowed to use educational facilities in common with whites. But only a very negligible number was able to do so. Under the present policy, the number of nonwhite college students is increasing at a fast rate. Ultimately the nonwhite educational institutions will be staffed by nonwhites too. The number of nonwhites who are being educated as lawyers, physicians, etc., is steadily mounting. It is the intention of the South African Government that each ethnic community should be enabled to create its own educational institutions and ultimately its own political, cultural, and economic leadership.

On this point, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to add some figures which I have with me here.

Eighty percent of the Bantus, the nonwhites, between the ages of 7 and 20, are literate. Fifty percent of the total Bantu population is literate. Eighty-three percent of the 7- to 14-year-old Bantus are attending school. School attendance increased by 800 percent since 1925, and by 100 percent since 1953. In 1948, $8\frac{1}{2}$ million rand (a rand is \$1.40) were spent on schools. In 1963, 25 million rand were so spent. In 1952, literacy in the total Bantu population was less than one-half of what it is now. It has increased faster than anywhere else in Africa. Let me add to this, that there are—that from 1954 to 1964, Bantu schools increased by 50 percent. The number of teachers in these schools increased from 21,000 to 32,000 (of which about 500 are white).

I have been informed, Mr. Chairman, that you have been told by a previous witness that of the total Bantu population only 8 percent attend schools, while of the total white population, 21 percent do attend schools. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would want to call to your attention, this is an incompetent type of comparison statistically speaking. Even if the figures should be correct, the percentage of the population that attends school does not depend only on school attendance of the school age population on the age structure of the population. That is, the percentage of the total Bantu population attending school is necessarily lower than that of the total white population attending school, if the Bantus have a higher proportional below school age children than the whites have. They do; therefore, a competent statistician would never present a percentage of the total population attending school, but only a percentage of the school age population, or otherwise the comparison becomes totally irrelevant and misleading. The figures I have given you are the figures of the Government census. Of course I cannot investigate beyond the census, but I assume the figures you received were also based on the same Government census.

I visited, myself, some of these institutions for nonwhites and I spoke with leaders of the nonwhite communities, members of boards of trustees, and so forth. My impression is that these institutions bid fair to reach a high degree of academic competence and that they, after having been looked upon askance originally by leaders of the communities they were to serve, now are enthusiastically supported and well attended. In fact all of them are overcrowded.

The nationalist government also favors spatial separation of the various ethnic groups. For instance, in Johannesburg most of the nonwhite inhabitants have been relocated from their slums to places such as Suwoto, a suburb. Housing in Suwoto and other places has been built by the Government. I have, myself, inspected the suburb consisting of small houses with gardens. The housing is considerably better than that available to most American Negroes; it is rented to nonwhite exclusively, at nominal rents between 5 and 9 rand—that is about \$15 at most a month—less than \$15. There are also houses built by the wealthier inhabitants for themselves. Over 1 million Bantus have been rehoused, which seems to be an enormous number for 10 years. I have myself inspected the suburb consisting of small houses with gardens. Most of the 500,000 Bantu population of Johannesburg

live there. The place consists of small houses, three to four rooms, usually, but there are also bigger houses built privately, each with a garden, each with running water, and so on.

Elementary and high schools seem to be sufficient, though they are overcrowded, even though attendance is not compulsory. I visited some of these schools and am highly impressed with the teachers, principals, and, not least, the students. There seems to be a universal eagerness to learn and teach, and I could only wish that our own teachers and students were half as enthusiastic. May I add it was a very moving experience to visit these places. Principals complained about teachers' salaries as did the principals of white schools which I also visited.

The suburb, as a whole, though relatively well served by nonwhite hospitals, physicians, lawyers, shops, and so forth, still lacks amenities such as parks for which land has been reserved and which I was assured would be created. The suburb is quite new.

In Johannesburg separate means of transportation are used for the various ethnic groups. However this is not uniform. Thus in Durban the same conveyances are used but with separate seating. Whereas in Cape Town mixed seating occurs in the same conveyances.

Many of these regulations are locally made and enforced, some are national in scope, still others are simply customary. I spent some time in East London where I found by all odds the best beach reserved for nonwhites. In Durban each population group tends to utilize the beach nearest to its habitation, and this seems also to be the case in Capetown.

Separation is also carried out through the so-called "Immorality Act" which prohibits marriage and sexual intercourse among people of different color or race. It should be noted that the prohibition of intermarriage simply legalized a *de facto* situation. The prohibition of interracial fornication on the other hand has greatly reduced, if not eliminated, the prostitution and exploitation of nonwhite females which were previously available to white males. The "Immorality Act" thus, though imposing some discomfort on white males, tends to be protective of nonwhite females. I am noting this even though as a matter of principle I am chary of any government regulation of voluntary association and disassociation, sexual or otherwise.

In pursuit of separation, the South African Government has also legalized the reservation of a number of job opportunities in white areas to whites. It has zoned areas in such a way that in those reserved and to be reserved for nonwhites, nonwhites will be able to exercise the professions of law, et cetera, whereas in white areas these professions will be reserved for whites, and so with a number of other professions and occupations. Similar provisions will be made for managerial, trade, and business activities. Ultimately residential zoning will reserve areas for whites or nonwhites, and in the areas so reserved those groups who are not permitted to reside there will be permitted to sojourn only in the pursuit of occupational interests or by special permission.

Although the legal form these measures are taking is new, they formalize a situation that has *de facto* existed before—with this difference. In the past areas and occupations were *de facto* reserved for whites, but there were none that were reserved for nonwhites; now

there are, and will be, areas in which a whole range of occupations is reserved for nonwhites, exclusively. Thus a nonwhite attorney will not have to compete with a white one; nor the trader, physician, accountant or skilled worker. For the time being at least such competition would be ruinous for nonwhites.

What has happened is for instance, that in nonwhite areas the Indian shopkeepers who usually traded for the Bantu, have not been allowed to settle. The Government, by an appropriate financial institution is financing Bantu businessmen to undertake the trade previously undertaken by Indians, who, according to rather widespread impression, exploited the Bantus.

On the whole, however, since the nonwhites in the past have had much less opportunity to acquire skills and education than the whites, the great majority is still confined to the less well-paying jobs. However, present educational measures of the Government bid fair to change this situation, as fast as can reasonably be expected.

I might point out that according to the Government census the average income of Bantu workers in manufacturing is about \$50 a month, that is about \$600 a year, which is far below the average income of white workers in the same occupations, but also far above the average income of nonwhite workers in any of the African areas other than South Africa. And it seems to me the appropriate comparison is to be made not so much between whites and blacks in South Africa, but rather between blacks in South Africa and blacks outside it. That seems to be, Mr. Chairman, the comparison that the South African and the outside South African natives themselves make, because we do find that there is a constant immigration of Negroes from outside South Africa who seem to be attracted to South Africa, either for economic or for other reasons.

The proportion of nonwhites in the more skilled occupations and professions, relative to the total nonwhite population in South Africa, does not seem to be less than it is in the sovereign nonwhite countries of Africa. But I expect that progress will in this respect be faster in South Africa.

Nonetheless some of the present job reservations to my mind are unnecessary and disadvantageous to nonwhites, and not advantageous to whites. They exist *de jure* and have existed *de facto* before because of the pressure of the unions of skilled white workers. These unions, frequently under Communist leadership, particularly in the gold mines, but also elsewhere, have made the advancement of nonwhite workers impossible. I may point out that unions in this country have been similarly successful in obstructing the advancement of nonwhite workers in many skilled occupations, and our Government has not seriously interfered. In this matter, it seems to me that the major difference between the South African and the United States Governments is that the former has been explicit and candid.

On the other hand, the introduction of strict legal separation has led to some hardships. Nonwhites in a number of cities had to leave residences where they had long lived. The same is true of whites, in regions zoned for nonwhites. In both cases, expropriation proceeded by eminent domain with the usual judicial safeguards. (The judiciary is regarded as fair and nonpolitical by all those, including opposition leaders, I had occasion to speak with. I have witnessed

judicial proceedings, and had the same impression myself.) In the enforcement of these new regulations, I feel that a number of hardships occurred that might have been avoided. I would, myself, question whether some of these regulations, particularly those in Cape Province, regulating the residence, occupation, etc., of coloreds (people of mixed, largely Malayan blood) are justified. This, however, seems to me an internal South African question, and I trust that the democratic process within South Africa will, in time, correct errors.

From a purely economic viewpoint, the absence of minimum wage laws, and equal pay for equal work regulations, has made it possible in South Africa to keep a far greater proportion of the total labor force employed than would be the case if such laws and regulations were to exist, as they do in the United States. Clearly employers will not employ less able or less skilled people, when they have to pay them the same wages as they do to the more able and more skillful. This is, of course, a major reason why unemployment among our own minorities tends to be greater than among nonminorities. And in South Africa they would not employ nonwhites at the same wages given whites, because white workers would insist on separate facilities which are costly to employers. Indeed, one reason why unemployment in this country in high for minorities is the presence of the above mentioned regulations which are alleged to be made in their interest.

Despite the unfavorable image of South African conditions, economic and otherwise, as they affect nonwhites, which has been created the world over and particularly by African political leaders, there is a steady influx to South Africa of nonwhites who prefer to work there feeling that the income they can obtain is superior to what they can obtain at home under their own native leaders, and that the opportunity and security afforded by South African regulations is superior to what they can hope for at home. Oppressive and totalitarian countries usually guard their frontiers to prevent the exodus of dissatisfied subjects. South Africa guards its frontiers to control the entry of natives who prefer life in South Africa—at the present time I am informed about 830,000 Bantus live in South Africa who have entered the country illegally.

The separate development policy of the present South African Government aims ultimately at instituting a number of "Bantustans." These should become reasonably self-sufficient nonwhite regions to be governed by elected nonwhite governments. The nonwhite inhabitants have the exclusive voting franchise, and the appropriate civil rights for political activity. The Government intends to provide economic and educational institutions, and, at least initially, to provide various other forms of aid. A number of institutions have been founded for the purpose, such as banks to make loans to nonwhite businessmen and industrialists, and so forth.

I visited the first of these region, the Transkei.

Let me add, Mr. Chairman, here to my statement that at the present time the totality of areas reserved for Bantus is larger than England and Wales together.

The Transkei itself, which I visited, and which has already gained a great measure of autonomy, and is entirely reserved for Bantus, is bigger than Belgium.

I saw native villages and interviewed leaders of the elected native government, as well as of the opposition, and finally some tribal chiefs. My impression is that the Government is seriously and honestly pursuing its policy of separate development.

In the United States, "separate but equal" has historically always been a dead letter. Perhaps it could have been implemented; but it never was. Moreover, American Negroes never had a separate culture they could possibly have been interested in preserving. Their native culture had been destroyed, as well as their native language, skills, religion, family organizations, and so forth, when they came over here as slaves.

In this respect the situation in South Africa differs fundamentally. The great majority of South African nonwhites are members of tribal communities with their own language, culture, family organization, religions, rituals, and so forth. Only about one-third of the Bantus live in urban areas. Separate development will permit them to keep and develop their own culture—a fundamental human right. Integration in South Africa would mean basically what it has meant to the American Indian; that is, a loss of tribal language, culture, and custom. It is nonetheless advocated by a small group of urbanized and detribalized nonwhite intellectuals, who have lost contact with and interest in their native tribal cultures and would prefer membership in the white community. This small group is encouraged in turn by an equally small, motley group of white ideologues, who wish to obliterate all cultural differentiation associated with race or color. Many members of this small white group favor Marxist differentiation according to class. Many, though not all, are Communists, and wish to achieve their goals by violence.

I do not generally favor laws to bring about either association or disassociation of different groups. I prefer to leave this to the individuals concerned. However, when there are vast differences of cultures, ways of life, family organization, and attitude, and when the groups each possess viable cultures of their own, measures to separate them may be in the common interest to preserve native cultures and prevent clashes. I believe that the Indian tribes would have survived under far happier circumstances than they find themselves in now had the U.S. Government pursued a policy similar to the one now pursued in South Africa.

It is not my impression that integration would be desirable, or that it is desired by the great majority of South African nonwhites. On the other hand, it is my judgment that 90 percent of South African whites would leave the country, or fight, rather than allow it to be dominated by the nonwhite majority, or to be integrated with it. Even if integration is desirable, which in the South African circumstances is not the case, I think that given the realities I have just mentioned, any attempt to bring it about would be harshly disadvantageous not only to the whites but also to the nonwhites whose prosperity for the time being depends on an industry that they would not be capable of running without the whites that run it now.

South Africa is the major industrial country in Africa, and its industry could be vastly beneficial to the African continent if the rest of it were to follow more stable and rational policies than it does at this point.

Let me now briefly summarize, Mr. Chairman, my views and observations on separate development:

- (a) Separation de facto has always existed in South Africa.
- (b) It now has been legalized.
- (c) Whereas in the past it only denied opportunities for white jobs to nonwhites in white areas, it now opens opportunities to nonwhites in nonwhite areas which are being created legally.

(d) In the white areas, the de facto situation of the nonwhites has not deteriorated to any great extent. I am informed, Mr. Chairman, that the income of nonwhites has increased in the last 4 years by an average of 6½ percent per year.

In the nonwhite areas, the situation of the nonwhites is likely to improve greatly.

(e) The educational situation of nonwhites has greatly improved and will improve further.

(f) Integration in South Africa seems far less possible or advantageous for either group than separate development.

(g) The separate development may lead to sufficient elevation of nonwhite educational and economic welfare to make slow ultimate integration feasible.

(h) I believe present policies to be both desirable and irreversible, and any attempt at radical change to be likely to bring disaster.

(i) Finally, basic policies must, however, be distinguished from the variety of big and small measures taken for their implementation. These range from the sensible and the necessary to the inept and unnecessary, and even cruel.

Mr. Alan Paton, an author of worldwide reputation and a well known and adamant opponent of present government policy—he forthrightly describes himself as favoring integration—described this policy to me as “a mixture of cruelty and idealism.” I believe we have focused exclusively on the cruelty which, to be sure, does occur, although at its worst it cannot be compared with the cruelty of black governments against their own subjects or that of Communist governments against theirs. We have disregarded idealistic intentions and accomplishments, as well as the great hope the policy offers for the future of all races in South Africa, largely because it differs from the policy, which under very different circumstances we have seen fit to apply in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I beg your indulgence for a few more minutes and I shall be finished with my statement.

The next question I want to briefly discuss is the internal political situation in South Africa.

The present nationalist government came into power by a majority vote of the franchised population, which is essentially the white population of about 3,300,000. Incidentally, while I am at it, I may state according to census figures the Bantu population is 11,645,000. The colored population, 1,650,000. And the number of Indians is about half a million.

The nonwhite population never had the franchise in South Africa, except for the colored (mixed) of Cape Province, whose franchise has become more restricted than it was, and with the exception also of the Bantu, just mentioned by Dr. Rubin in his testimony.

Essentially, the present government has left the political rights of the white population unimpaired, with a few exceptions to be noted below. As a result, there is a vigorous opposition press including all the English language press in South Africa. There is no noticeable censorship; bookstores, for instance, freely sell books of such American authors as James Baldwin and others. The opposition is free to and does engage in political activity.

I found Mr. Anton Delius quite unimpeded according to his own statements, and so did I find Mr. Alan Paton. Mrs. Suzman has not, as far as I know, complained about interference with her political activities.

Whereas the main support of the Nationalist (Government) Party in the past came from the "Afrikaner," who speak "Afrikaans" and are largely of Dutch descent, the main support of the United Party came from the English language minority. This numerically most important opposition party which previously had been the Government party, does not have a program essentially different from that of the Nationalist Party. Perhaps as a result of that, a Progressive Party split off from it and has one representative in parliament, Mrs. Helen Suzman. A Liberal Party headed by Alan Paton also exists, but has obtained no parliamentary representation. And seems to be largely a debating society.

Finally, now, a group split from the Government Nationalist Party feeling that its policies were too pronative. This is the Republican Party, which feels that the Government's policies are too pronative. And that, above all, too much money is being spent on the Bantus.

My impression is that in the election forthcoming at the end of March, the Nationalist Party will gain a sweeping victory. Whereas, previously the English speaking, and the Jewish community, largely voted for the opposition, the government's policies, on the one hand, and the external pressures against South Africa, on the other, are likely to unite the voters behind the leadership of the Nationalist Party. Though undoubtedly the United Party will remain well represented in Parliament, I doubt that Mrs. Suzman will be reelected. In a sense this is regrettable because, I believe, any government benefits by effective opposition. The American policy of interference in domestic South African affairs is likely to have contributed to the forthcoming defeat of the opposition, which will not occur because of intimidation, but because many South Africans now feel that to be in opposition to the present Government party, is as it were, unpatriotic. We have created this feeling by statements and acts, taking an attitude that seems hostile, not only to the South African Government, but to South Africa itself.

Although the democratic freedoms exist in South Africa, and neither nonwhite opposition leaders in the Transkei, nor white opposition leaders elsewhere had substantial complaints at government interference with their political activities, there are laws on the books which could be abused to restrict democratic freedoms. The Government is empowered to confine people, and prevent them from publishing, or engaging in political activities. This measure can be taken without trial. It has been directed, so far, against persons that can be reasonably suspected of attempting violent subversion, but it could easily be abused, even if it has not been. Such measures are explained

as necessary in view of the ostracism and external pressure to which South Africa is subjected. It is to be hoped that they will become unnecessary, and that they will be eliminated as South Africa is permitted to deal with its domestic problems without foreign interference. We in the United States have traditionally claimed this right for ourselves, and should be willing to grant it to others. Nonetheless, our activity, or support of the activity of others, has contributed to threats to democracy in South Africa.

May I call the attention of the committee in this connection to an article that appears in the New Yorker Magazine, this current issue, dated March 19, on page 47. The story deals with a visitation, by the security police to Mr. Anthony Delius' house. If you will read this article you will see that Mr. Delius is clearly hostile, both to the laws that made the visit possible, and to the visit itself, but you will also see that although he and his wife could not restrain themselves from acting discourteously to the police that investigated them and came to their house, the police itself was entirely courteous and behaved in an entirely correct manner.

I do not think that it was Mr. Delius' intention to convey this impression, but nonetheless I think that is the impression you will get from reading the article.

I come now to the final question I want to briefly discuss, dealing with the external political situation.

(4) Do, then, South Africa policies constitute a danger to peace? What are American interests and policies in South Africa, and what policies should we pursue?

South African policy seems to be very clearly one of nonaggression and noninterference. There are no signs of aggressive intentions. South Africa has remained neutral in the disputes between England and its former colony, Rhodesia. Unfortunately we have not.

It has continued trade relations with both. It seems ready to continue trade relations with America on a normal basis. Unlike many of the totalitarian states in Africa, it has not received foreign aid from us.

Complaints that South Africa's policies somehow constitute a danger to international peace appears to originate with governments who are themselves inclined to attack South Africa and represent their inclination to do so as a danger to peace, yet, somehow finds South Africa guilty of endangering peace. That is the prospective victim of aggression is accused of causing the violence that is to victimize it—and thereupon is to be denied arms even by our own Government. In effect, they complain about their own intentions—not about South Africa's. They justify their aggressive inclination by declaring their dissatisfaction with South African domestic policies. Not being able to, or willing, to take the risks of military action against South Africa themselves, these governments are trying to push, by means of the United Nations, the United States, and other governments toward military intervention. I may point out the United Nations itself, is not a body that can intervene in any State. Whatever intention is undertaken by the United Nations is in effect intervention by the nations constituting it, largely, the United States, as it has been in the Council.

These activities indeed constitute a danger to peace, but this danger is best minimized by assuring the governments in question that the United States will in no way support any form of military intervention in South Africa; and further by persuading them to devote their

energies to the improvement of their own domestic policies which oppress their inhabitants whether by disorder, corruption, instability, and incompetence, or by intention, far more than the South African Government, at worst, could conceivably oppress the nonwhite inhabitants of South Africa.

Our traditional foreign policy has been to oppose aggression anywhere, and to allow each nation to govern its own territory even when we did not approve of governmental policies, provided it did not threaten its neighbors or the international community. It seems clear to me that it would be in our interest to pursue this policy with regard to the Republic of South Africa. Specifically, I would urge that we do not try to impose policies that we have decided to follow in our own territory with regard to nonwhites, in a totally different situation and under circumstances in which we have no right to impose anything, and in which any action that we might take would not only be contrary to the interests of the local population, but also to our own. We should recognize in South Africa a force for stability on that troubled continent; a source of industrial development for it; practically the only stable democratic country on it, and a potential ally against Communist subversion anywhere.

Thank you.

Mr. O'HARA. Doctor, for purposes of identification, you were a witness, were you not, for South Africa in the hearing before the International Court?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir; but I would like to point out that that was before I visited South Africa, and that I testified on purely theoretical issues, obviously, since I had no knowledge of anything in South Africa.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would ask as a courtesy I be exempted from answering any questions about these proceedings since the proceedings have not been concluded, and are *sub indice*, and I would not want to appear—

Mr. O'HARA. No, that would be highly improper for me to ask you anything about the proceedings, themselves. The Court has not yet ruled.

I believe you also are a director of the American-African Affairs Association, Inc., are you not?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I think so, yes.

Mr. O'HARA. Beg pardon?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I think so, yes.

Mr. O'HARA. How old is that organization?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. To be frank, I have never, so far, attended a meeting of the board of directors, and I am not altogether sure when it has been founded. Its activities so far have consisted of reprinting a number of essays and statements, and I am not frankly too well informed about what it is doing. I am not saying this to in any way detach myself from it. I am just not able to give you much information.

Mr. O'HARA. Did you pick up the bills when you went to South Africa last January?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, I went at the invitation of the South African Government, and the South African Government, naturally, picked up the bills.

May I point out, though, that I went with the clear stipulation that I would be free to see anyone, anywhere, that was willing to see me, and I spent, I guess, three-quarters of my time seeing members and leaders of the opposition and I may say the South African Government in no way interfered at all with any of my activities.

Mr. O'HARA. Then you came back to our shores with substantially the same ideas that you had when you left, did you not?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, I would say not, Mr. Chairman. As you know, on theoretical grounds I would be willing to say that under certain circumstances separation is useful. Before I went to South Africa, however, I was under the impression that separation had been used there to disguise oppression, as it had been used for many years in our own South. It was my visit to South Africa that convinced me that this is not the case.

Mr. O'HARA. Doctor, I received a report that a Pitney-Bowes meter is used by the American-African Affairs Association in the office in New York; is that right?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I greatly doubt it, but I have no information whatsoever. If that is the case, as a director of that organization, I would object. Furthermore, I have not, as a director of that organization, been informed of this, and knowing the persons in charge I would find it most unlikely that this would have happened without informing the board of directors. They have been very scrupulous in writing letters about everything they do. I have been fairly unscrupulous in not following this very carefully, but this I would have noticed.

Mr. O'HARA. Well, is it true that the American-African Affairs Association, Inc., supplies mailing lists to the Office of Rhodesian Affairs?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I really couldn't tell you. I don't know.

Mr. O'HARA. What information—

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I would not, incidentally, were this matter to come before me, as a director, as it has not, and would I have before me a letter of this Rhodesian agency asking whether such mailing lists would be made available, I would certainly vote for their being made available.

I should also vote for such mailing lists being made available to Dr. Martin Luther King, should he be interested. I would make them available to anyone interested.

Mr. O'HARA. You say if it were brought to your attention as a director you would vote to furnish them these mailing lists?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Right.

Mr. O'HARA. Is this organization registered under the Foreign Agents' Registration Act?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I certainly don't think so. And I don't think that making mailing lists available to a foreign embassy, or a domestic agency, would compel such registration. I am sure that the association has legal counsel, and has inquired about the matter.

Mr. O'HARA. Well, as a director, can you furnish me the name of the legal counsel?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, sir; I don't have that with me. I am sorry.

Mr. O'HARA. How many members of this association do you know?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Well, I know perhaps I guess half a dozen. I do not know how many members we have, frankly.

Mr. O'HARA. Who is the treasurer?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I am terribly sorry, but I am not able to tell you.

May I add, Mr. Chairman, I am a member of a variety of organizations and boards. I am a fellow of the American Sociological Association, a fellow of the Royal Economics Society, numerous other associations, and if you were to ask me who the treasurer is, or who the chairman is, who is getting the mailing lists, I would be, I am afraid, unable to tell you.

Mr. O'HARA. Are any of those organizations furnishing mailing lists to the Rhodesian people?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I do not know, but I think if the Rhodesians were to apply, I certainly would vote for furnishing them these mailing lists indeed. I believe the Rhodesians, and anyone else, if they have something to say, and wish to address it to members of any association of which I am a member or director, I would certainly be willing to let them do so.

Mr. O'HARA. And despite the fact that the U.S. Government has joined in invoking sanctions against Rhodesia?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I oppose these sanctions, and I think it is my right as a citizen of the United States to so oppose them, and to try to persuade my fellow citizens to oppose them with me. The conflict between Rhodesia and its former master, England, is a conflict between England and one of its ex-colonies, which I think is of no interest at all to the United States. As far as I know, Rhodesia has committed no hostile acts to the United States whatsoever, and I certainly do not favor a policy hostile to Rhodesia.

Mr. O'HARA. Is this association receiving any funds from organizations that are fighting American labor?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I wouldn't know, sir; but what organizations, may I ask, do you have in mind?

Mr. O'HARA. Do you know?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I don't know, either. I don't know what organizations are fighting American labor.

Mr. O'HARA. I call attention to your statement on page 14: "From a purely economic viewpoint, the absence of minimum wage laws, and equal pay for equal work regulations, have made it possible in South Africa to keep a far greater proportion of the total labor force employed."

This implies that you are against the minimum wage laws, are you not?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir; I am.

Mr. O'HARA. You are? Are you opposed to equal pay for equal work?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir; I am.

May I add, Mr. Chairman, that in this opposition I am joined by practically all American economists I am acquainted with, and I may quote or name a few. I am joined by Professor Stigler—

Mr. O'HARA. That isn't necessary. I want to know what you think.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Oh, I certainly, as I indicated, am quite opposed to equal pay for equal work, and I am quite opposed to minimum wage

legislation, as are practically all economists, because they are disadvantageous to the people that are supposed to benefit from them.

Mr. O'HARA. Were you employed by the South African Government to testify at the Court of International Justice as an expert?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Oh, no; I am not employed. I was asked.

Mr. O'HARA. Did you pay your own expenses there?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, no; my expenses were paid, but I would not call this an employment relation.

Mr. O'HARA. Were there any fees paid?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I got a fee of \$100 per day, but I still would not call it an employment relation. I am testifying in Federal court next week, and I will get a fee from the U.S. Attorney's Office, and my expenses would be paid, but I would not regard myself as an employee of the U.S. Attorney's Office. My relationship to the lawyers acting for the South African Government was exactly the same as it is for the lawyers acting for the U.S. Government in this case, that is, as an independent expert. I am called to give my views, as I am giving them before this committee, which I hope will pay my fees, without employing me, and that does not, it seems to me, commit me, as you must have noticed, Mr. Chairman, to share the views of the committee.

Mr. O'HARA. Yes; I can assure you your expenses here will be paid.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Thank you, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. We treat all witnesses alike. Mr. Adair.

Mr. ADAIR. Doctor, you spoke early in your statement about—you gave us some statistics about education, which I thought were very helpful. Now, a question which we have tried to explore previously is as to the quality of the education which I suppose cannot be statistically demonstrated.

Would you address yourself briefly to that, as to the comparative qualities of the education?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir. When I was in South Africa, most schools were closed, it was the vacation period, summer there is in January, that is when I was there, so I was able to attend fewer than I would have liked.

About the schools that I did attend, and let me point out my visits were improvised, they were not staged or organized by the Government. I merely said, while riding in a car, this is a school, let us see whether we can visit it, and then I would speak with the principal, who would take me to any class I designated.

The most lasting impression I had, which let me assure you once more was a moving one, occurred while I was in a class of, I would say, about fifty 9-year-old ones. It was—and I have never seen this in an American school, and I have visited many American schools—hanging on the lips of the teacher. They were getting an English lesson. The teacher would say to them "What is this," and they would raise their hands and say "This is a book," and then the whole class would repeat "This is a book," and the teacher would explain the grammar, and so on, and so on.

There was no noise, no whispering, the teacher seemed to teach with great enthusiasm. I was very impressed by this. I have not had a chance, because they were closed at that time, to visit—which I would have liked to do—institutions of higher education. But I have the

impression that from speaking with the trustees, that the quality will be high, and the reason for this is this, that the professors teaching there will have their degrees from the South African universities, and they will be people that have been entitled to teach in the South African white universities.

Now, this right to teach in the South African white universities is not given lightly. It is far easier to become a professor here than it is to become a professor there. They follow the English, and continental system there. Ultimately, these native universities will give their own degrees, and will probably be staffed by their own people. But for the time being the type of people which staff them are simply controlled by the South African universities, and these universities, I may add, are mostly staffed by people who are in opposition to the Government. It depends a little bit—the English-speaking universities tend to be in opposition to the Government. The African-speaking universities are more friendly to the Government.

At Cape Town, for instance, about 90 percent of the professors there are bitterly opposed to the present Government policies. I would think the quality is likely to be high, perhaps too high.

Mr. ADAIR. Now, with Dr. Rubin, and with almost every other witness that has been before us, we have explored the opinion as to the likelihood, some place down the road, of armed conflict in this part of the world. You have addressed yourself to that subject in your statement, and thought that this is a threat exterior to the Republic of South Africa, rather than interior. Would you enlarge just a little upon that? Suppose that the practice or the policy of apartheid at this time is continued, would you see some place down the road armed conflict in this part of the world?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Well, let me, with your permission, divide my answer into two parts.

As far as my own experience is concerned, I have found those native South Africans I spoke with far more friendly than I had found most of our Negro citizens to a white person in this country. They are hospitable, they are friendly, they are pleasant. I am not speaking of the personnel one meets in hotels, professionally friendly, but people who I saw in villages, houses I visited, and so on, always by my choice.

I furthermore like to walk, and so I walked at considerable length in the evening, and at night, in Johannesburg. I did this originally with some fear because, well, I wouldn't want to walk at night in Harlem, in New York, frankly. I was assured there was no danger. On that assurance I did take my walks, and I did certainly not find that there was any danger to myself.

Now, I do wish to make clear this is a small example, and maybe far too small. It may be different elsewhere, or at different times. I do not think one should rely too much on such superficial impression, but this is my impression for what it is worth.

In the long run, more theoretically speaking, I believe that the native South Africans are economically considerably better off, and educationally, and in terms of welfare services, than they have been in the past, and it seems to me to be the considered policy of the Government to constantly increase the expenditures on these measures. It seems to me very likely that the creation of independent enclaves,

in which they are going to have self-government, in which they can vote, but whites cannot, and from which whites will practically be excluded, and so on, it is likely to make for far more peaceful, rational relations than have existed heretofore. I do not know of any major attempts at violence in the last few years.

Mr. ADAIR. My final question, Mr. Chairman.

From something in your statement I gathered that you thought that the practice of apartheid would in the course of development pass away within the next few years. Did I correctly understand you?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, sir; but I was a little equivocal, not as clear as I should have been.

Right now I think the practice of apartheid or separate development is going to increase. There is a further separation, and the separation will be more strict. But my own view, not shared, incidentally, by South African politicians, is that as the Bantustans, as they are called, will become powerful, they will have enough force to compel—if they so wish—integration; and that that integration will no longer be spurned as much by whites as it is now, because the people who then would want integration would not be people so greatly different in their level of living, in their education, in their behavior, and so on, as they are now. So that 50 years from now, it seems to me, there may be a chance for such an integration, if it is desired.

Mr. ADAIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Culver.

Mr. CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Van den Haag, where did you receive your Ph. D.?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. New York University.

Mr. CULVER. What is an adjunct professor of social philosophy?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Adjunct means he is not there full time.

Mr. CULVER. I see.

How long have you been on the faculty?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I have been there something like 16 years.

Mr. CULVER. What is the nature of your course load, at the present time? Do you teach a course?

Dr. VAN DER HAAG. Yes, I do, indeed. I teach courses in social philosophy. That depends on how much time, what the university wants, and what I want.

Mr. CULVER. Are you paid on the basis of the number of classes you teach?

Dr. VAN DER HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CULVER. Do you consider that employment?

Dr. VAN DER HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CULVER. I am rather intrigued by your definition of employment. You suggested you received \$100 a day to testify on behalf of the South African Government. Do you consider that employment?

Dr. VAN DER HAAG. I do not. I also may point out this involves a considerable financial sacrifice for me.

Mr. CULVER. That doesn't go to the question of employment, how you characterize income.

Dr. VAN DER HAAG. I think hiring an independent expert for a particular task, as hiring a lawyer, or hiring a physician, does not constitute employment. And it is not so generally considered.

Mr. CULVER. Do you pay income tax on those \$100?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, I do.

Mr. CULVER. Why do you do that?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I pay income tax also, since I am in private practice, if one of my patients comes to see and pays me, but he doesn't employ me.

Mr. CULVER. What if the South African Government comes to you and asks you to testify for 3 days. You submit a bill and they don't pay it. What would you do?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I would be out of luck.

Mr. CULVER. You would consider legal action?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I would.

Mr. CULVER. On what basis? Breach of employment contract.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. On the basis of services rendered.

I would like to ask the lawyer what the basis is for serving.

Mr. CULVER. I think that is what he might suggest represents the basis of your suit.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I am not a lawyer and I am willing to accept your suggestion.

Mr. CULVER. Would you pay income tax on the \$100?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I would on any income received, whether for employment or services rendered.

Mr. CULVER. Doctor, may we have short answers, unless I inhibit your response.

How long were you in Africa?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Three and a half weeks.

Mr. CULVER. How long?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Three and one-half weeks.

Mr. CULVER. Does that constitute your full and complete exposure to the African Continent?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, not to the continent. I have gone to the Congo and other places in Africa.

Mr. CULVER. Would you for the purposes of the record state when those were and how long a duration?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. That is going to make greater demand on my memory than I can fulfill. That was during the trouble in Katanga some years ago. I don't remember how long ago that is, frankly, 3 or 4 years ago perhaps.

Mr. CULVER. Did you visit Angola at that time?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, but I visited Mozambique on this (present) occasion, incidentally, for 2 days.

Mr. CULVER. Do you make a practice of lending your name to organizations when you know so little about their policies and their philosophies as you apparently do with your present association?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Sir, I do know a great deal about the ideas of the association to which you refer. I haven't lately had time to follow all their policies, and I do normally, with pleasure, lend my name to organizations, the basic purpose of which is identical with my own.

Mr. CULVER. Would you, for the purposes of the record, submit what you understand the policies and purposes of this organization to be?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir, I think that the policy and purpose of the organization is to—

Mr. CULVER. For the record, if you would—just for the record. If you would be kind enough to have that submitted to the record.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. You would want that in writing?

Mr. CULVER. Yes, I would appreciate that.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes.

(The information requested follows:)

**AMERICAN-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
550 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.**

Cochairmen: William A. Rusher and Dr. Max Yergan; **Treasurer:** Robert R. Richardson, and **Secretary:** Theodore Lit

PROSPECTUS

Starting in the early 1930's—and for a generation thereafter—American understanding of China was pretty much in the hands of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Because there was no real competition, the IPR and its intellectual leadership became the only available group of American "experts" on Chinese affairs. Their expertise permeated the thinking of the American intellectual community and helped to shape American foreign policy. The disastrous results of this situation—fostered by a near-total absence of opposition—are all too well known. Fallacious interpretations of events in mainland China were an important factor in making possible the Communist takeover.

A similar situation exists today in regard to Africa—another "sleeping giant." The field is largely in the hands of semiprofessional "liberals." Through various "scholarly" publications and organizations—such as the American Committee on Africa—they repeat the same intellectual blunders in regard to developments in Africa as did the IPR in regard to developments in China: emotionalism, naivete, wishful thinking, and a Pavlovian "liberal" view of history. Through a default in the exposition of differing points of view, another intellectual and political vacuum is being created which is capable of doing as much damage as was done by the IPR.

In an effort to fill this vacuum in some measure, the American-African Affairs Association has been organized. What follows is a brief outline of the individuals involved, the purposes of the association, its preliminary plans, and the estimated budgetary requirements to enable the association to carry out its work during the next 12 months.

THE OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND MEMBERS

Cochairmen: William A. Rusher and Dr. Max Yergan.

Treasurer: Robert R. Richardson.

Secretary: Theodore Lit.

DIRECTORS (INCLUDING THE ABOVE)

Lawrence Fertig
Hon. Loy W. Henderson
Dr. Thomas Molnar
Prof. Charles E. Rice

George S. Schuyler
Prof. Ernest van den Haag
Leon Well

MEMBERS (INCLUDING THE ABOVE)

Prof. James D. Atkinson	Prof. Reginald D. Lang
Prof. Patrick M. Boarman	Victor Lasky
Prof. Anthony T. Bouscaren	Nell McCaffrey
L. Brent Bozell	Edwin McDowell
Jameson G. Campagne	J. Daniel Mahoney
John Chamberlain	Frank S. Meyer
Dr. Philip M. Crane	Rev. Vincent P. Micelli, S. J.
Ralph de Toledoano	D. Thomas Miller
John Dos Passos	Prof. Gerhart Nlemeyer
Donald M. Dozer	Michael A. Padev
Dr. Stephen Enke	Dr. Melchior Palyi
Clifford Forster	Prof. Sylvester Petro
William J. Gill	Henry Regnery
Prof. Jerzy Hauptmann	William F. Rickenbacker
Henry Hazlitt	Prof. David N. Rowe
Dr. Walter Darnell Jacobs	Prof. Edward J. Rozek
Frank J. Johnson	William S. Schlamm
Dr. Walter H. Judd	Prof. William S. Stokes
Dr. Russell Kirk	Prof. Stephen J. Tonsor
George F. Koether	Nathaniel Weyl
Mrs. Irene Corbally Kuhn	Prof. Francis G. Wilson
Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane	

PURPOSES

Nowhere in the world today are the winds of change blowing more forcefully than in Africa. Until only a few years ago, almost the whole of this enormous continent was occupied and administered as colonies of the principal powers of Europe. Only here and there did individual nations maintain a precarious independence; and often even this was only nominal. Today, as the wave of European control recedes, a score or more of infant nations have sprung into being—many of them with little or no political experience, and almost all of them without the economic strength to make their way alone.

Moreover, this vast change has occurred in the midst, and near the climax, of that struggle between the major powers of the world that is known as the cold war. Each side in this great confrontation, on whose outcome depends the future of all mankind for centuries to come, feels compelled to move into the vacuum left in Africa by the departure of the colonial powers—seeking political allies, military footholds, and economic advantages. The new nations of Africa, as well as the few strong and old communities on the continent, are forced to make decisions in relation to this struggle for which they are, in almost every way, unprepared.

These formidable complex developments are rendered still more difficult to comprehend, let alone control, by the bewildering variety of Africa itself. It is almost impossible to bring into a single coherent focus its enormous deserts, impenetrable jungles, snow-capped mountains, and limitless plains; its mineral wealth and its human poverty; its Arabs, Swahilis, Bantus, Indians, Bushmen, and whites; its totally unique Pleistocene fauna; its history; and its hope.

And yet, if Americans are to maintain a reasonable control over the management of their own destiny, let alone discharge the obligation imposed upon them by fate to defend the cause of human freedom everywhere against the worldwide Communist onslaught, then we must learn—and right speedily—far more about Africa, old and new, than it has ever been necessary for Americans to know before.

On all sides special pleaders press forward, each bearing at best only a part of the truth. We are told, for example, that it is entirely proper for the newly

independent nations of Africa to stand apart from the cold war, regarding it merely as a struggle between non-African powers in which they have no essential interest. Again, we are told that the United Nations have, or can have, or ought to have, a special part to play in the development of the continent, and particularly in shaping its political destinies. Still others find in multiracialism the solution to the political problems of radically different peoples, thrown heterogeneously together by the tides of history. Every motive and every viewpoint is represented.

It is in order to further the cause of knowledge concerning Africa among the people of the United States, that the American-African Affairs Association has been formed. It shall be our purpose to search out and to disseminate the truth concerning this enormously important subject, without regard to the prevailing shibboleths, and from two viewpoints which we take to be similar in all essential respects: the cause of freedom in its struggle against world communism, and the best interests of the United States of America.

For example, when certain of the new African nations imperil, by their conduct, the cause of human freedom everywhere, we shall say so. When the United Nations, succumbing to the blatant demagogic of certain of its members, advocates courses (both political and economic) which can only end by endangering the peace and welfare of Africa and the world, we shall say so. Where multiracialism offers a sound hope of political progress, we will be swift to acknowledge that fact; where it can only serve to promote chaos, we shall say so.

One thing, and perhaps only one, is certain: Africa can never be brought from poverty and barbarism into the full light of 20th-century day by means of facile slogans and magic tricks. Envy of the hard-won prosperity of the free nations of Europe and the Americas can be—and is being—played upon by unscrupulous African politicians, hungry for personal power and profit. But the road to true progress for Africa lies through the diligent development of its own resources, in an orderly political and economic atmosphere. Here is where America can help: by precept, by example, and by judicious extensions of practical aid. Certainly it is in America's own interest to do this, for the reasons already stated. But who deserves our help, and who does not? Which tendencies in Africa are working constructively toward the betterment of its peoples, and which are divisive or purely destructive? These are the sort of questions that the American-African Affairs Association proposes to investigate and to answer.

PROGRAM

The proposed program for the association's first year of operation can be broken down into five basic categories: organization of a constituency; publications; conferences; exchange of individuals; informational liaison with other American and African organizations.

Organization of a constituency

The basic resource of the American-African Affairs Association will be its constituency: those who support and take an active part in the affairs of the association; individuals, institutions, mass media, and organizations who will receive the publications and information circulated by the association for additional dissemination.

1. The work of the association will have to be supported by individual Americans, foundations, and business corporations. Those who will respond to various calls for financial support will, by that token, have evidenced interest in the work of the association. This group, when and as it is developed, will serve as the basic constituency of the association. As the program is developed, the new members of the association will serve as conduits for further dissemination of the work of the association within their own communities and specific areas of operations. The first task of the association will be to begin to organize this basic constituency and, thus, to enlist part of the funds required to carry on its program.

2. Mailing lists will be organized with the prime purpose of providing a resource for distribution of the association's material. These lists will be made up of individuals in the following general categories: opinion molders (editorial writers; columnists; publishers; radio and television commentators); political leaders, including all Members of Congress; State Department personnel, including personnel posted overseas; foreign diplomatic personnel, including all U.N. delegations; the American intellectual community, with particular atten-

tion to university personnel; business leaders, with particular attention given to those with interest in Africa, both present and potential; leaders of civic, fraternal, veterans' and women's organizations; religious leaders. We will also organize overseas mailing lists which will include individuals selected from the above categories in other countries. Finally, in cooperation with African friends and cooperating organizations, we will organize an African mailing list which will be used for the exchange of publications and information.

3. The association has already begun organization of these lists. Their utilization—like all the other work of the association—will be dependent on available financing. (E.g. It costs 75 cents each to airmail a 24-page pamphlet to Africa. If our African mailing list numbers 1,000, it will cost \$750 per mailing.)

Publications

1. *Scholarly studies*.—The association will commission experts—both African and American—to prepare scholarly studies on various issues of concern. These studies will be given relatively limited circulation to individuals, institutions, and organizations who will find them of value for background and other purposes.

2. *Pamphlets*.—A series of pamphlets and brochures—for relatively wide distribution—will be published and circulated. These publications, in many cases, will cover the same area as the scholarly studies, but will be so edited that they can be absorbed by as wide an audience as possible.

3. *Reprints*.—The association will undertake to reprint various articles of interest—both from American and African publications—for circulation to interested individuals, institutions, and organizations throughout the United States.

4. *Newsletter*.—The association will undertake to publish a newsletter—to be issued periodically—which will present items of interest about Africa and Africa-American relations. As the constituency of the association grows, this newsletter may be issued monthly or even fortnightly.

5. *Books*.—From time to time, and as the funds are available, the association will participate in helping to publish various manuscripts in association with established publishing houses. There are many, many manuscripts of tremendous value which cannot find a publisher because of a potentially limited audience. It is possible for a group such as the association to help subsidize publications by ordering advance copies of the book for circulation to its own constituency.

Conferences

Conferences, seminars, and meetings will be used as extensively as possible to further the work of the association:

1. Although the association is now formally organized and incorporated in the State of New York—with officers, directors, and members—it has not yet been publicly launched. In order to give the organization maximum public attention, a 2-day conference will be organized dealing with African-American affairs. Participation in the conference will include all members of the association and others interested in African-American relations. This conference will be broken down into various panels and will result in a paper—containing the findings of the panels—which will be the first official publication of the association.

2. Other conferences will be organized in various areas of the country to deal with specific matters of African-American affairs; e.g., the United States and South Africa; the United States and the Portuguese overseas provinces; apartheid; the United Nations in Africa; Communist infiltration in Africa; etc. These conferences will, in effect, be study groups which will produce papers for distribution.

3. A series of seminars will be organized at various universities. Distinguished African leaders will be invited to address small groups of university professors and graduate students on specific items of interest. These will be informal seminars which are relatively easy to organize and can be tremendously productive. Through this medium, African leaders—including members of diplomatic missions in the United States—can meet with university people for off-the-record discussions of mutual problems. Similar meetings can be organized with members of the press, Members of Congress, and other groups.

Exchange of individuals

There is no better way of learning about a situation than being there and seeing at first hand. Africa—and the problems of its components—remains a mystery to most Americans simply because most Americans have not been to Africa. One way of rectifying this situation (and it has been used most effectively in specific countries such as Israel and Taiwan) is arranging for influential Americans—who are in a position to pass their knowledge and opinions along to greater numbers of their compatriots—to visit specific areas of Africa and meet the leaders there.

Such a program will require the cooperation—financial and moral—of government bodies in Africa. Bringing Africans over to the United States can be equally beneficial—not so much to learn (although this is important) but to inform Americans of the problems of their own countries and what they are trying to do about them. The association will arrange that such visitors be given the widest possible audience to tell their stories.

Informational liaison

There are many organizations and institutions who should be brought into the area of American-African affairs. The association will set up lines of communications with these groups and provide them with as much information, literature, and other facilities as are possible. Because the association is an educational organization—and hopes to secure the benefits of tax exemption—it cannot take part in any political agitation or activity. However, from time to time, political action may be called for to deal with various situations which may arise. It will be up to other organizations to take such action independently as and when they see fit.

*Estimated budgetary needs for first year of operation,
September 1965-September 1966*

Administration:

Headquarters, staff (executive and clerical), equipment and management at \$3,000 per month.....	\$36,000
Fund-raising direction and implementation at \$1,000 per month.....	12,000
Total, administration.....	48,000

Program:

Honoraria, printing, and circulation.....	55,000
Conferences.....	35,000
Exchange programs.....	23,000
Total program.....	113,000

Total budget for 1st year of operation..... 161,000

¹We would hope to raise this sum from 3 sources: American foundations (\$43,000); grants from African sources (\$70,000); general public solicitation (\$48,000).

CONCLUSION

The American-African Affairs Association is still in its conceptual stages. Although we have distinguished leadership in our members and directors—and a program which we are convinced can be implemented to fulfill the idea set forth in our purposes—we cannot begin operations until we are assured of at least half of our first year's budget. Those of us who have undertaken the responsibility of organizing the association have seen too many groups—many with the highest purposes—founder and die because of the lack of adequate financing. To announce a group such as the American-African Affairs Association, without having assurance that sufficient funds will be available to implement our program, would do a disservice to the entire area with which we are concerned. If we are successful in raising the initial funds required—some \$80,000—we will begin operations in the conviction that we can make a substantial contribution.

There is a great need for such an organization as we propose. Through our initial membership, we have a pool of vast talent and experience. We believe that the program briefly outlined in this memorandum can fill the existing vacuum. What is required now is the wherewithal to carry out these plans.

Mr. CULVER. On page 3 of your statement you make reference to discriminations in the United States in the past with specific reference to our immigration policies. Are you familiar with the present immigration law?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I refer to the present immigration law.

Mr. CULVER. Are you familiar with the immigration law passed in the first session of Congress?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes. I referred to the past immigration law, which established different quotas for different nationalities and to the present immigration law which establishes the same quota for the various nationalities.

Mr. O'HARA. Pardon the interruption.

We will be through in 20 minutes, maybe.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Excuse me, I want to finish the answer this gentleman took down—in contrast to the previous law that established different quotas for different nationalities, but in either case the entrance of a person still depends on his nationality, that was the point I made.

Mr. CULVER. Are you familiar with the fact, No. 1, the quota system has been completely revised?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CULVER. The allocation has been completely changed to achieve greater equity? That is under the new law, I don't think it is something—

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I pointed out the quotas are the same for all nations.

Mr. CULVER. The question is, They are not the same? Under the new law the quotas are not the same, not based entirely on nationality, one. That is one change. Secondly, based on the skill of the applicant, contributing to the economic strength of the society, on the basis of ability to contribute.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, sir, I don't interpret it that way. My interpretation, of course, has to be based on the reports that I read in the New York Times. These reports indicated that about 20,000 persons from each nationality were to be admitted, in contrast to the previous law which made differentiation, that nonquota immigration would be permitted on the basis of skills as it has been before.

Mr. CULVER. I don't wish to take the time at this time, but I would be glad to provide you the information about the new immigration law and how the quota system has been revised to achieve greater equity and avoid past discrimination.

Now, the next question I have, on page 4, our policy toward Indians, toward Americans of Japanese extraction during the second war, and other occasions demonstrates we have made ethnic and cultural distinctions and located and relocated ethnic groups accordingly, when we felt ourselves justified in doing so. Aren't there justifications, and justifications?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes.

Mr. CULVER. There are justifications of national security interest. How do they compare with rational discrimination justification?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I don't think national security in the United States was imperiled by people because they are of Japanese ex-

traction. That was a false basis, and I think it was a somewhat more false basis, than the distinctions being made in South Africa. That was the point I tried to make.

Mr. CULVER. In your judgment, that is the case?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Indeed, I give only my judgment.

Mr. CULVER. How about the cases of homicide? Are there cases that differ there, self-defense as differentiated from premeditated murder?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I don't think it is called homicide in self-defense.

Mr. CULVER. Are you sure?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes.

Mr. CULVER. However, you speak here, on page 5 of your statement, about the fact that there have been other cases of brutality and discrimination far in excess of what you currently recognize the South African situation to be, and you go ahead and cite some, certainly I will concede, some rather brutal and disturbing illustrations of historical extermination.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I'm speaking of the present time. What is happening now in Rwanda; I took it from the New York Times, March 10.

Mr. CULVER. This doesn't necessarily justify inequities elsewhere in the world?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Not in the least.

Mr. CULVER. Brutalities in the law of the jungle, because it existed in the past or somewhere today, does that necessarily mean this is the goal, or this does not mean we aren't trying to achieve a more civilized and enlightened society of man on this globe of ours?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Do you wish me to answer this question, sir?

Mr. CULVER. Yes.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. My answer, sir, is I did not in anyway imply that one brutality or crime justifies another.

But what I did imply is that it seems to me puzzling that the attention of the committee and the attention of American public opinion is directed altogether on one kind of alleged brutality; namely, when it is performed by whites against nonwhites, and altogether ignores in comparative terms the brutality that is committed by whites against whites, and by blacks against whites. This seems to me a peculiar sort of racial discrimination in reverse to call attention to brutalities only when they are committed by the white against blacks.

Mr. CULVER. Are you aware of the time that this committee and other committees of Congress devoted to other problem areas of the world as you might suggest, white versus white, black versus nonwhite.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I have not.

Mr. CULVER. I would like to finish the question if I may without interruption. This committee and other committees of this Congress have been inquiring on a regular basis into the problems of the Greeks, the Turks, and the problems of the Jews and the Arabs, and the problems of Pakistani and the Indian dispute, certainly that isn't something you are unaware of?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Was that a question, sir?

Mr. CULVER. No, it was not.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I'm sorry.

Mr. CULVER. Page 7, you make reference to the fact that the present South African Government has declared its policy to separate the various ethnic groups of the population while granting an equal though separate opportunity for cultural, economic and social development of all of them. Then you go ahead and indicate that this policy, on page 16 of your statement, in the United States, separate but equal, has historically always been a dead letter. Perhaps it could have been implemented but it never was.

Are you aware of the fact that up until starting in 1896, the doctrine of "separate but equal" was first enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States and upheld. It was in fact the law of the land of the United States from that case *Plessy v. Ferguson*, up until as recently as 1954, when the Supreme Court in the *Brown v. Board of Education* case held this was no longer constitutional under the laws of the United States, and that decision went further in fact, and stated in part that we conclude in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place.

Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.

Now, just two questions—

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Is this a question, sir? I would like to answer it, if I may.

Mr. CULVER. Are you aware of that constitutional history?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Not only am I aware, but I'm sorry to have been somewhat unclear. I said separate but equal, I am aware was pronounced but has been a dead letter. I meant, that although the law was observed in terms of separation equality was never obtained. In this sense it has been a dead letter. And my point is in South Africa it is not.

Mr. CULVER. I think if you examine closely the briefs, for the Southern attorneys—

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. These I have examined, sir, and I have written several articles in law journals about it. Forgive me, I'm fully aware of it. The briefs stipulate that the separation—that equality may be obtained in the future and concedes it hasn't been obtained in the past.

Mr. CULVER. Are you trying to suggest you can find in the brief for the Southern attorneys, that they are prepared to concede that Negro education and school construction in certain areas they cited before the Court were not only equal but superior to that of white facilities in the same geographic area? Did you examine those briefs and you found they did not make that advocacy?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. They certainly did state that, but they also implied this is a recent development. They stipulated that, with the opposing attorneys, that the only question before the Court, a stipulation to which the court agreed, was whether, when facilities are indeed equal, separation in itself is still wrong.

Mr. CULVER. I won't debate that point with you, but I would like to point out that the educational figures you cite regarding South Africa, the most impressive ones are since 1954.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes.

Mr. CULVER. That is rather recent, too, isn't it?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CULVER. On page 10 you state in Durban, each population group tends to utilize the beach nearest to its inhabitation. This

seems also to be the case in Capetown. Well, I happen to have swum on the beach at Durban, and I remember coming out of the water and with shock and disgust to walk up and see written very prominently in both English and Afrikaans, on that beach, that no Black African could sit on them. Did you happen to see those benches when you were there?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir, I saw some of the beaches.

Mr. CULVER. Did you see the benches that line the beaches?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I'm sorry, since you were there, perhaps things have changed. I saw no benches whatsoever on the beach or near the beach. I did swim on those beaches. The beaches as you will recall from your swimming, are contiguous, one after the other. They are quite of the same quality, and they are so located as to be near the habitations of the groups that use them.

Mr. CULVER. Now, I understand that you generally are supporting the apartheid policy of this government, of the South African Government?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I think it is the best of the feasible alternatives, yes, sir.

Mr. CULVER. Then I find this most ambiguous on page 11. You go on to state, as "a matter of principle I'm chary of any government regulation of voluntary association and disassociation, sexual or otherwise."

Now, about the practice of apartheid itself. What could be more contrary to the principles you profess to believe in?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Would you like me to answer this?

Mr. CULVER. There is a question mark at the end of it.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I see.

Certainly, as I indicated I am chary, that means wary, careful, before I accept either compulsory congregation as we have now introduced in this country, or compulsory disassociation, as it exists in South Africa, because I would like to leave that to individuals. However, as I state in the part of my statement which you quote, when cultures are greatly different, it may be well for the sake of preserving these different cultures, to introduce compulsory separation. And I point out if we had done this with the Indians, the Indian culture would still be preserved probably.

I would say such a policy would not be favored by me in the United States, because I do not believe that there is even a remnant of the original Negro culture. But I sympathize.

Mr. CULVER. It seems exactly what we did with the American Indians, apartheid.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I don't think so at all, sir. We did in effect exterminate them.

Mr. CULVER. Aren't the Indians in special reservations? Aren't they totally excluded from the normal intercourse of the society, and aren't they pathetic as a group?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, indeed.

Mr. CULVER. As a result of isolation?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. As a result of the reservation provided by our Government, sir.

Mr. CULVER. You feel this is not inconsistent with the apartheid policy?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. It is inherent in the use we have made of it, use which the South African Government is not making of its policy. That was my point.

Mr. CULVER. The opportunity to compete and to contribute to a society?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, sir; separation in itself does not involve placing any one at a particular disadvantage. We separate, say, in noncoeducational schools, boys from girls. It doesn't mean one school is worse than the other. But it can be so used. And in the United States, most unfortunately, the separation of Indians has been very largely used to deprive them of desirable opportunities, desirable land, and so on, most of the time in most cases.

Mr. CULVER. How about the land available to the Africans? I was in Johannesburg, I toured some of these areas. I toured the factories and the gold mines, and so forth. I wasn't overimpressed with the unique choice of land that has been made available to them and designated in their general areas.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I don't understand, sir, what connection between gold mines and land?

Mr. CULVER. The general areas where they spend their working and living days compared with Indian reservations.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. They have no land in the Johannesburg area.

Mr. CULVER. The living conditions.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. You mean the living conditions in Suwoto?

Mr. CULVER. Yes; when I was there many of them were in the cities.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. The living conditions in the city was extremely bad, which is why the slums were cleared and dwellings were built for them in Suwoto.

Mr. CULVER. On page 13, you talk about the problem of union discrimination, racial discrimination in organized trade union movements.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CULVER. You cite the problem faced by the United States as well. You say in part in this matter:

It seems to me the major difference between the South African and the U.S. Government is that the former has been explicit and candid.

Do you really believe that?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CULVER. That is the only difference; do you really believe that?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I didn't say it is "the only," I said it is the "major difference." I usually mean what I say.

Mr. CULVER. Is that the major difference? What about the public concerted efforts by the U.S. Government in the new civil rights legislation, and in the new Civil Rights Commission, and other forms of persuasion and pressure by way of public policy on the organized trade union movement to eliminate racial discrimination? Isn't this distinct and unique from the South African situation when all power in government is forcing it—opposing as contrasted with supporting it?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. What is unique, sir, is that all of this has not let to a single Negro being admitted to the plumbers' union in New York. If the Government used this power, which you, sir, were able to create; it was not sufficient.

Mr. CULVER. Are you saying there is not a difference between the moral commitment and the principle of the U.S. Government on the whole general question of race, even though we both enjoy racial problems, or are tortured by a racial problem? Are you saying there is no distinction between the effort of this Government to mobilize all the moral force we possibly can to eliminate this problem as opposed to the South African Government, which is doing exactly the opposite thing? You think there is no difference, even though we both have a racial problem?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Sir, I tried to explain the difference, but I am delighted to do so once more.

Mr. CULVER. You can just answer yes or no on that, I think.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I cannot. But if you wish me not to answer, I will not answer. If you wish me to answer, I will answer.

Mr. CULVER. Just answer the question.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes; I would like to.

Mr. CULVER. Do you see a distinction between that?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes; I do see a great distinction in favor of the South African Government. I would be delighted to explain why.

Mr. CULVER. The thing that confuses me, you talk about the fact both countries are having problems, with racial discrimination in the trade union movement; is that correct?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CULVER. You say the major difference between the approach of the two governments toward that problem is that the South African Government has been explicit and candid in acknowledging it; is that correct?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes; and in fact in making it legal.

Mr. CULVER. All right, in making it legal.

Now you see no distinction between that governmental determination toward the resolution of that problem and that of the United States toward the same problem?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I just told you, sir, I do see a distinction, and it seems to me the way pursued by the South African Government under South African conditions is better than the way we have pursued under American conditions.

Mr. CULVER. Now, on page 14 you talk about some of the reservations you have about what you recognize as some of the more onerous regulations under the apartheid system. You say—

this, however, seems to me to be an internal South African question; and I trust that the democratic process within South Africa will in time correct errors.

Now we've got 11 million blacks, disenfranchised at the present time in South Africa. Three million whites. The 11 million blacks are the ones that are presently being denied freedoms. How on earth does the democratic process effectually correct this injustice, over time, if there is not in fact a political democracy?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Sir, in exactly the same way, in which we have done so in this country.

Let me point out that when the Constitution of this country was approved, the number of people, as a proportion of the total population, who were allowed to vote on it, was somewhat less than the number of people that are now enfranchised in South Africa as a propor-

tion of the total population. It is in the nature of democracy to spread.

Now, the way it is likely to spread in South Africa is by enfranchising the Bantu in Bantu areas, and enfranchising the whites in the white areas, which is precisely the policy of the South African Government. As I indicated, I have faith this policy will be successful.

Mr. CULVER. The grievances of the blacks in these communities are going to be expressed, and above all the government, the Nationalist government, is going to be responsive. Why would they be responsive if their own governmental position does not depend on the nonwhite support and continued allegiance? Why would I be assumed as a Member of Congress to be responsive to and solicitation of Mr. Fraser's district, for a particular appeal from his constituency, if there was no recourse at the polls?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I don't know, Mr. Culver, what makes you responsive.

Mr. CULVER. Put it in the context of a democratic process—

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. You are an authority on that.

Mr. CULVER. You are the philosopher.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, I am perhaps.

Mr. CULVER. I am a politician; you are the philosopher.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I started to tell you what should make you responsive. You are able to tell what does make you responsive; I do not know that.

Mr. CULVER. What should make me responsive?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I think you should have a general moral feeling of responsiveness, and be willing to accept grievances when they seem justified, even though they may not yield you votes. I do not know whether you do that, but I think you should.

Mr. O'HARA. I hate to interrupt this battle between the philosopher and the politician, but before we adjourn, we want to hear the voice of Minnesota.

Mr. CULVER. Could I have just one last question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. O'HARA. Yes.

Mr. CULVER. You speak on page 17 about separate development will permit them to keep and develop their own culture, a fundamental right.

Now, isn't there also a fundamental right not to want to do it? I notice you enjoy smoking Dutch cigars, but don't see you wearing wooden shoes; it is a matter of choice, isn't it?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, indeed.

Mr. CULVER. Don't you think this choice of fundamental right should be available to somebody else?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. As far as I know, the natives in South Africa have the right to smoke the same cigars and wear whatever shoes they choose, as they do here.

Mr. CULVER. I am referring to the culture of their own society.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. If they wish indeed to change these, and let me point out I myself doubt that they want to, and indeed must say some of their cultural habits appeal to me very greatly, if you will permit me, I spoke with a native farmer who had—

Mr. CULVER. But you would agree they should be able to make that judgment and determination?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. They do, sir. They do. They are able to change their arrangements any time they want to.

Mr. CULVER. How can they be free while being forced into a separate development if that is the law of the land?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. But you are forced into a separate development in the sense you are not able to go to Liberia, say, and own real estate there, unless the Liberians will let you, and so am I.

Mr. CULVER. I hardly think that is analogous to the problem.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I do, sir.

Mr. CULVER. No further questions.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Van den Haag, did you say you are a practicing psychologist?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Psychoanalyst.

Mr. FRASER. Psychoanalyst?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Are you a medical doctor?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. But anyway, it is work related to this?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. I was interested in one comment you made—this is just to get at the approach that you bring to this problem—when you said that we have compulsory congregation in this country; do you remember using that phrase?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, indeed, sir, I have been using it for years.

Mr. FRASER. What do you mean by that? I have trouble understanding that.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. If you will permit me, and I would like to put in the record if you wish, an article I have written on that in a journal.

To make it very brief, the decision that Mr. Culver quoted, *Brown v. Board of Education*, in my opinion, went a little too far by not just prohibiting compulsory segregation as it existed, and in my opinion was unconstitutional in a number of Southern States before that decision, but by also insisting that no locality has a right to engage in segregation, however voluntary, in public schools. This insistence was based on, and I quote—

Mr. FRASER. No what?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No locality.

Mr. FRASER. I see. No community.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. This insistence was based—and I quote the Court on this—"on modern authority," which was supposed to have shown that the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision necessarily would bring about a sort of psychological inequality.

The Court's opinion, based on modern authority, was that when Negro children are separated from white children, even though all facilities, salaries, and so on, were to be the same, the mere fact of the separation would be "inherently unequal."

Now, in the article that I have mentioned, and that I have with me. I pointed out that the experiments undertaken by "modern authority" are of no scientific value whatsoever, and that the Court was misled.

Then I went on further to point out that with us, whereas compulsory segregation is unconstitutional, because it interferes with freedom of association, compulsory congregation, compelling one group to

accept another, be it in public facilities, is equally repugnant, according to the Constitution, because it interferes with the freedom of association, which in my opinion implies a freedom to disassociate.

You will say there is freedom of marriage if, when I want to marry someone, I am free to do so, provided the person I wish to marry gives her or his assent. You will not say there is freedom of marriage if I can compel a person to marry me. But it seems to me what the Court has done is to compel white southern communities to accept the presence of Negro children in their schools, even though they may not wish to do so.

Dr. FRASER. When did you write this article?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I have it with me. Excuse me, I will give you the exact date.

Mr. FRASER. Just roughly.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I don't really remember.

Mr. FRASER. Was it some time ago?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Oh, yes. That came out in the fall of 1960, in the Villanova Law Review.

Mr. FRASER. In 1960. I am really just trying to get at how you view these things. Basically your view is for government to be neutral, as among the races, is a mistake, at least when it comes to schools?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, sir, I am sorry I was not clear enough. I rather think that the government should allow in this country at least people to mingle or not to mingle in schools as they wish.

Mr. FRASER. Yes. Well—

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Suppose you have a community—

Mr. FRASER. I mean if a school is run by government, which is the case with our public school system—

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER (continuing). What you are saying is you don't think government should be required to be neutral?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I can put it in two sentences, sir, it is simply this: If one part of the community refuses to go to school with another part of the community, then the community would have to provide equally good facilities for all parts, including those members of the community that wished to mix. We would have, say in the South, possibly three schools.

Mr. FRASER. They could do that through private schools?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Those are only available to the rich. That seems to me a discrimination against the poor that I am not favoring.

Mr. FRASER. What you are saying then is you think the government can, in effect, or should be permitted to, on the local level, identify people by their race and segregate them if the majority of the people of the community wanted to do it that way?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. You favor that as a policy in the United States?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Starting from that premise, I can understand why you approve of apartheid, because there obviously is a consistency.

What I have trouble with, then, is when you get to the next point. You see, in the question I last asked you, I assumed a majority of the community wanted segregation and you would agree?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. If a minority of the community wanted segregation you would not think that was right?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, sir. I would also permit them to have a segregated school at public expense, but I would make it clear the community will then have to defray the costs if it agrees to this, of a school, and it would have to be an equally good school, for the minority that wished to be segregated, those that have been segregated, and those that wish to mix.

Mr. FRASER. You would permit that as a matter of policy. But obviously somebody would have to make a decision as to whether that would be governmental policy or not; isn't that right?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. You would accede to the basic principle the majority should make that fundamental decision?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, but it would be constitutionally obliged to offer equal facilities to all three groups, if anyone wants it.

Mr. FRASER. You agree with the idea in this country that the majority ought to rule?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Oh, certainly.

Mr. FRASER. I come to a complete blank in your argument here. In South Africa, it is my view that what is happening doesn't reflect the majority view. Would you agree?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. It is hard to say, but it is entirely possible.

Mr. FRASER. This is where I have the biggest trouble. Now, what I see is the minority imposing its will by force.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Well, sir, what I would say is this. You see—

Mr. FRASER. You would agree that is what is happening?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, I am not sure, but it is quite possible.

Mr. FRASER. Only minorities are allowed to vote, so that is the only viewpoint ascertainable?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. That is exactly what I would say.

Mr. FRASER. Would you defend on a philosophical ground that a minority ought to be able to impose its will on a majority by force?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Sir, I would make two statements on this. The first is simply that I would grant to each government the right to regulate these things domestically as it wishes.

Mr. FRASER. What, any government?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Any government.

Mr. FRASER. No matter how it is bottomed?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, including the governments of Ghana, Haiti, or Tanzania, and in all of these states incidentally, there is no effective franchise.

Mr. FRASER. I am trying to go into this seriously. Are you saying it doesn't matter whether it is self-decreed dictator or a Fascist government or Communist government, no matter what their choice is, you think we ought to abide by it?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Sir, let me just expand a little bit.

Mr. FRASER. All right.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I would disapprove of certain kinds of governments, probably the same ones that you would disapprove of, sir, but I would not think it is our right to impose our philosophy on the Soviet Government or Russia or the East German Government, or for that matter the West German Government, provided—and I would

make this exception—that they have no aggressive intentions against us, that is, if I could show—

Mr. FRASER. Against the United States?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes. If I could show they were about to attack us, I would be willing to change the domestic circumstances to prevent that.

Mr. FRASER. I understand that.

Let's see how far you carry this. Let's take the case of Nazi Germany in its treatment of the Jews. Your view would be so long as the genocide was carried on, entirely within the German boundaries, that this was not a matter of concern for the neighbors of Germany?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Oh, concern, yes.

Mr. FRASER. I mean in terms of any effort on our part to change the events in that country?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. All other things being equal, let me point out, we tolerated the murder of 6 million people in the Soviet Union, and we did tolerate the murder of great numbers of the Jews. We did not go to war, to my knowledge, because of the murder of the Jews, but because of their attack.

Mr. FRASER. Let's not tie so much to what we have done, but to show your philosophical position here. That is what I am trying to do.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Then to follow your line, I would certainly say, what happens within one country, may be bitterly disapproved by citizens of another country, but they have no right, unless they are attacked, or have reason to believe they will be and so on, they have no right to impose their views on the domestic order of that other country.

I think, sir, that this often leads to

Mr. FRASER. You don't put any limits to that?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I put no limits on that.

Mr. FRASER. I see.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. If you will be good enough to let me say, I think that leads very often to our having to tolerate terrible things happening in other countries which I would regard as just as terrible as no doubt you would, but I feel a different principle would bring about even worse things. That is, if we grant to ourselves right, to institute democracy against the will of the Soviet Government in the Soviet Union, it seems to me fairly clear we are implicitly granting to the Soviet Government the right to institute what it thinks is right for America here. And so we would in effect make the world into a number of warring states, each feeling it has to impose its philosophy on other states. Therefore, I think it has long been a principle of international law and international custom for each nation not to interfere, however much it disapproves of, and there often is good reason, in the domestic order of another nation, but merely to respond to possible attack. And I think this is on the whole the correct policy, even though sometimes—

Mr. FRASER. I respect the fact you hold those views. I ask these questions illustratively. In the case of the attack of North Korea on South Korea, there was no evidence of any direct threat to the United States. You would have been opposed to any intervention in South Korea?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I didn't make myself clear. Here we had an attack of one nation against another nation. We didn't go to war against North Korea, because we didn't like their domestic order, which in fact I didn't like. We didn't attack North Korea, we merely went to the help of an ally of ours. It is an established principle of international policy that a nation has a right to defend its allies.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I suppose when it comes to a matter of right, we are free to work through the United Nations and to do whatever is within their jurisdiction. I don't want to get into that argument. I want to get at the root of your philosophy.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. The case of North and South Korea was very different from the case we are studying.

Mr. FRASER. I was just trying to get at the periphery of what you say. If I can just re-cap:

No. 1, you think that segregation of the races would be desirable even in the United States on a State to State or local basis?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. You believe this would be in the national interest.

Secondly, you believe that even where a government were committing genocide against others, based on race or religion, that this is a matter that we might deplore, but that we would not be called upon to do anything about?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Now, I would have to say that I think if I accepted these premises of yours, I would come out about the same way that you do. My problem is that I think about what happened in New York on that occasion when this woman was attacked and being stabbed, and she called for help, and her neighbors stayed inside their houses because they didn't want to get involved.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I would not defend the neighbors, sir, because they were fellow citizens. The principles I have very badly enunciated.

Mr. FRASER. Some of us see ourselves on a very small planet traveling through space, and we think of all ourselves as neighbors.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. That would be very nice if it were that way. But you, sir, must be aware of the fact it isn't that way.

We have no call to interfere in China, though perhaps we should, but if we were to try to, I think that the consequences would probably be worse, though I certainly would like to save the Chinese from their government, so save the Russians from their government, to save the people in Burundi from their government and so on. But we would be very busy if we were to try to do all this. I'm not sure the effects would improve the total situation. The principles, sir, I enunciated are the principles of my countryman Grotius and principles of Samuel Puffendorf that the foreign policy of the nation must be governed by "*pax et securitas Communis*." That is, its business is to make sure that it itself, be able to live in peace, and security, which implies that it can make alliances, can defend its allies against possible attackers, but that it is not its task to interfere in the domestic arrangement of other nations. For, sir, if that were, then there would be no sovereign nations. The sovereignty of a nation consists of the fact its government has the right of ordering its domestic affairs. That is what we mean by a sovereign nation. If a nation is not sovereign, then some

other power has the right to interfere. But if a nation is sovereign, then it is the supreme law within its own territory. I don't know of any other definition of sovereignty.

Mr. FRASER. I accede to the fact that you hold that view of sovereignty, but I don't.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Well, then you simply reject sovereignty, sir.

Mr. FRASER. No, I don't. I think sovereignty is very important. But I think most important of all is we have to live together. Sovereignty is a very important thing.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. That means we have to tolerate each other's domestic orders. If we live together by saying the domestic order one nation likes or prefers must be imposed on another nation, we will have constant wars in effect.

Mr. FRASER. All of our foreign aid program, for example, is designed to influence events in other countries.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. To the extent, sir, to which it influences events in the sense of making nations less aggressive against their neighbors, and making nations less aggressive against us, and thus assuring our own security, I'm in favor of it.

Mr. FRASER. You are in favor of anything that will make less likely their—

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Attack against us.

Mr. FRASER (continuing). Becoming a problem in the international community?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. I think that principle, of course, would bring us back to South Africa, because I would judge many of the Africans are going to feel the non-Europeans in South Africa are being discriminated against, and that they ought to come to their aid?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I have no doubt that is the feeling of many.

Mr. FRASER. If we could get the Government of South Africa to accept people on their individual merits rather than just because of the color of their skin, that threat would be diminished?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I think it would be more useful to get the governments of Africa to accept the principle of nonintervention.

Mr. FRASER. The governments of what?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. The governments of the independent African states, to accept the principle of nonintervention into each other's affairs, including South African affairs.

Mr. FRASER. I think that would be harder, because perhaps they share the view which most people in the United States do, that they do have concern for the citizens around the world?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Sir, we have never practiced this. Never once.

Mr. FRASER. You may say that. I would say we practice it irregularly.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Very irregularly.

Mr. FRASER. But I think more and more we are—

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. In fact, forgive me for interrupting, it is the irregularity I object to. We don't practice it in Haiti. We don't practice it in East Germany. We don't practice it in Rumania. We don't practice it in Czechoslovakia, Russia, China, and so on, but we insist on practicing it in South Africa.

Mr. FRASER. The truth of the matter is we have done nothing in South Africa except embargo arms.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Why embargo arms against a government that has got no use for arms other than possibly defend itself from attack by its neighbors? For no one to my knowledge has contended that the South Africans are trying to conquer anyone.

Mr. FRASER. You were saying we were taking the tough line toward South Africa and not against the other nations?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. That isn't true. We have a very substantial ban on trade with the Soviet Union. We have had very sharp restrictions on the bloc countries of Eastern Europe. We fought consistently against China's admission to the United Nations. None of these policies have been applied to South Africa. Why do you say the policies toward South Africa have been harsher than against the others?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I was thinking of the threat of the future, rather than our actual policies in the past.

Mr. FRASER. Would you favor establishing normal trade with the Soviet Union and with China?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. If we have any reason to believe that China and the Soviet Union are no longer interested in attacking us, I would indeed be in favor of doing so.

Mr. FRASER. We will never know that for sure?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No; not for sure, but there are some indications. If our Government convinces itself of a reasonable way, that there are clearly written declarations of the Chinese and Soviet leaders, that they are intending to attack us—which are quite as clear as Hitler's were—are no longer being followed in practice, and that there has been a change of mind and intent, I'm all in favor of normal trade relations, and indeed I would go further and say in favor of all kinds of relations that would make living together more easy.

Mr. FRASER. I will make one last comment, then I will close. You are a U.S. citizen now?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Of Dutch descent?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. I would only venture to say that if the U.S. Government, or some local community should suddenly decide that those people who are of Dutch descent needed their culture preserved, and needed to be isolated and moved out, restricted in their jobs and voting rights, that your philosophical evaluation of man's relationship to man might suddenly undergo a transformation. Perhaps not, because you are wedded to your views. It would be an interesting experiment?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I would try to persuade them they are wrong, and if I couldn't persuade them, I would certainly say they have a right to follow their views, they have a right to exclude Dutch citizens from immigration, and so on.

Mr. FRASER. I'm talking about people in this country who are citizens already.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes; here I would say I would somewhat object to the sudden change.

Mr. FRASER. Maybe we could arrange to do it slowly.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Well, I would even object to the slow change, but let me point out in South Africa there has been no such change.

Mr. FRASER. There has been a change backward?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. What about the colored in Capetown whose franchise has been cut down?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. There I agree with you, there has been a change, which I find quite regrettable.

Mr. FRASER. What about the non-Europeans that have been moved out of where they lived: that is a change backward?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. They were allowed to live there once. Let me finish my question and then comment on it if you will. They were allowed to live there once, now they have been forceably moved out under the impelling logic of the apartheid philosophy?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. They are gradually moving backward?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No; I would not say backward. You see what happens—

Mr. FRASER. Forward from your point of view?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. No; not even that. What happened here is this: separation implies white citizens are being moved out of the Transkei, and colored or black citizens are moved out from certain other locations. This is a move that occurs on both sides, and it is inherent in the nature of separation: that is what we mean by separation.

Mr. FRASER. Yes; a separation where the whites had the right to vote on the question, and the non-Europeans were denied any voice in the decision.

Let me ask one last question, if I may. In South Africa, there are many South African qualities which I like. The Afrikaners have some fine qualities. But let me just say what my impression is. Among the 3 million Europeans there are the forms of democracy and substantial exercise of them with some restrictions. But their relationships to the Africans, or I should say non-Europeans, because there are Asians—we have not talked about the culture of the Asians, which I assume they once had 200 years ago—but the relationship between the whites and the Africans is essentially that which you would find in a totalitarian society, because of the denial of political rights, and restraints on their jobs, where they can live, and other restrictions, would you agree with that?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. You have been so good in giving me the opportunity to make myself clearer than I have had a chance before, so that I would beg your indulgence to allow me to state this in a general form. There are two things. First, it was mentioned before that the blacks have been disenfranchised. I think that is slightly misleading. It involves they were franchised before and disenfranchised. That is not the case; they did not have the franchise. This is merely a continuation. Second, it is entirely true the present Government of South African does not promise to give them the vote in the areas that they call white, but it does promise to give them the full vote in the areas which they will have of their own. And I believe, sir, that there is,

apart from the ideological and matters of principle, which I think we have no time to go into any further, you have to remember that the situation is somewhat different. There are, as has been mentioned, about 11½ million blacks and about 3½ million whites. So that to give them the vote would mean, in effect, for the whites to renounce the domination, the power, and so on, that they have had until now.

What you are asking from them to do is to commit suicide, and that seems a very hard demand on anyone.

Mr. FRASER. Could I say the relationship would be essentially that which exists between the American citizens of Dutch descent and all the rest of the Americans? The Americans of Dutch descent have surrendered their political power to this overwhelming mass of Americans who are not of Dutch descent?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, but they did so, voluntarily, by coming to this country, with this idea in mind.

Mr. FRASER. Everybody from this country you know has come from somewhere. I don't mean to pick the Dutch out, whom I admire very much.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes; we all did surrender our own national feelings to the general American feeling, but there were no such enormous differences of culture, education, and so on, as still exists now, though they are rapidly being wiped out in South Africa. I would like to make a comparison that seems to me more apt.

When this country was founded, as a democratic—

Mr. O'HARA. Will the witness make the answer very brief? The hour is very late now.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. Yes, sir.

The great majority of the citizens in this country were not allowed to vote. They were, in your words, disenfranchised, because they were not taxpayers or they were not literate and so on. The progress of this country has on the one hand made it possible for the great majority of people to become more educated and on the other hand to become franchised. I expect in a different form, under different circumstances, a similar development in South Africa.

Mr. FRASER. Just to say 10 words to follow that up. We got into a civil war, along the way, which I think will happen in South Africa, and this time there is no great ocean to keep the other nations out of the fight.

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I hope you are wrong, sir. But neither of us can predict the future, I guess.

Mr. O'HARA. Doctor, I have one question, and you can answer yes or no.

Do you believe in the United Nations and its objectives?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. I believe that the United Nations are a fiction, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. Then your answer is "No"?

Dr. VAN DEN HAAG. They have never been united. They have never been anything.

Mr. O'HARA. That is all.

(Whereupon, at 5:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., Thursday, March 24, 1966.)

UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MARCH 24, 1966

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 2:45 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn Building, Hon. Barratt O'Hara (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. O'HARA. The subcommittee will come to order.

I would like to announce first we are glad to have with us today a group from the Business Council for International Understanding, director, Harold Randall, American University, and among the group are representatives of quite a number of countries. We are very happy to have them with us. Mrs. Bolton, I wonder if you have a message of greeting to them.

Mrs. BOLTON. Greetings to you all. We are always so glad to see you. I am sure you know that. I hope you are enjoying it because it means a great deal to us in America to have other people come from other countries—all Americans going to other countries—every one of you an ambassador. That is really something. We trust you to do a good job. We are glad to have you here today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mrs. Bolton.

We have three witnesses today, including Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, witness for South Africa before the International Court of Justice. Will you commence, General Marshall?

STATEMENT OF GEN. S. L. A. MARSHALL, BRIGADIER GENERAL, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)

(Biographic of data of General Marshall is as follows:)

GEN. SAMUEL LYMAN ATWOOD MARSHALL

Born July 18, 1900; student Texas College Mines, 1920-22; L.H.D., Wayne State University; LL.D., St. Bonaventure University; foreign correspondent, military critic, chief editorial writer, Detroit News, 1927-62; now syndicated columnist Washington Post-Los Angeles Times; served from private, engineer corps, to First Lieutenant, Infantry, U.S. Army, 1917-19; major to brigadier general, U.S. Army, 1942-52; decorated with numerous citations, including the D.S.M., Legion of Merit, Legion of Honor; author and contributor to national magazines.

General MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; members of the committee, I come before the subcommittee at its invitation and wish to make it clear from the beginning that I am not here as an expert on

South Africa or on the continent as a whole, or for that matter on race problems. My professional work has carried me abroad frequently over the past 50 years and several times to parts of Africa on specific assignments. It has also entailed dealing with some of our own race problems at a national level, my role being that of a policy shaper and maker rather than a sideline observer. Should the committee wish particulars about that, I would be glad to extend my remarks. Suffice to say that over the years, both here and abroad, my rounds have been such that situations which generate mass tensions have become rather familiar to me, as are the rule-of-thumb criteria for measuring their degree.

I infer that the committee called me here because of my recent experience in South-West Africa, in connection with the case now being weighed by the International Court, and the charge that South Africa has violated the trust reposed in her by the mandate under the old League of Nations.

The committee may wish to know how it chanced that I made two trips to South-West Africa in 1965, which also carried me into parts of South Africa, and resulted in my appearance as a witness before the Court at The Hague in October. The facts are as follows:

As an American citizen devoting the greater part of my adult life to the study of military problems, I have become increasingly concerned since World War II about a growing divergence in our shaping of a national grand strategy. The familiar adage has it that when one hitches his wagon to a star he should not forget to lock the tailgate. That should apply right to the hilt in our international dealings. What we do with the object of winning the minds and hearts of other peoples should not be stopped or unduly limited out of fears over our own future security. Even so, ideal ends, in politics or otherwise, are rarely, if ever attained, where there is inattention to the conservation of means. So in the making of foreign policy by the United States, the ultimate effect on our well being and that of other nations, cannot be approximately estimated, unless when policy is formed the consequence to our military position worldwide is also factored. That is the rule of commonsense, and my concern is that over the past 20 years, due possibly to an evangelistic spirit in us, due more probably to the intensity of the ideological struggle in which we find ourselves, we have tended to drift ever farther away from it.

My attention was drawn to the South-West Africa case only last March from conversations here in Washington primarily with my brother, Charles B. Marshall, years ago a staff adviser to this committee. Then I read into the court proceedings and the background. Shortly, I talked it over with a small group that included Admiral Burke, Admiral Radford, General Twining, ex-Secretary McElroy and ex-Secretary Bendetsen. The consensus among these distinguished individuals, all thinkers in the realm of military strategy, was that the decision of the Court now pending might gravely imperil the long-range strategic interests of the United States.

When several weeks later I was invited to visit that part of the world by the South Africa Foundation, at their expense, I replied that I would, provided that I could spend the greater part of my time in South-West Africa. I was gone during most of April, and traveled 3,700 miles in South-West Africa, mainly by small plane, though with

many small jaunts on a Land Rover. My time for the greater part was passed among the tribes in the Caprivi Strip, Ovamboland, Damaraland, the Okavango country, the Baster people at Rehoboth, and so on. I visited the diamond fields along the southwestern coast. Finally, I spent 1 week in South Africa touring the Transkei, seeing the Bantu townships outside Johannesburg, and so forth. My purpose was simply to get as much of the feel of the country, for my own information, as the time allowed. Along the way I made about 50 pages of notes on my observations, copies of which I would be happy to provide this committee if such is wished.

There I had expected the matter to end. What struck me as the most curious, if not ironic, note of all was the contrast between what I had found and what was formally charged against South Africa in the proceedings at The Hague, that her stewardship of South-West had generated a state of tension which constituted a "threat to international peace."

South-West is twice the size of California, and for the most part is desert country. With a population of slightly more than one-half million people, but one-tenth of whom are European, the vast majority being Bantu, living in a relatively primitive state on their own tribal lands, the territory would be all but impossible to administer if social upheaval were imminent or violence rife. Yet it is the most tranquil, least policed area that I have ever visited. The constabulary counts but 660 men and more than half of them are Bantu. The European and Bantu policemen work together; the incidence of misbehavior or dereliction among the latter is less than 2 percent. In Ovamboland, with its 250,000 Bantu, there are but 12 policemen, 6 of them Bantu, and there was no one under arrest in my time there. To keep the peace in the Kaokoveld, with its 18,000 tribesmen, in the wildest, most remote corner of the territory, there are but 4 policemen, 2 of them Bantu.

Men walking armed are not to be seen in South-West Africa. There are no sentry boxes or police posts along the highways. Speeders can do as they please. In the native reserves, the homes of the white commissioners and staff members are unguarded, and often unfenced and there is no lockup of the premises or the house by night. I saw much of these people in their outpost work and it is possible to generalize about them because they have several main characteristics in common. Despite the relative isolation of their environment, they are individuals with great human warmth, cultivated mind, and a broad knowledge of world affairs. In conversation, they talk as readily and as informedly about the business of nations as about their day-to-day problems with the tribes. They are men of quiet dignity and marked personal restraint, and the words sober, gentle, and dedicated are appropriate.

Their sympathetic concern for the Bantu, understanding of his psychology, compatibility with his interest and welfare, and hopeful outlook about the future all come quickly to the surface. None speak at any time in derogation of the people among whom he worked. To the contrary, the words were always generous, as if the individual were ever disposed to give the Bantu the benefit of every doubt. Yet, I found no tendency in them to boast of the programs set for Bantu improvement or to cast their own labors

in an heroic light. They felt that more could and should be done, voiced regret that advance was so gradual and were self-critical when they spoke of any general difficulty. None felt that the present state of things is ideal or composes a pattern to be maintained indefinitely.

They view their jobs as a requirement to build a firmer base under the Bantu through education, improved public health and a more vigorous and dependable economy. Out of this social progress, which will gradually win the Bantu away from tribal ways and old superstitions, a more felicitous political relationship will in time evolve. That is the goal though its ultimate form is perfectly undesirable. Here I am expressing the hope, or philosophy, of the people with whom I talked. They do not view the present condition as a solution; it is merely a halfway house. They would like to see the programming accelerated; but they understand that Rome was not built in one day and the civilizing process does not proceed by leaps and bounds.

I watched these men move among the Bantu, saw how they held themselves, noted how they were received. They do not talk down to the bantu, but speak at the same level. Where they go, they are greeted with smiles, a wave of the hand, and a friendly shout. Small children at play in the fields rush to the roadside advance with excitement when the commissioner bounces by in his jeep. The general atmosphere is one of relaxation. I moved out among the people, the Bantu, by day and by night and felt no hint of danger.

The tribes own their homelands. The dignity of that fact must be respected by the state in its negotiations with them. Were it not so, there could be major reclamation in one section, such as Runtu on the Okavango River, to advantage the economy as a whole. To such a simple principle as irrigation, the tribalized Bantu must be won in small groups, one step at a time. The Bantu family has its kraal. The lands are a tribal possession, and even where they are not worked communally, the authority of the chief, chieftainess, or headman disposes their use. The Bantu in the homelands do not pay taxes. The public institutions designed for their uplift are provided mainly by the state and marginally by the missions. They use them increasingly, and benefit greatly from them, notably in the field of public health.

However, they do not pay for these institutions and are adverse to any change which would require them to do so. I cannot envisage such a change, short of an uprooting of the tribal systems and general dispossession, elimination of the chiefs, the return of the lands to the public domain, and so forth, for the sake of giving the tribesman status as a taxpaying voter. Such a revolutionary uprooting could hardly be done in the name of democracy and it would inevitably visit chaos, if not anarchy, on Ovamboland and the other northern preserves. I feel like quoting what Chief Martin, of one of the Ovambo tribes, said to me at his kraal in Ontoneigo: "We want more of the same. Give us more schools, more hospitals, more dams. But leave us alone." Such is the Bantu enlargement of an antipoverty concept. It nonetheless speaks up for a separateness which the tribal majorities in overwhelming numbers are determined to continue and which cannot be voided without doing egregious violence to them, their culture, their dignity, and their prospects, as I see it.

No liquor is sold to the tribes. The mandate forbids it, and by that prohibition would seem to require maintenance of the status quo. There is some bootlegging of Angola beer across the border and the tribes ferment their own homebrew.

These broad generalizations apply, however, only to Bantu homelands and Bantu status in South-West Africa. They are not true of the Baster (or Bastard) people and their holdings. This mulatto folk around Rehoboth have a wholly different culture, social outlook, and political standing. While they possess an integrated homeland, it is not a common holding, the properties being privately owned. They are run by an elected council and not by a chief. The white magistrate who sits as chairman, thus linking the community with high administration, has veto power but had not used it during 9 years in office. The Basters are taxed like the Europeans of South-West; they have the vote, but only with respect to issues in their own domain.

Whether it is reasonable at this time to equate South Africa's problem in dealing with the various peoples of South-West with the problem of the United States in trying to get equal treatment for its Negro minority should be a fair question. The Delaware Indian blood in my family line prompts me to say that we cannot escape our own history, or disregard what has been done by other colonizers, conquerors or beset emigrants in contentions with indigenes arising from their self-interest in survival. While I want my country to adhere to moral standards, that does not in this instance mean applying the rule: "Do as I do, not as I say." For I think it will be found that South Africa, since taking over the mandate, has done as much to help the tribesman, promote his economic welfare, prevent his exploitation and protect him from being cheated of a proper use of his holdings, as we are doing with our aborigines. The Sioux—a particularly noble people—have about 10 percent of their finally assigned homelands in productive use, the rest having been taken over on lease by white Americans. Approximately one-quarter of the indigenes who still try to live in a tribal way are unemployed. Income for the majority average less than \$1,000 annually, which by official definition is stark poverty. Among the Cheyennes, the unemployment figure is reported at 40 percent. I cannot vouch for these figures. I have read them in our magazines and heard them over NBC programs, and those are the impressions that are being put before the American people.

But recently in Bemidji, Minn., I was told by educators that the poverty among the large Indian population in that region is so general that the average Indian child, on trying to make the grade in school, feels lost and helpless, and cut off from participation. These conditions have been called to general attention on nationwide TV programs. They create no outcry to save the Indian from his ruthless exploiter, thereby to protect the peace of nations.

With that, I conclude my reflections from my first visit. I did not expect to go again, having made no commitment to South Africa. Then I was asked by the Embassy in Washington if I would appear as a witness before the Court on one specification only: Had South Africa militarized the territory in violation of the mandate? This issue was within my range of competence, and I replied that I would, though on my prior trip I had not looked about with any such pur-

pose in mind. That was all too apparent. Ethiopia and Liberia had complained, in the petition already before the Court, that South Africa had established military bases around Windhoek and in the enclave at Walvis Bay, and I had not bothered to look at these places. Then following my return from the first journey, fresh charges against South Africa, pressed by other north-of-Zambezi African States, arose within the United Nations and were widely publicized.

They were: That at the copper-mining town of Tsumeb in northeast South-West Africa, South Africa, in secret league with West Germany, had set up a sort of horror factory. A missile-tracking plant, it was also turning out poison gas and manufacturing atomic warheads.

That at Ohopoho in the distant Kaokoveld—northwest corner of the territory—South Africa had established a monster military air base.

I agreed to return and conduct a formal inspection of these and all other sites, or bases, alleged in the memorials, provided that the South African Government gave me carte blanche authority to go wherever else I pleased and talk to whom I pleased. This was done by the Foreign Minister.

The second tour of South-West took 8 days. My testimony before the Court was to the effect that there were no military bases, no fortifications of any kind, no standing forces whatever in South-West. At Ohopolo in the Kaokoveld, where the monster military airbase was supposed to be, I found one 3,000-foot airstrip, with cattle and goats grazing on it, and the surface interrupted in spots by anthills 8 feet high. The airstrip was put there prior to World War II. It simply serves a frontier outpost where the Commissioner and his staff are based. The group includes 4 policemen, a veterinary surgeon, 2 cattle inspectors, and a radio operator—the only force in a region populated by 18,000 of the Ovashimba, Oshimba, and Herero peoples, who, like the country where they live, are absolutely untamed.

At Tsumeb, the copper mining town, owned by American interests, I had no difficulty locating the "horror" factory. It turned out to be a three-sided ranch-style building, with no basement—an installation of the Max Planck Institute of Liidau, Germany. The project is wholly unguarded. I was halfway through it before anyone stopped me, there being only two German technicians and four Bantu gardeners present. The purpose of the project is to measure beamings from the unisphere to serve pure science and to assist long-range weather forecasting. I went over all the electronic equipment present: None was hot. In one wing was a dark room for processing motion picture film; nothing else in any way resembled a poison gas factory. Thus as to that portion of the charges which I sought to run down, the important thing is not that the delegate from States north of the Zambezi should utter such vaporous nonsense but that they have to be gravely received by a whole race of men, some of them presumably intelligent.

I have gone into these details to emphasize one point, that intrinsically, and as to its interior in all aspects, South-West Africa is so far removed from being a "threat to international peace" that to call it such makes language meaningless. Thus if that charge has any validity, any substance, it must rest on the assumption that the condi-

tions which South Africa has wrought in South-West are such an intolerable affront to African States north of the Zambezi that unless there is a correction they will rise as one and stage another great "washing of the spears." Let's test that out. Recent events have helped shatter the illusion that the pressure exerted by this bloc was based on any true power reality. I refer to the way that seven or so governments have been shot down like ducks in a gallery. That was to be expected. Not one had enough force to do an adequate job of keeping its own interior tranquil. Each establishment is in hock to its own military. None has promise of continuing political stability. All need be so deeply concerned with home base that none should be in a position to mold our policy toward all of Africa. I am aware of the argument that if we do not keep them happy they will turn toward the U.S.S.R., Red China, communism, but in my judgment it is not a legitimate argument. They may make that choice anyway if it gratifies the passing whim of the man temporarily in power. It still must follow that when a political body has no basic solidarity within itself, those who lead it are without power to keep it firmly aligned with any ideology, friend, or ally from the outside. Such governments may not be bought; the best one may do is get a lease on their good will for a while.

For one, I cannot understand how an attempt to visit ruin on South Africa in the name of social justice may at this juncture contribute anything to the advance of civilization, or do other than compound political disorder and economic stagnation. Despite our material plenty and determination to have more of it, we Americans are loath to acknowledge that productiveness is a prime factor in the promotion of world social betterment. Otherwise, we would not so ardently persist in the course of trying to make the heaviest possible trouble for those parts of Africa which have the greatest enterprise and make the largest contribution to the commerce of the world. I do not say that is the whole thing; I do assert that we choose to ignore the factor. It is no small factor when the chronic condition of the great body of the continent is underproductiveness.

Seeing things as an American nationalist, and a liberal in the sense that I am devoted to the rights of man, I still cannot look without alarm at the possibilities. Consequences, as George Eliot said, are pitiless. The Court may find against South Africa. United Nations may then vote sanctions. But sanctions against such a strong state, wealthy in natural resources, producer of a great part of the world's gold, commanding the loyalty of a vigorous people and not lacking in maritime resources, are not easily applied. Should they fail, what comes next? It is conceivable that the U.N. might be reckless enough to attempt staging an expedition into South Africa to enforce its will. Should it do so, there is no doubt in my mind that South Africa would fight, and the world would have one more war it cannot afford which the U.N. could not win except through the direct help of a major power intervening with large-scale forces. I do not believe any such venture could have a likelier outcome than the death of the U.N.

Then there is another thing—our strategic interests in that section of the globe continue to expand radically. For the first time, we have naval power operating regularly in the Indian Ocean. The uncertainties about Red China, the volatile condition of Indonesia, the lone

hand being played by Singapore, the lengthening shadow across Thailand and the deepening involvement of our power in the southeast Asia struggle all militate toward making such an extension of our sea power presence necessary. And at Simonstown, 30 miles from Cape Town, is the only great naval base and graving yard in that quarter of the globe. The United States must not discount the connection between such a facility and the conserving of its own worldwide strategic interests. In the event of major war in the Middle East—let us say around Iraq—in which our forces became engaged, we would have to lean on that prop. We have done so before. We may have to do it again.

These, in broad outline, are my misgivings along with the line of reasoning whence they arise. I am aware that other witnesses which have appeared before this committee do not see it my way at all. Some of them are ready to mount the saddle and ride—into what, they do not exactly know, since one cannot see very far into a thicket. They argue that nothing less than precipitancy spells prudence. They say, "Let's have sanctions, and as for what comes after that, we will cross the bridge when we come to it." But this is like a woman thinking she can be a little bit pregnant or a man thinking he can be a little bit honest. Sanctions is the beginning of real troublemaking for another state, the fixing of a quarrel, the portal to violence. He who is prepared to cross that portal should in all honesty be prepared to go on to the sequel of blockade or war.

Perhaps it is natural enough that some who disagree with me on the main point either overlook, discount, or scorn certain of the values—in particular, the military values—which greatly concern me. I contend that they do so, or else they would feel greater trepidation about urging yet another overextension of the military power of the United States. This, mind you, in behalf of a moral principle, and not because our national honor has been crossed. Always it has been this way, that some men may become so enwrapped with a cause that they feel no compunction about beating the drums for a holy war which other men have to fight. That is no more to my taste than is the idea that we should enter upon any venture the end of which could well be the Congolization of yet another great expanse in Africa.

I cannot think of any principle which gives us a moral right to allow us to steer such a course.

But I do not rest on the proposition that what is most expedient for the United States is also best. The possibility of a vote on sanctions against South Africa arises only from what may develop out of the case now awaiting decision. I have endeavored here to bear witness that the proceeding against South Africa is not based on solid ground. Irrespective of how the Court may decide, it must seem to the eye of any trained observer that the general charges fall of their own weight. South Africa is accused of not having done her utmost to lift the state of the natives. She may be guilty of that. What is "utmost"? Every nation, and any person, might be brought to judgment for not having given an utmost contribution to the well-being of humankind, or the furthering of the humanities or human rights, for being mortal, we are all frail vessels, and the world seethes with trouble while self-interest is not yet outlawed. But I for one would attest that what the mandatory power has done over 40 years to elevate

the living conditions of the tribes deserves our respectful regard. South-West is no Garden of Eden. All things there fall short of perfect. Still, many wonders have been worked. I went there expecting even in my brief rounds to find widespread misery and degradation among the tribes, a resentment toward the overlord, expressed either in hostility or an apathy toward life. What I met was quite the opposite. The Bantu out in the reserves, and where they are employed in industry, walk proudly, heads up, a light in their eyes, and a smile on their lips. But as I measured the environment and the problem confronting the administrator, I could not but speculate that Americans, confronted with a like responsibility in a similarly waterless and forbidding countryside, could have done no better. And I speak as a west Texan reared in desert country.

I am under no obligation to South Africa except for the courtesies and cooperation extended me on my tours of inspection. That concludes what I have to put before this committee, save for my thanks that you have listened to me.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, General.

Did I understand you to say, General, that the population of South-West Africa is about a half million?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. And the country is very rich in diamonds?

General MARSHALL. I could not hear you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. The country is very rich in diamonds?

General MARSHALL. Yes. I think the take, as to the South-West Africa holdings, amounts to somewhere around 1,500 carats a day in gem stones.

Mr. O'HARA. The story as I read it is rather fantastic. First, I think about 1906 they discovered some diamonds. Then there was a lapse of about 10 years, under the desert sands there was another large find of diamonds. And then later off the coastlands more diamonds.

General MARSHALL. These are all alluvial deposits, Mr. Chairman. The diamonds are in a layer schist, in potholes and cracks of the schist under the sand dunes, and the sand dunes have to be stripped away. These are dunes as tall as any as you see in the Sahara or the Sinai Deserts. They will run 200 to 500 feet. It is necessary to take something like 175,000,000 equal parts of sand, strip that much away, to get 1 carat of diamonds.

Mr. O'HARA. That is very interesting. There is enough wealth there to take pretty good care of half a million people; is that right?

General MARSHALL. I am not sufficient of an economist, sir, to say how far it would spread.

Mr. O'HARA. Any of the natives that you saw there, did they give you the impression of being the children of a land rich with diamonds and of prosperity?

General MARSHALL. Yes, indeed.

Mr. O'HARA. All of them?

General MARSHALL. Not all of them. There are 3,400 Ovambo who work in the diamond fields. Oddly enough this is the only place I know where men work in shifts, and the shift is a year long. These 3,400 come down 1 year, they live there throughout that period at company expense, their income is around \$100 a month, some make \$75 a month, but everything else is taken care of for them by the

company. They move back to the tribe at the end of the year and then another 3,400 come on. That money is plowed back into the tribal homeland over the year.

Mr. O'HARA. What is the highest wages paid? Did you say \$100 a month?

General MARSHALL. \$100 a month.

Mr. O'HARA. How many people receive that pay?

General MARSHALL. To how many?

Mr. O'HARA. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I could not give you the breakdown on the rates. Highest pay would be to the operators of motor vehicles, or bulldozers—the semiskilled hands in the operation.

Mr. O'HARA. I found your testimony interesting, General. I presume that your services have been paid for by South Africa?

General MARSHALL. If you want the exact figure, I would be glad to give it to you.

Mr. O'HARA. If you wish to give it to us.

General MARSHALL. I would be delighted. I had no basis on which to calculate their debt to me. But when I am out of this country on a trip for my own country as a consultant or as a worker, and am paid by Government, I am paid \$125 a day. That's what I charged them. I counted only the time that was called for by my second trip and took nothing for the first trip or for the writing I did. I just took those days because that time was spent at their specific request.

Mr. O'HARA. And you have received no other financial benefits from the Government of South Africa?

General MARSHALL. That is not correct because they paid for my hotel and they paid for part of my meals.

Mr. O'HARA. That has been all?

General MARSHALL. That is all.

Mr. O'HARA. Then it is similar of testimony of other witnesses who have testified for South Africa, and the subcommittee thought in fairness to the witnesses it should be put in the record.

General MARSHALL. It is in my income tax report.

Mr. O'HARA. We didn't bring you here to question your integrity. As a military strategist, do you believe that the Republic of South Africa is essential to U.S. military strategy, and to what extent?

General MARSHALL. I feel the position of South Africa, that the maintenance of the status quo there—and I am not talking about the political conditions—the general strength and economic well-being of the country is certainly in our strategic interest. And that the creation of a condition of chaos anywhere on any part of that continent is detrimental to our strategic and our economic interest. If it came to sanctions, if it came to bringing down that Government through pressure exerted by the U.N. and turning to a new form of government, this could not be a matter that the U.N. could suddenly wash its hands of or the nations that engage could wash their hands of, saying: "It is your problem now; you go ahead and clean it up."

I return to the point I made, Mr. Chairman, that to vote sanctions one should be prepared to go all the way because this is, in essence, a hostile act. One should resolve one's self to face the ultimate once that step is taken, especially against such a vigorous state.

Mr. O'HARA. General, this subcommittee has received considerable testimony that the present policy in South Africa is a threat to our national peace and security as set forth in chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter and, therefore, sanctions should be invoked. I take it from your testimony that you do not think sanctions should be invoked?

General MARSHALL. I disagree.

Mr. O'HARA. You do not think the situation there threatens international peace?

General MARSHALL. I do not.

Mr. O'HARA. Some of the witnesses have testified in their opinion if this problem is not attended to within the next 2 years there will be a great blood bath in Africa, and that may spread throughout the entire world. You have no such fears?

General MARSHALL. I have no such fear.

Mr. O'HARA. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this time. I very much appreciate every word you have said.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Culver.

Mr. CULVER. No questions at this time.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Adair?

Mr. ADAIR. Just, General, to elaborate briefly upon the line of questioning of the chairman—and we have had testimony pro and con along this point—you as a trained military observer then, if I understand you correctly, say that if armed hostility should arise, in your opinion it is not likely to arise internally but could be externally?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, Congressman Adair. I see no likelihood of it arising internally, and I would say further I do not think it is possible for the states north of the Zambezi to fight a war on South Africa at any time in the immediate future, and I mean within the next 5 or 10 years.

Mr. ADAIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, just to recount the thrust of your testimony, you were invited to go to South-West Africa as a prospective witness in the Hague proceedings, is that correct?

General MARSHALL. In the first place?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes.

General MARSHALL. No.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You were invited—

General MARSHALL. Mr. Rosenthal, if there was that intent on the mind of the people that asked me, I haven't the slightest notion of it.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let me see if I can reframe the question.

You were invited to be an observer of conditions, and then if asked for your observations you would be a useful witness for the South African Government, and you would be willing to testify, is that a fair statement?

General MARSHALL. That is not a fair statement. I thought you understood, sir, I am primarily a writer. I make my living writing. I am a professional magazine writer, syndicated columnist and book writer. Whenever I have a chance to go where I can pick up material to write about I am ready to go.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you usually go to visit places that you may find material to write at the expense of your publisher or your own expense, or do you go—

General MARSHALL. I am a freelance. I am a retired man.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. At any rate, the South African foundation paid your expenses to go to South-West Africa, isn't that correct?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Are they financed by the South African Government?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I am sure they are not. I cannot give you an exact picture of how they are financed. The general thing is that they get contributions from the major industries and business houses of South Africa. The South African Government does not feed money into that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do most freelance writers in categories such as your own accept expenses from some third person to go to places about which they might write?

General MARSHALL. There is nothing unusual about this at all.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. At any rate, after you visited South-West Africa—you spent some months there, I think—you did testify in The Hague proceedings on behalf of South Africa?

General MARSHALL. I did not spend months there. I spent around 3 weeks there the first time, and the last time I was only there 8 days.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. On the basis of whatever it was, 3 weeks and 8 days, you did testify before The Hague proceedings?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. All your testimony here today was directed toward your observation of South-West Africa?

General MARSHALL. Right.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am just trying to find the relevancy of this testimony because the matter is in a court proceeding and once a judgment is made I assume you would recommend that the United States abide by the U.N. decision, would you not?

General MARSHALL. I thought I made that clear, that I felt that the United States should not vote for sanctions.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it your opinion that the United States should disregard the decision of the Court at The Hague?

General MARSHALL. If the United States is convinced that it is in its interest, then it should not use its influence that way or vote sanctions. After all, the Court is not going to recommend sanctions. The penalty, if there is one, will be assessed or decided upon within the U.N. Security Council.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How would the United States make an independent judgment, not having heard the testimony? I assume we have to rely on the presumably impartial observer who heard the testimony. It is like an arbitrator or referee. What is the purpose of having these hearings if you are not going to be in some way influenced by them?

General MARSHALL. As Mr. Dooley said, the Supreme Court sometimes follows the election returns, and this is true also of any court. The court is not without diverse political currents within itself.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Suppose the Court finds on behalf of South Africa, in support of the people that you testified, do you think we should be influenced by that decision?

General MARSHALL. I could only answer your question with a question. If the Court made a decision that was obviously in the view of Government against our interest to go along with, then should our Government go along with it just because it is a Court decision?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That is a very basic philosophic question, whether one wants to abide by a system of rules of law or one doesn't.

General MARSHALL. States have been up against this question many times.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I don't argue with your position if that is your position. If your position is that individuals or nations should not be bound by court decisions, you are perfectly entitled to that opinion.

General MARSHALL. I would certainly say that the United States should not be bound by a decision of the International Court which in the judgment of those who make policy for us might lead us into a war that we did not want which would finally be destructive of our major interests either in the United Nations or anywhere else.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. When you agreed to testify in that case I would think you hoped that your side would prevail or otherwise there would be no point in going there.

General MARSHALL. There was no such thought in my mind. I was asked to do an objective job. That is what I did. My statements were not questioned by the other side. The counsel for the other side said, "We are prepared to accept the truth of everything that has been said by General Marshall." I was simply there as a witness.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The competency of your testimony in that case was based upon 29 days of visiting South-West Africa?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I regret that I did not hear all of your statement, General Marshall. With what I did hear, I am in full agreement. I have said before in this committee, and I say again for the record, that the action of this Government in joining in the boycott of Rhodesia is reprehensible and an outright violation of article I of the Constitution of the United States, and it contravenes the Export Control Act of 1949 as amended last year, which says that it is the intent and will of Congress that this country not engage in a boycott of a friendly government. It calls upon U.S. exporters, urges them not to recognize the boycott by any foreign government of a foreign government friendly to the United States, and Rhodesia is friendly.

I say to you that it is true in both instances, in one a violation of the Constitution and in the other a contravention of the will and intent of the Congress of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be able to say a few words, although I am not a member of the subcommittee.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, General Marshall.

I beg your pardon. Congressman Fraser, I didn't note your arrival.

Congressman FRASER.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would in general terms subscribe to your view that where the national interest of the United States might be greatly imperiled that we would be compelled, the leadership of this country would be compelled, to respond first to our security interests.

However, if our security interests were not greatly impaired, or there might appear to be something less than a grave impairment, perhaps only some disadvantage in a strategic position, then I assume you would agree that our interest, and I am sure you share this, is that insofar as possible decisions of international tribunals be respected and upheld.

This would also have to be taken into account in measuring the total range of our national interest, isn't that so?

General MARSHALL. Correct, Congressman Fraser. May I add this to your interpretation of my position? I was trying in my paper to distinguish between that immediate and pressing peril to an interest and the cumulative effect of things that are not properly considered at the time as really jeopardizing our national interest and security.

As for example in 1948 when we got one leg out of Korea and left the other leg in. As a general staff officer I protested against this because I was certain we were going to get into war as a result of it. I have had to disagree with my country's policy in times past both as an officer and as a civilian in major matters of this kind because my life's work has led me to an understanding and awareness of the little things that seem to be insignificant at the time that just build up, up, up until the position is destroyed or until finally we are in a war that our people would like to have avoided.

Mr. FRASER. You correct me if I am wrong, but I would judge that you are indicating the way the United States would have to approach a possible United Nations action in support of a decision by the International Court of Justice. I don't presume that at this time you would say that regardless of what may be involved at that time that it would be against our national interest to support action by the United Nations. You would want to know what the circumstances were.

General MARSHALL. Exactly so.

Mr. FRASER. For example, it might well be that what the United Nations Security Council would opt to do would be to ask another nation to take over the mandate and displace South Africa. This is hypothetical because I have no idea they would do it, but they could ask another nation to take over the conduct of the mandate.

That would seem a reasonable proposition if the Court had ruled that South Africa had not properly carried it out.

General MARSHALL. It might seem a reasonable proposition at this range, but it is one certain way in my judgment to bring on a new war.

Mr. FRASER. Why should that be? Why should they have an interest in preserving a mandate control over South-West Africa? The mandate carries no territorial rights. It is simply an international obligation.

General MARSHALL. The course of South Africa ever since World War II has been marked by trying to bring the South-West into the Union, that is into alignment with South Africa. Gen. Jan Smuts was the first spokesman for the policy I think before the United Nations; and with an investment of this kind—with what has been

put into the territory by South Africa—I can understand South African feeling. At the time that Alaska was a territory, for example, or when Puerto Rico had just been taken unto us, we felt no less strongly about the necessity that we preserve it as a territory confined to our power than we felt about our own interior.

That was it. They were our charge.

Mr. FRASER. There is a difference here, is there not, in the case of Alaska and Puerto Rico?

General MARSHALL. These are differences of degree.

Mr. FRASER. Let me finish my question, if I may. While we didn't give these territories and have not yet allowed Puerto Rico statehood, we nevertheless claimed they were part of the United States, South-West Africa came under the mandate and control of the South Africans as I recall, through the League of Nations, isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Wouldn't it be your view that the South Africans have to respect the manner in which they acquire the right to exercise that mandate?

General MARSHALL. I am not going to exercise any moral judgment here, Congressman Fraser. I am going to say that is not the way South Africans look at it or feel about it, which is the important thing. They would not yield on it. Of that I am certain.

Mr. FRASER. I would think that is a very important principle. As I understand, the International Court of Justice has already ruled, I may be mistaken on this, that the United Nations succeeds the League of Nations and in effect the mandate carries over as a responsibility of the United Nations, and what you are saying in effect is if South Africa decided to annex or have an accession of territory of South-West Africa so that they claimed all of South-West Africa as part of their territory, you are saying because they feel this way, we should do nothing about it?

General MARSHALL. This is the nub of the basic disagreement between the U.N. and South Africa on this question. The U.N.'s case is based on the fact that it is the descendant in line tail-mane of the League of Nations and that the tribunal therefore has authority.

South Africa simply contends this is not so. There are collateral points of course, but South Africa does not recognize that the U.N. took over from the League of Nations in this particular.

Mr. FRASER. If this matter is resolved by the International Court of Justice which determine that the United Nations does have this authority—my understanding is that the primary issue before the Court now is whether the primary mandate has been violated. There has been an earlier decision on jurisdiction. I would think in this kind of case if there should be a ruling by the International Court of Justice that we would have a strong national interest in upholding the integrity of these proceedings. I am not saying that we may not have some countervailing circumstances, but this would be a very important point for the United States to sustain, to say, when the International Court of Justice has ruled, after oral argument, briefs and testimony, we, as the prime defenders of the rule of law, would like to see it sustained unless it would gravely imperil our interests.

Wouldn't you agree that is at least a reasonable position?

General MARSHALL. Without a doubt it is a reasonable position. This is true of every major decision that a nation makes with respect to its own security. There are always arguments on both sides. Sometimes the dilemma is absolute. My contention was that the countervailing considerations, as you put them, be weighed to the greatest possible extent before any more is taken by the United States.

Mr. FRASER. I have taken some time, but if I could ask one or two more questions. I would gather as a matter of principle you don't approve the policy of apartheid as pursued in South Africa?

General MARSHALL. I do not.

Mr. FRASER. Would you agree that someday other African nations may decide to take a hand in changing the arrangements in South Africa?

General MARSHALL. I see that as no threat in the immediate future. I am talking about the next 10 years.

Mr. FRASER. At some point if it should become a threat, what would be your view of our national interest?

General MARSHALL. I believe other questions confronting the United States and confronting the world are so much more complex and so much more serious than this that it is almost useless to discuss it as if we could project from here and say everything else being even as of now, this is what we would decide.

In other words, suppose out of the Rhodesian situation you should have a breakup in Zambia and Malawi within the next few months, this will change our whole perspective on the problem as it exists, or at least shade it seriously. You cannot maintain this thing in a vacuum.

Mr. FRASER. When Mr. Gross made the statement about Rhodesia, I don't know if he asked it in the form of a question, but it happened you were acquiescing in what he was saying. Do you regard our support of the British and our compliance with the ruling of the United Nations Security Council injurious to the U.S. interest?

General MARSHALL. I do.

Mr. FRASER. You believe it would be wiser to let the Ian Smith government exert its minority control over I think it is 4 million people of that nation?

General MARSHALL. I believe we have taken a short-range view of the problem, that a good many things were not considered when we moved so rapidly. I was rather intrigued or amused by the editorial reaction of the press of the United States at the time independence was declared by Rhodesia. Our willingness to declare to our people that things were so different. I remember quoting from the Detroit Free Press where it said:

Look at the difference. They declare independence and they do it using some of the same words we used in our Declaration of Independence. But look at the difference. We declared independence so we could be free, so we would have a right to determine our affairs. But all they are doing is declaring independence so they can maintain a white autocracy.

I thought to myself, "How hypocritical can you get?" The Declaration of Independence did not free one Negro slave. The Bill of Rights didn't lift up the position of one Indian or save one Indian's life. It took us more than a half century to work toward the position

where we could move toward forming the genuinely good society based on a brotherhood of man in line with our declarations.

We did so only after one of the bloodiest strifes in history. As to the white autocracy bit, many of us have forgotten that in the period following the Revolutionary War only 6 percent of the white people of the United States had the vote. It was not one man, one vote; we were a white autocracy. But we were given time to work out our problem.

This is the one thing we say that Rhodesia is not entitled to. Be like us right now. That is why I object.

Mr. FRASER. The truth of the matter, General, those have not been the requirements that the British have laid down. The British have only required there be some basis upon which all of the citizens of that country might one day be—

General MARSHALL. Correct. Mr. Fraser. Wouldn't you agree that the argument flew off like sparks? They were talking about different things, talking about the same thing, but in different terms, and then finally the breaking point was reached.

Mr. FRASER. The only thing that occurs to me, General, I have heard this argument that because the United States evolved toward the end of slavery and the enlargement of rights of the American Negro that this is likely to be the course in South Africa and Rhodesia. There is an important difference between the United States and these countries.

I doubt, and I don't believe you could demonstrate otherwise, had the South succeeded in its effort to secede from the Union, that today you would find the Negro in the South being given the rights that are now being given under Federal legislation. The realities are that the North has imposed its will through Federal legislation upon the South.

You cannot reproduce those circumstances in either South Africa or Rhodesia where there is a total commitment and total involvement of the whites to the notion of white supremacy founded on a racist concept of man. There is no likelihood you will reproduce the circumstances that prevailed here in the United States.

What does seem likely to me, and you probably disagree, is that because people are finally stirred more by ideas than anything else, that one day there will be some effort made to give these people who have every right that you and I have or should have, every right you and I have, to participate in their own future, and this will cause a major conflict on the continent of Africa and at that point we may be on the wrong side because this will be couched in the cold war ideology.

General MARSHALL. It could happen sometime. I can't see that far ahead, nor can any Member of the Congress.

Mr. FRASER. We have to make our best judgments.

General MARSHALL. I repeat that we cannot equate the two problems because in the case of Rhodesia, for instance, the same condition exists that I mentioned in connection with South-West; the overwhelming number of the Bantus, somewhere around 70 percent live out in the tribal homelands and do not want to have that changed which is a tremendous obstacle.

How would you do it? Tens of thousands of people still living in a condition where the influence of the witch doctor is great, where the individual even after he goes into a city and becomes a part of a city

complex working in a job, returns to his preserve once a year to pay his chief because he still owes homage to that chief, and then goes back to his job. That is nothing like any condition that we know in the United States.

Mr. FRASER. I don't truthfully know a great deal about South-West Africa. All I know is that the policies of apartheid in South Africa have not been confined to those non-Europeans who live in a tribal culture. Apartheid has been applied to Asians who have lived there for scores of decades, and applied to coloreds who lived in cities and had a right to vote and who now have been disenfranchised, who have been confined to ghettos, moved out of the cities and there is a general downward movement toward increased restrictions in that nation.

I would think that one's moral sensibilities would be offended greatly by the logic of apartheid as it has unfolded in Africa.

General MARSHALL. Sir, you already asked me that question. You asked me if I am sympathetic—

Mr. FRASER. I perhaps feel more strongly about it than you do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. General Marshall has a very rich background as a soldier and as a writer, including 35 years as chief editorial writer for the Detroit News and is presently a syndicated writer with the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times.

There being no objection, the biographical sketch of the general will be put into the permanent record.

The next witness is Mr. Hodding Carter of the Delta Democrat-Times of Greenville, Miss., and a Pulitzer Prize winner.

Would you proceed, Mr. Carter?

STATEMENT OF HODDING CARTER, GREENVILLE, MISS., TIMES

HODDING CARTER

Born February 3, 1907; B.A. Bowdoin College, 1927; reporter and editor capacities in various newspapers; editor, publisher of Delta Democrat-Times, Greenville, Miss., since 1939; member Pulitzer Prize Advisory Board; received Pulitzer Prize in 1946; Southern Literary Award, 1945; author of several books and contributor to numerous magazines.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, first I must apologize in advance for what will become apparent to you soon. I was unable to sleep at all last night because of a series of mishaps that proves that Foggy Bottom extends all the way to Mississippi. I will probably go to sleep while talking before you, while I am talking.

Secondly, I have recently suffered some impairment of my vision and have not been able to prepare the text, such as the able one General Marshall presented. I do have some notes which I think will afford some continuity to what I am going to say.

Like General Marshall I am a writer. I write books and magazine articles, and I publish newspapers.

I didn't go to South Africa as a newspaperman or even as a writer, although I did do some articles for some national magazines when I returned. I didn't go on the payroll of the Republic of South Africa. I was on the Rockefeller Foundation payroll, which I think is pretty much above reproach. They paid my way and that of my wife, and two of my youngest sons. We stayed there 6 months.

My designation was that of recipient of the first fellowship under what is called the United States-South Africa leader exchange program. It has nothing to do with the Government of South Africa or our own Government. It was in most respects six of the most pleasant months of my life in which I had my eyes opened in a number of respects, both for good and bad.

What we did for the most part was travel. We went through the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, Natal, and the Cape, almost constantly traveling.

I made something like 200 talks, mostly to universities and colleges, but also to groups in the population that were not all white. I talked to people of every political persuasion and almost every color. I talked to dedicated Communists, if that is the right word for a dedicated Communist—I have another one I prefer to use. I talked to them and they were determined that one of these days they were going to overthrow the leadership of the Union of South Africa.

I talked to a chief who I understand is still under house arrest, but who is identified with moderate nationalist Bantus, as the Africans are called there.

I talked to many Afrikaners, formerly known as Boers, and found they weren't all of the same point of view. In fact, the division between the extremists of the right, and the moderates and liberals in South Africa were numerically closer than you would think.

I talked, as I say, to every group, to Malayans who number a part of the population, to the Cape Coloreds, with a capital C, to the Bantu, the Indians. I learned a great deal.

My observations during my activities of speaking, listening, traveling, left me with certain strong impressions, particularly regarding the so-called policy of apartheid. It comes from certain deeprooted convictions of the white man, and particularly of the white man of Dutch and Huguenot descent.

Paramount among those convictions that led to a long ago policy of apartheid was a sense which is not held or felt alone by South Africans. This was a sense of racial superiority and a determination that the white man will rule in South Africa.

That takes on additional meaning when you consider the weight of numbers. If the ratio of black to white were the same in the United States as it is in South Africa—and I am not talking about all of Africa, but just Africa south of the Sahara—we would have 800 million Negroes to less than 200 million white, roughly 4 to 1.

In addition to the pressure of numbers there is the determination that one man, one vote shall not be the order of the day—and I completely agree with that. I think one man-one vote for South Africa, with no other restrictions on the ballot, is sheer political idiocy, and I think the white people who live there know it better than I do.

The third factor is the very real fear of Communist influence. If we can go 6,000 miles to contain communism in southeast Asia, you can't particularly blame the South Africans for going 1 mile from Johannesburg. They know that Communist guerrilla squads are being trained in a number of former colonies in Africa. They know that almost without exception, as these nations emerge, the leaders of the emerging process have threatened and promised one day South Africa is going to be brought to its knees.

They were more worried about that a few years ago than they are now because it looks to me, and I think they feel the same, that these emerging nations are submerging about as fast as they are emerging and don't offer any great threat now to the security of South Africa. I agree with General Marshall that certainly in the next 10 years South Africans can take care of themselves if their hands aren't tied behind their backs.

All of this adds up for the white South Africans to the feeling that they are almost in a state of war with a potential enemy who is black and who outnumbers them more than 50 to 1, if you take all the blacks south of the Sahara, and in a state of economic and political war with much of the Western World.

One of the results has been intensification of the insistence on apartheid, the determination to keep the black people and the white apart from each other and do the best they can, which is better than we do, as the general said, to raise the status of the black South Africans. They may only get a hundred dollars a month. But that is more than they get in British Bechuanaland or anywhere in the African Continent.

He is paid better in South Africa than anywhere else on the continent. The problem is not to keep the black Africans in South Africa. It is probably to keep them out. One of the great border troubles is trying to withstand the continuing stream of Africans wanting to come over there and live in what by and large is a lot better housing than two-thirds of the people in Harlem live in and get paid money which is more than they can get anywhere else, to attend schools which may be primitive by our standards, but better than anywhere else on the continent.

I resent some of those pressures, which, for the newspapers, although they will tell you they enjoy a certain freedom of the press, result in their having to walk a tight rope. Newspapermen can be very badly handled and some have been. The night passes, and such things, are things you and I would not want to live with.

I say the only way to understand it is that these people, outnumbered as greatly as they are, do believe that they face the antagonism of a whole continent and the antagonism of much of the Western World. It doesn't make for good sleeping and it doesn't make for living under the same conditions we like to think that we live under in this country.

On the visit I had certain distinct impressions besides the sense, which I share with the general, that we have indulged in some hypocrisy in this matter. I would like to point out at the northern end of Africa and a little to the east, across the Suez, in what is the Middle East, is a nation which greatly resembles South Africa. They are a tough, resolute people. I am speaking of the Israelis. They are surrounded by unfriendly people in more than the ratio, certainly as much of a ratio as the South Africans. At times they have had to take stern measures to protect themselves.

The Israeli, like the South African, believe that they belong to a people chosen by God. If people believe that, you don't have much of a chance to change their minds. The Israelis think this; so do the South Africans.

They believe the land which they entered upon is theirs by the divine will of God. They believe this land was ordained to them by God, and the Israeli and the South African both made the desert bloom like a rose. South Africa is one of the most beautiful countries—much of it thanks to man's cultivation, that I have ever seen in my life. South Africa and Israel both emerged to nationhood by way of the British Empire: One has an mandate after World War I which eventually fought for its freedom, the other a former colony which has now cut all its ties with the British Commonwealth, then declaring its independence as we declared ours, and for pretty much the same reasons.

South Africa's concern at the time was not with the continuance of apartheid. It was certain other political relationships. I can think of some others. South Africans and Israelis are very, very tough people and neither the Arabs nor Africans are going to change their way of life or we will have quite a little war.

We as a nation should indulge in no actions that will precipitate such wars, such as arming these people or tying their hands behind their back and arming their enemies. They are not going to take it lying down. If we are going to do it because of mistreatment of other peoples, why don't we pick on somebody our size. Take on Russia, for instance. Russia misuses people by crimes just as heinous as the racial attitudes. Russia abuses people who believe in the same form of government we do. Among the Mongols she uses pretty much the same techniques.

Take the fighting between the Pakistanis and the Indians, or between the various castes. Gandhi is supposed to have outlawed the caste system and the untouchable as such. That is not so. Why not intervene in India. Why not intervene on the island on which the Nationalist Chinese live. I have not heard that the nationalists have treated the Formosans with any great degree of equality.

If we are going to intervene, let's start at the top and work on down. I repeat, otherwise this is sheer hypocrisy. As I said, apartheid is the result of certain fears, certain attitudes that are there and which have existed for a long time.

You are not going to stop them either by isolating that country or by living as we do and not showing any better example to the South Africans that much of the rest of the world can tell by the last few years. My newspaper is not the Times, but the Democratic Times, and I am pleased as to what has taken place in the last few years, particularly in this regard.

I might say also that down home I am known not as a racist, no, but something which in Mississippi is a dirty word. I am a moderate. That is worse than being a Red in Mississippi. People may be a little surprised to hear me say some of these things. I don't believe isolation or sanctions would solve the South African. It would precipitate a war. A war we don't want, a war with one of only two nations in Africa and the Middle East, with the possible exception of Liberia, that is friendly with us, that will stick by us in a fight, the other nation being Israel.

The two countries again are so much alike that it is truly amazing, but the most amazing thing about it all is the way we treat Israel on

the one hand and the way we are setting about treating South Africa on the other.

I have no answers as to what to do. I think this thing is taking its own course. I think the people in South Africa, intelligent Afrikaners, the Boers, and English speaking, are coming more and more to the realization that they have to do something politically for these submerged people. They deserve to vote not on the basis of one man, one vote, but on the basis—I would settle, as I wanted to in Mississippi a long time ago, for a sixth grade level of education, fourth grade to them, and give some restrictions on the vote, otherwise you would have more than three million people, who have built a culture of which anyone could be proud, and who are building an industrial society and much else besides who I know would go down tomorrow if this Uhuru went the full way and the 12 million black Africans would have the right to vote completely on racial grounds. The white man would be run politically and other ways into the sea.

They are 3 million people out of a continent of 250 million people and we singled them out as an object lesson. It is hypocritical and opinionated, and to hell with it.

Let me repeat, because this seems to be so important. I wasn't on the South African payroll. I am not today. I am not on anybody's payroll but my own. What I tell you comes from my heart and my reluctance to see a basically decent and brave people—I might say I am prejudiced. Two of my uncles were mining engineers in South Africa. One fought on the side of the Boers in the Boer War. Another one lived out his life there. I had six first cousins born there.

I have known about South Africa, even though I have visited it only once, ever since I could remember. I grew up full of admiration for the Zulus as well as the others. Instead of playing Indians off the reservation and cowboys, I used to play Zulus and Boers as a kid.

I think the best book written for boys is one called "Jock of the Bushveld." You may learn something more about South Africa if you will take time out to read and enjoy also the beautiful illustrations in that book.

So I say in conclusion that I am to a degree prejudiced toward those people. I have no reason not to be. I do not agree with racial biases, but we have them all over the world. Let me say this one last time, why should it start down there? Pick somewhere else.

Thank you.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you very much, Mr. Carter. As I recall you were given the southern literary award in 1945; is that right, sir?

Mr. CARTER. Roughly.

Mr. O'HARA. The following year the Pulitzer Award.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. O'HARA. That was for your writings on race inequalities?

Mr. CARTER. Right.

Mr. O'HARA. You were a pioneer in that field, one of the pioneers? Do you see any similarity of the situation in South Africa with the situation in our own country before the decision of the Supreme Court?

Mr. CARTER. The first piece I wrote after I got home, Mr. Chairman, was for the Saturday Evening Post and the title of that piece, it will give you an idea of its content, was that "We Never Felt More

"At Home." I felt more at home in South Africa than anywhere else except in the State of Mississippi.

I said the matter was critical. I wrote things that I liked. They are a homogeneous Protestant outdoor people, and have as I said—turned what was not a paradise into a near paradise, except for the race inequalities which exist, but which I know do not take intervention or sanctions to bring about changes.

Those changes are coming. I do not think this conflicts with any ideas about South Africa and my own ideas and some things that I have helped to bring about in my own State of Mississippi.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Carter, we really feel honored you have been with us today. For the subcommittee, I thank you very much and apologize for the circumstances that visited you last night. You told me you got no sleep last night. You gave up a whole night's sleep to be with us. Thank you, sir.

Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very deeply interested in these testimonials. I had the opportunity of serving on an ad hoc committee of the United Nations in 1953 and part of my ad hoc job was South Africa. I dug into it from that angle very definitely.

Then in 1955 I went to Africa and I had 2 or 3 weeks in South Africa, all over the place. I am intensely interested in their efforts. Stellenbosch was a most fascinating place. One of their top men I had dinner with and he was very full of the fact that God had told him what to do and had singled him out to do this, and he began quoting some of the Bible at me, but he only quoted half the verse.

I happened to know that part of the Bible and I quoted the rest of it to him. It was a little disconcerting to him. We had it back and forth a bit, very pleasantly. I found out a great many things. I think one of the things we Americans need to know is the opposite point of view that other countries have. We have been closed into our own frontiers and have done what we have wanted to for so long.

We need to know how different people are and how they feel and think. I had friends who lived in Johannesburg behind a high wall and they had a machinegun on a porch. That is not my idea of how I want to live. It was very revealing all around.

I went out to where a great many coloreds lived. Dr. Wohlman had done a great deal for the coloreds. I found them an exceedingly interesting and tragic group. I met a good many of the Indians, particularly the women, and have known something of them anyway. I found the whole melange of the races and cultures something like my own district in Cuyahoga County and Cleveland. We had many first and second generation foreign. They speak every language under heaven. We get along pretty well. We have about 12 percent Negroes in our district. They are great friends of mine. I think I went to South Africa without any prejudice and I certainly learned a great deal. In talking with the Ambassador here it helped me in many ways. We tried to understand each other but I found it rather difficult and so did he.

We were honest about it. We wanted to know. I suppose the Afrikaner is the same as a Boer, isn't he?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. I think they feel that is the best way to help the non-white, particularly the African group. They will then make their own way in their own time. They mustn't be hurried, pushed around and shoved. Here we have done differently. We have tried to take the way of evolutionary processes which is not very easy. We are having our troubles.

I keep thinking of our experiences here on every hand. When I got to Africa, Miss Lucy down in Birmingham was on every newspaper's front page. It was very interesting to attempt to explain what we were trying to do. They explained what they were trying to do. For myself I think that evolution is a thing that nature takes its own time about and is never hurried. She won't really shove us around very much.

I think that I feel your testimony is somewhat the way I feel.

Mr. CARTER. Precisely.

Mrs. BOLTON. I think the general felt the same way as to change. Have we hurried them here? It is pretty hard to change a whole method of life and thinking. I am deeply grateful to you for what you have said, and I shall read the notes with much interest a little later on.

Thank you.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Carter, let me say initially I am thoroughly aware of your reputation and your writings and all of the things you have done down in your area. I commend you for them. Your credentials as far as I am concerned are unblemished.

I am very pleased that you had an opportunity to appear before the committee. It would seem to me that your conclusion was that evolution is a good thing rather than revolution, and I suppose a lot of us might well agree with that. I also assume that you disagree with racial inequality as such.

Mr. CARTER. Very much so.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. And your past performance has certainly supported that position. As a matter of fact, the words that you used were that South Africa is a near paradise except for race inequality. Assuming that you subscribe to the theory that evolution is a better, and reasonable, and more acceptable solution of eliminating racial inequality, I wonder if you could tell us what evolutionary progressive steps the present South African Government has taken to eliminate racial inequality?

Mr. CARTER. The present South African Government has not taken any I know of. What is changing down there is what is in the minds of the people who will take over the Government later. I am speaking of Afrikaners and others who know this is wrong. They believe in their hearts also this is true, that the change is coming.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Some of the things we have heard about is that the law has become tighter, more restrictive, more retrogressive than past laws, and the work opportunities, the jailings, limitation on free speech and assembly in addition to the loss of voting privileges, that they have gotten worse rather than better since the time you have visited South Africa.

Mr. CARTER. They have not gotten better yet. I won't change the phrase, but it can be a relative period of storm before the calm.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I would be delighted to join with you in support of evolution if I thought there was a glimmer of hope or some evidence to support the conclusion the evolutionary process has begun. It seems since the 5 years you have been there things have gone from bad to worse.

Mr. CARTER. I think it is fear of the emerging nations and the continual hammering away by others, not among the African emerging nations, and they are given the desperate feeling they are on the verge of a state of war. I do not know that the Communists must be busy there. I know of no more fertile area for them to be busy in. They know this too. As I say, I met two Communists, the only two I am sure of, both of whom made no bones about it, that one of these days the Communists would direct the revolution to overthrow the South African Government.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am sure if you met a Communist in any free country, they would be delighted to tell you that. The thing that worries some of us is that we should give them the ammunition that will make their job easier. If the blacks in South Africa are pushed against the wall, if apartheid becomes stricter, if their life becomes more unbearable, which way will they turn?

Mr. CARTER. The intellectuals, yes, but the rank and file do not feel this way yet. They must be led in that direction. The African intellectual who feels this way, he in turn can very well influence the others. Right now I am sure those people are trying to get into South Africa and not out, those who work in the mines, on the farms, in the town.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The black people in South Africa, native Africans, do they have any hope that their lot will improve?

Mr. CARTER. Men like Chief Lithuli, who is known as a moderate over there, I don't think the South African Government believes that, but he believes the way to do it is to topple, and they have had some close elections over there, even though it is 100-something to 38, the opposition party. The numerical balance is a lot nearer than you might think. Where the change of heart is going to come is among the Dutch descendants. I wish there was, in this room, and could be questioned a young South African newspaperman who is in this country now. I think he would give you a heartening word about some of these things.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let's see if I can put your testimony in perspective for my self-enlightenment. You strongly disapprove of the policy of apartheid?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What would you do to correct it?

Mr. CARTER. Have it voted out.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How can you do that if the people who want to vote against it can't vote?

Mr. CARTER. You don't understand what I am trying to say. I said many white South Africans, including the Dutch, the Boers, are inclined to make some concessions. I believe this. Pressure may be helping. Again I wish I had some young South Africans, Afrikaners, here to testify to this fact.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think the American press has been unfair to the South African Government?

Mr. CARTER. I don't read all of the American press. I think in some respects, yes. In some respects, the South African Government brought it on themselves. I say we have been too selective as to this little country—it is a little country—as a target. We have bigger and more important targets in this whole business of getting along with other people.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. One of the things that we are fighting for in Vietnam is the freedom of individuals to make their own choice, the choice of where they want to live, work, a choice of what kind of government they would like to have. We are putting an enormous effort into that in the policy now.

Do you see any relationship between the people in South Vietnam and the blacks in South Africa?

Mr. CARTER. I think in South Vietnam there has been a policy as to Roman Catholics, Buddhists. There has been political distinction made. In the intervention in South Africa we have to intervene all over again, and in South Vietnam it has to become united, if it does. There are so many places we could—

Mr. ROSENTHAL. It seems to me that we have accepted as a basic premise that the rights of man and the rights of self-determination is something we subscribe to. We intend to support it with varying degrees depending on the exigencies of the situation.

I wondered if you believe the right to vote in southeast Asia more or less important than the right to vote in South Africa?

Mr. CARTER. In that, if this is true, if the literacy of southeast Asia is higher than that of Africa, I would be more in favor of a broader base of suffrage in southeast Asia than Africa.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you have any reason to believe that the literacy rate in South Vietnam is higher than in South Africa?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You don't know?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know. It couldn't be lower. It could be lower because they have done quite a remarkable job of secondary education of the African.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. These Africans that have achieved secondary education, do they have the right to vote?

Mr. CARTER. No. I made many talks over there and I will say that, what it is now I don't know; then I had freedom of speech, movement. The only ones I did talk to were the two Communists. In my talks to universities especially I said this is not right. The Cape Coloreds, as they are called, by and large are literate and I would say have a relatively high rate of literacy. They are town dwellers. They have had schools available.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They don't have the right to vote.

Mr. CARTER. No, it is a shame.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Who is going to do something about it?

Mr. CARTER. The ones who have the right to vote will do something about it. I believe this.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Just putting it on simple moral grounds, you can find nothing to approve of in the policy of apartheid?

Mr. CARTER. No. I don't think it is expediency. It will say that a great many white South Africans honestly believe that giving these people their Bantustans, much as what we gave the American Indian—no; I would say they honestly believe that a separate nation within the nation, with a degree of self-government, they can't engage in foreign affairs, the Bantustans, they can't have their standing armies, but as far as local self-government, it is my belief they have that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think a government should have the right to move people around based on nothing but color?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They have done that, haven't they?

Mr. CARTER. They have done that, but very few have gone willingly.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am just trying to come to a conclusory point. You seem to be in disagreement with their racial policies, you say it is a paradise. Is this based on physical beauty?

Mr. CARTER. I meant that. Not that it is a political paradise.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I assume it is a paradise, I have not been there, perhaps a physical paradise, but politically it is something far removed from paradise.

Mr. CARTER. That is right.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it your position that this Government, the U.S. Government, should encourage their citizens to support the political system there, or should we do whatever we can to tell American citizens not to support it?

Mr. CARTER. To the extent of being punitive about it, I don't see that we should. If we do, we have bigger targets than that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think the American Government should remain aloof from these South African policies?

Mr. CARTER. If we are to apply sanctions, I am against sanctions.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Taking a step down the road, do you think we should encourage American businessmen to go in there and support these policies?

Mr. CARTER. No. I dont think we should tell them they should or shouldn't or can't.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Carter, the views you have expressed have come as close to the heart of this problem as anyone can come, which is to try to have some idea of what the future holds in South Africa. If through time and the apparent natural expansion of individual liberty which seems to characterize most social orders, if that process could be believed to be in existence in South Africa, I think your position would be persuasive.

It is primarily on that consideration, for example, that while there are people oppressed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and other countries, Spain and other nondemocratic countries, that the long term seems to hold some hope of moderation.

I have a problem however in seeing this in racial matters. My observations, and your certainly are more profound than mine, is that when man decides another man is to be treated differently because of the color of his skin there is an erosion and corrosion to the human spirit which goes with this, and that things move backwards.

I am reminded for example of the fact that in the North, where we claim to be so enlightened about our relationships, that actually housing discrimination, which is the most acute form of discrimination that is seen in the North, increased over the first half of the 20th century.

I think it might well be increasing today except that there has been some governmental intervention. I find it hard, as I was suggesting to General Marshall, to believe that if the South had seceded in the Civil War, that there would have been any forces that promised any liberation for those Negro citizens who were in the South.

This is the problem that I see. Your views are obviously thoughtful and considerate, but it is on this point, does time—the passage of time—bring about a liberation where the racial element is the central feature of the social order?

Mr. CARTER. I can only say that economic factors without a doubt would have brought emancipation of the American Negro before the turn of the century. There were too many leaders of the South who saw that in economic terms. Whether on balance it is better to have killed, how many, roughly 600,000 men and many others maimed, to save 35 years or less, I don't know.

I don't know on balance which is better. I am certain emancipation would have come. There was almost no slavery in Tennessee. If slavery was one of the causes of the war, and the continuance of it one of the causes for the South to secede, there was bound to have been quite a profound split among southerners because in at least five Southern States the vote on secession was very close.

In Tennessee they didn't know for days whether she was in the Union or out.

Mr. FRASER. I don't mean this in any derogation of my colleagues, but I look how the vote went on the civil rights vote before the Congress. The truth is that there weren't many members who felt they could survive an election campaign had they voted, for a civil rights measure.

Let's leave that for a moment if we may. If one puts one's self in the shoes of a non-European South African, I would think that one would feel compelled to struggle against what, from that point of view, would appear to be an oppressive system, one which destroyed political rights.

It would seem to me someday, and you may be right about the time element that there may be a civil war of some dimensions in South Africa. If that should occur and should threaten to embroil other African nations, what then would you suppose should be the policy of the United States?

Mr. CARTER. Certainly not to side with other African nations.

Mr. FRASER. You would side with the whites—

Mr. CARTER. I would say this is their affair. We should stay out of more wars than we have done.

Mr. FRASER. For example, there was an intervention in Cyprus because of a fight of this character. Do you think it was unwise to have gone in there?

Mr. CARTER. Cyprus?

Mr. FRASER. Yes, with the United Nations.

Mr. CARTER. They were going to have to stop fighting, not to take part in it. They were trying to stop it.

Mr. FRASER. I understand that. What I come to, you see, hypothesizing that a war will break out, which I think it will some day, which amounts to a racial war in South Africa, if you intervene to stop it, you just can't let it go at that, you are then compelled to face up to the basic grievance of the non-European, which is that he has been subjected to the whim and will of the white minority. At that time it seems to me we would have no choice but to pursue those values on which our own country is founded.

Wouldn't you agree?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, but I think it is proper to assume that there will be wars on the African Continent between rival African nations before there will be a war between the South Africans and the rest of the Africans.

Mr. FRASER. There may be. We may intervene in those as well. I would say to you if I were a non-European South African I would be out organizing. I think you would too.

Mr. CARTER. I think I would too.

Mr. FRASER. And they are, of course, to some extent.

Mr. CARTER. Most of them yet don't feel that way. As a group they do not have the political consciousness that even the Mississippi Negro had prior to action by Congress and the Supreme Court and the administration.

Mr. FRASER. I find this to be a very uncertain finding to rely on. I think if you had to go through the rural area in South Vietnam there would be little political interest, but it becomes the area for a major conflict. Are there things that we can do to avoid a major war in the southern end of Africa—let me just ask that question.

Mr. CARTER. I don't know. I don't think we can do it by disarming in effect white South Africa and arming black Africans.

Mr. FRASER. I am not suggesting that.

Mr. CARTER. I don't know what we could do, frankly.

Mr. FRASER. Do you think we ought to do anything?

Mr. CARTER. It is easy to answer in generalities. In generalities I think anything would be helpful.

Mr. FRASER. Pursuing Mr. Rosenthal's question, supposing that we attempted to dissuade the business community from expanding their operations there?

Mr. CARTER. That would, in effect, be a boycott of private businesses. It is a little different from massive governmental intervention in what could be called their own internal affairs. There is the struggle between races, religions and ideologies. I think we would be out of our province.

Mr. FRASER. If I could give you my own quick view of this question of intervening in affairs in other nations, although I don't think it is necessarily persuasive to you. As I have thought back during the 1930's and what went on in Germany, it is my conclusion that never again can we say that what happens inside another nation can remain beyond our concern no matter what.

Mr. CARTER. This is perfectly true.

Mr. FRASER. It seems to me, too, as members of the human race we have to have a basic regard for individual dignity and freedom

whether our concern stems from the Soviet Union, South Africa, or wherever it is, and that the sole question that remains to be answered is how do you go about expressing our concern in a way that doesn't draw you in over your head, and which is compatible with your capabilities, and doesn't lead to worse evils than you try to correct.

This is the question I find so difficult in South Africa because in other places of the world I can see that time may provide some answers.

Mr. CARTER. This is a matter of short term and long term contracts. These other African nations do not have even the simple skills that the South African urban—

Mr. FRASER. I wouldn't argue this at all.

Mr. CARTER. One way it seems to me to help is for the Africans in South Africa who have skills which are needed to go up to the Congo. Their ancestors came down as migrants. If they went the other way—

Mr. FRASER. Would you favor a strong program on the part of our country to help educate the refugees from South Africa?

Mr. CARTER. Sure. By "refugees" you mean those who might go into the other countries?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. Sure.

Mr. FRASER. You made some reference to one man, one vote. What you are saying was, as I understood it, that wasn't feasible at this time?

Mr. CARTER. I don't think it is really feasible anywhere. One man, one vote without a degree of education and mental competence, I don't see where you benefit a nation by—

Mr. FRASER. I don't know if I would argue with that. If South Africa would impose some educational requirements and literacy requirements and apply them uniformly, if they were reasonable it would seem to me that no one could quarrel with this and this would begin the long process of enfranchisement.

But the fact they are moving backward rather than holding even is the tragedy.

Mr. CARTER. The Bantu and the Boer began fighting before the turn of the 18th century. They were looking for grazing land. They have been more or less fighting ever since. I do know that even your Boer down there has a great respect for the Zulu as a fighting man. With that past of bloodshed, and of abuse—what would happen, of course, this is the crux of what the white Africans say, even if you restrict the ballot to educated, say high school or grammar school education, black South Africans would vote en masse against any white officeholder and they would win, because there are something like 3,250,000 whites in South Africa, and something like 12 million blacks, and you have colored and you have Asians, Indians.

As to these other groups, I don't think a white government would last. They don't think so either. That is why they have a tiger by the tail. It is different when the Negro is only 1 man in 10 as in this country. And even in Mississippi the Negro population in terms of percentage is no problem. There is no Southern State today and very

few southern counties where on a head count a Negro can outvote the white. We could take a different view. I expect to see Negroes elected to office in my town. They will be in other towns and have been in other towns before the recent Civil Rights Act.

In my town Negroes have voted without obstruction since World War II. The point I am trying to make is my town and my county have a long history of, if you want to call it, racial good will. I am not afraid of the Negroes all voting Negro and the whites voting white. They have not demonstrated that in our elections.

But I am certain in South Africa that the Bantu would vote Bantu all the way, until he can achieve some stature in which he could measure his own economic interest as against his color. In that case you could find a different kind of alliance.

There is very little resistance anywhere in the vote for Negroes except in northern Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi. Nobody is really worried about a takeover of State government by a bloc vote of people who are certainly more literate than the masses of Africans, but who in terms of government are illiterate still.

We don't have to worry about that in this country. If there were 800 million Negroes in this country to 200 million, that is the ratio in South Africa, I would be worried.

Mr. FRASER. There is no doubt that this fear exists and I think you see it in some parts of Mississippi today, the citizens who fear the Negro vote.

Mr. CARTER. That is true.

Mr. FRASER. When you think there has been a century that the Federal Government has been committed to the franchise and equality, you wonder how long the road will be in South Africa. Yet, all the people in South Africa are entitled to the same basic rights.

Mr. CARTER. Of course there is also the right to survive. I don't think the white people in South Africa would survive a complete rapid change.

Mr. FRASER. This is the prison into which the white has put himself, because the non-Europeans in South Africa don't seek to drive out the whites, they seek a multiracial society. They are not imprisoned, as the whites are by their fear.

Thank you very much, Mr. Carter.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you very much. We appreciate your being here.

The next witness is Dr. William Percy Maddox, a Rhodes scholar, with a masters and a doctors degree from Harvard. He taught at the University of Oregon, University of Virginia, Harvard, Princeton, University of Pennsylvania. He was formerly Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in South Africa, and is now vice president for academic affairs, Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, N.Y. There being no objection, the biographical sketch will be included in the record.

Mr. O'HARA. Dr. Maddox, will you proceed, sir, please.

**STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM P. MADDOX, VICE PRESIDENT FOR
ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, PRATT INSTITUTE, BROOKLYN, N.Y.**

(Following is biographic data of William P. Maddox:)

WILLIAM PERCY MADDOX

Born November 21, 1901; St. John's College, B.A. 1921; Rhodes scholar, Oxford University, B.A. 1925; Harvard University, M.A. 1931, Ph. D. 1933; U.S. Army 1943-46; taught at University of Oregon, University of Virginia, Harvard, Princeton, and University of Pennsylvania 1925-42; special assistant, Council on Foreign Relations 1941-42; Chief, Division of Training Service, Department of State, 1948; Director, Foreign Service Institute, 1947; Counselor, Pretoria, South Africa, 1955; consul general August 23, 1959, with personal rank minister February 21-November 30, 1961, in Singapore; retired from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as disarmament adviser, June 1962; presently at Pratt Institute.

Dr. MADDOX. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, you gentlemen are already aware of the basic characteristics of the situation in South Africa and doubtless have had testimony from experts with a more intimate and recent knowledge of that country than I can claim. For, although I have maintained a lively interest in its affairs, in both the internal and international aspects, my own direct acquaintance with South Africa is based on service as counselor of the American Embassy as long ago as from 1955 to 1959. Hence, I cannot offer firsthand evidence of current developments but, rather, with your permission will present a point of view, and reflections of a general nature, based on my lifelong dedication—as an educator, public official, and citizen—to the subject of American foreign policy.

The hundred-odd independent countries of the world reflect an extensive diversity of races, languages, cultural traits, philosophies, religions, physical environments, and types and levels of development. From its own special configuration, congealed through its history, each country has evolved a complex of these variables into a political and social order peculiar to itself.

As we look out upon these hundred-odd differing human conglomerations called nations, what do we see? We see scarcely more than a score which have managed to develop some sort of an orderly democratic system roughly compatible with our own; that is, a self-governing people with individual freedom and justice substantially guaranteed by the rule of law.

The remainder range from mixed forms of governments to one-party states to mild dictatorships to despotisms. Within many, various forms of injustices—according to our values—are practiced. We see discrimination, and the arbitrary subjection of large groups of people—on account of religion, or tribal affiliation, or race, or castes, or political beliefs. We see national rulers who have little respect for the law or the independence of the judiciary. We see the strong exploiting the weak, or the rich the poor. We are aware of the chronic instability of many regimes, of rigged elections and corruption, of terrorism, and a dozen times a year we read of violence and bloodshed in the overthrow of a government.

None of these conditions of injustice, oppression, or violence are to our liking. We abhor them all. We wish all countries would reform and develop more tolerant, humane, and orderly systems of gov-

ernment. We want them to be nice people like ourselves, or as we would like to be.

But, after all, this world of multidiversity, with so many standards not conforming to our own, was not of our making. So what can, or should, we do about it? In my judgment, there is at least one thing we cannot and should not do. We cannot and should not take on the massive task of trying to make over the internal constitutions and policies of other peoples in our image. I would apply this to South Africa, with its objectionable racial discrimination, the same as I would to any country, whatever conditions of unjust and despotic rule might prevail.

Although we have not always been consistent, the United States has generally clung to a policy of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries. The policy is founded on principle and sanctioned by long experience as well as pragmatic considerations.

It is a policy which does not rule out efforts exerted through quiet diplomacy to persuade foreign rulers to change their ways. Indeed, under certain circumstances, such diplomacy has a very important role to play. But the policy does caution firmly against the application of overt concrete pressures and forceful actions, designed to bring about basic changes in a foreign country's constitutional structure or internal policies.

The policy has its limitations, of course. On occasions we have intervened because of compelling national security or national interest considerations. I see no such considerations present in respect to South Africa.

On other occasions, the complete breakdown of law and order and a descent into anarchy may warrant remedial action by the governments of other civilized societies. No such conditions exist in South Africa.

Furthermore, a policy of noninterference in domestic affairs in no way affects the actions we may take, and may be obligated under the U.N. Charter to take, in the event of external aggression or a threatened breach of international peace. I see no evidence that South Africa is guilty of either, despite allegations of some African governments. If there is a threat to the peace of the continent, it comes principally from elements outside South Africa agitating for direct action against it, or for armed rebellion within.

It is, I fully accept, in the American humanitarian spirit and tradition to be concerned about the welfare of other peoples. We have demonstrated this again and again through foreign assistance and other programs. But when it comes to trying to change the political system or the structure of interracial relations in another country, I suggest not only the utmost forbearance and caution, but a little humility. We need only remind ourselves of chapters in our American Indian history. It is replete with exploitation, breaches of solemn agreements, and violence. And in respect to the Negro, we were long dilatory, especially after the Civil War, and still are far from having achieved our declared national aims.

Perhaps in recent years we have moved faster to reform ourselves than have some other peoples to reform themselves. But for many years we lagged behind other progressive countries, so we might be a little more tolerant today of those who still lag after us.

It should be apparent at this point that I would oppose the imposition by the United States, either independently or concertedly, of economic restraints, boycotts, embargoes, blockades, or more drastic measures—designed to compel South Africa to abandon apartheid.

But let me continue. In the long run, whatever basic changes for the better take place in South Africa, or in any other country, should and must and will develop from within. As outsiders, not only have we little business telling the South Africans how to run their show but, also, in my view, persistent organized overt attempts to do so would be self-defeating and counterproductive. I can imagine how the average American would react to any concerted foreign effort, in the U.N. or otherwise, to compel us to change our constitutional structure and way of life.

I have read a number of studies on whether collective economic sanctions against South Africa could be effective. I am still not certain as to what is meant by "effective"; it depends on the purpose.

If the purpose is punitive and vengeful, maybe some hardships could be imposed on South African peoples, and, if so, it would be on both white and black.

If the purpose is cathartic—a kind of soul cleansing by people who feel they must do something, anything, to uphold righteousness against evil—perhaps some relief might be afforded.

A third purpose might be the hope of winning friends by supporting those African and Asian governments who raise shrill and frenzied voices in agitating for direct action against sinful South Africa. I suggest that in the world of kaleidoscopic power changes—where the Ben Bellas, Nkrumahs, and Sukarnos come and go—the anticipated friendship of rulers is a slender and insubstantial reed upon which to rest foreign policy. And yet one of the most insistent demands for sanctions from well-intentioned people is that unless we join in the crusade against South Africa, we will forfeit the good will of Africans and Asians. It is also argued that this is a matter, to put it crudely, of vote trading; if we vote with the Africans on the apartheid issue, they might vote with us on, say, the China issue. And it is further argued that if we and the Western World do not support the nonwhites on South Africa, they will turn themselves over to the Communist camp. (How many times have we heard this ploy in the pursuit of our aid program.)

In all of these contentions, there are strong elements of emotional pleading. They are designed to appeal to our yearning to be popular—to be jolly good fellows, and equally to our apprehensions about the Communists.

I will simply say this: Neither our foreign policy, nor that of any country, could long endure on the basis of ephemeral personal friendships, vote swapping, or verbal intimidations. Rather, I would affirm that policy should rest on the solid bedrock of considerations of national security and national interest, as conditioned by our international obligations.

But I turn to a fourth theoretical basis for the advocacy of direct action against South Africa. Its purpose is not punitive, not conscience salving, not to win popularity contests, but corrective and reformative, that is, to try to compel South African rulers and voters to change fundamentally their convictions and attitudes. I respect

this purpose, for it accords with sound criminology as regards individuals; but as applied to enormous organized aggregates of individuals called nations, it has little warrant from social and political psychology, or from history. Moreover, its advocates show want of understanding of the deep-rooted apprehensions—justified or not—the stubborn character, and the diehard determination of the Afrikaner.

The only examples I can think of in modern times where a nation's constitution and policies have been radically changed by outsiders are Japan and Germany. And it took an all-out war, incredible devastation, armed conquest, a prolonged military occupation, and a rigorous civil administration to accomplish it. Needless to say, I vehemently oppose adopting such methods against South Africa or any country, simply on the grounds that we disapprove of their domestic policies.

And now I should like to conclude on a slightly more positive note. If, as I have argued, we should not engage in concrete economic pressures, independently or concerted, against South Africa, what might we do, if anything, in the way of helping to ameliorate the lot of its nonwhite peoples, and of easing the tensions of a vexatious international issue.

Frankly, I do not have much to offer. I think we will have to learn to live with the South African situation just as we had to learn to live with scores of other troublesome problems: Kashmir, Palestine, communism, or De Gaulle. We cannot change the world over to our liking, and in no event could it be done overnight. Whatever changes for the better take place will come principally from within a country and through its own people's efforts; moreover, social and psychological change, despite our age of rapid technological change, is distressingly slow. However insistent the impetuous reformers may be, we are going to need time and patience, whatever we may do.

But let me proceed.

1. First of all, I would hope that Americans may be helped to develop a better understanding of South Africans and the situation confronting them. The white South Africans are not all ogres; they are mainly decent, hard-working, talented people who, with the help of nonwhites, have built up the most advanced industrial and technological society on the African Continent. And they have demonstrated their allegiance to the West. As for their racial situation, they did not invent it; they inherited it. Although their ancestors arrived a century before the Bantus moved in from the north, the white man is now outnumbered 4 to 1. Let us ponder that ratio for a moment, reminding ourselves that, however much we deplore it, color discrimination is a hard and inescapable fact of social history, and that it manifests itself in its worst form where the number of nonwhites is proportionally very large. The highest ratio in any of our own States is about 1 to 1, not 4 to 1, and yet we have problems enough. In England and Scandinavia, where liberal sentiment has strongly favored sanctions, the Negro is in a tiny minority.

I suggest the proposition that in most—there are exceptions—white-dominated societies, the intensity of racial feeling and the severity of discrimination varies in direct proportion to the relative numbers of Negro and white inhabitants.

For my own part, I think I am devoid of racial prejudice and I deplore racial discrimination, but as I look at the white South African with his 1 to 4 ratio, I say to myself: "There, but for the luck of racial arithmetic, and the grace of God, go I."

2. Second, I think we have a very difficult, and very delicate diplomatic task in our relationships with our U.N. associates from Africa and Asia. Many of their compatriots lived under white colonial rule and suffered verying degrees of subjection and discrimination. We understand and sympathize with their instinctive resentment against apartheid. Our own declared goals of racial equality, and our efforts to achieve them, are proof of our sincerity. But I would hope that we could persuade them to curb impulsive and emotional reactions, and develop qualities of restraint and patience with long-view perspectives. We might try to help them understand better the uniqueness and complexity of the South African problem; the refractory nature of the human animal and his resistance to rapid change; the hard, stubborn realities of mass social psychology, and the intricacies of international trade and finance, and their limitations as tools of political pressure. Slowly and patiently and understandingly we should counsel that larger wisdom in the conduct of their foreign relations which we aspire to develop in our own.

3. Finally, we have even more difficult problems in our diplomatic relations with South Africa. In one phase, they involve on the part of our resident representatives an appropriate balance of firmness with respect to the principles we stand for, with such accommodation to local customs as may be expected of guests. In our conversations, we should try discreetly but resolutely to persuade the South African that the tides of history are against arbitrary discrimination on account of race; that the excessive rigors of restrictions should be gradually eased; that palliative measures would relieve resentments which otherwise could boil over beyond control, and that as we counsel moderation on the part of other countries, we can hardly hope for success unless South Africa makes positive and substantial contributions of its own.

But I suggest that instead of engaging in a blanket condemnation, we look for some good things, and no country, I submit, is wholly good nor wholly bad. I would hope that our Government would take a fresh look at that special phase of apartheid embodied in self-governing Transkei and the promised Bantustans. For, whatever the present inadequacies and future uncertainties, I see nothing intrinsically wrong in the idea of converting cohesive tribal entities into autonomous nations—eventually to become counterparts of newly independent Basutoland and Bechuanaland.

For I submit that where you find a deep-rooted social cleavage between two great peoples showing little sign of being peaceably resolved, a splitting into separate countries may be wiser than establishing in a single domain the rule of the stronger over the weaker. History affords many examples, but I simply remind you of two: The Irish Republic and North Ireland; the Moslem Pakistan and Hindu India.

If the Bantustan idea has some merit, let's say so and offer to help in its proper implementation and improvement.

I suggest this because I believe that if, instead of working wholly against a government, you work with it where you can, you may be able to replace a hostile atmosphere with constructive understanding and dialog. And patient, continuing diplomatic dialog is indispensable to any course of wisdom.

Mr. O'HARA. Dr. Maddox, do you have faith in the United Nations?

Dr. MADDOX. Yes, sir, I have certainly a great respect for the United Nations. I cannot say the United Nations can be expected to solve every problem that we have in the world. It certainly can be helpful in a great many.

Mr. O'HARA. It may not always be perfect, but it is the only instrumentality that we have in that area.

Dr. MADDOX. If it did not exist, we would have to invent it.

Mr. O'HARA. You have respect for the International Court of Justice, have you not?

Dr. MADDOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. Presume that the International Court of Justice in a decision expected within the next few weeks should hold against South Africa, and South Africa should refuse to respect the decision of the International Court of Justice, would what you have said here today be changed?

Dr. MADDOX. Of course the discussion has turned in this direction today, although since the subject is still subjudice I would prefer to have waited until the decision is handed down. Otherwise anything one may say is hypothetical.

If you are asking the hypothetical question of whether if a decision of the International Court of Justice (and a decision, not an advisory opinion) has been issued and that given country has refused to abide by it, I would certainly feel that the rest of the United Nations should take such measure as may be appropriate. But I do not think economic sanctions are necessarily appropriate.

I don't feel that South Africa should be allowed to escape the condemnation on the part of civilized society, if it refused absolutely and point blank to conform to a decision laid down by the International Court.

Mr. O'HARA. Much of your career has been in the field of diplomacy, education, and of course it is the problem of the diplomat to seek to avoid trouble, wars, and so on. But if he fails, then he must accept the inevitable. So I put this interpretation upon your remarks on page 3: "Furthermore, a policy of noninterference in domestic affairs in no way affects the actions we may take, and may be obligated under the U.N. Charter to take, in the event of external aggression or a threatened breach of international peace."

Thank you very much for your being with us. We feel honored. We are thankful for your talk.

Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Maddox, I am sorry to have missed some of your testimony. On the other hand, I find as I look through it, some of it I have read, that I am pretty thoroughly in agreement with you. I have lived a long time and found that life is an experience in which you can't change people overnight, you can't go barging into their home and tell them they must put the kitchen stove in the parlor or vice versa. It seems to me that there is a considerable amount of real

danger in our attempting to tell any other country what they may or may not do. I was in Africa when we had Miss Lucy and I had to meet it on every hand. I was most interested in my own reactions to the fury with which I was attacked by these people. "You call yourself a civilized country. How can you? You should do this. You should do this, that, or the other." I found myself holding my tongue and wanting to tell them to keep out of my business. I find myself in a good deal of sympathy with the South Africans with whom I have dealt in the United Nations and in Africa. I too wish things were different. I have watched us change here and I find that in the South where the feeling was and is strongest, naturally, that they have done a most amazing job. I listened to a very interesting talk one night by a very black African to a group of our Negroes. He said, "If you think you are not slaves any longer you are mistaken. You are still waiting for the whites to do things for you. In Africa we have had to do things for ourselves." It was amazing the effect that had on that small group of people. I was fascinated by it. Naturally we want apartheid done away with, but not as I said a little earlier, they quoted the first half of the verse, and left out the second half which I happened to know. It made quite a bit of difference in the meaning.

We are doing that all the time. It seems to me that we are far from blameless in all these matters. I think for myself I would be very reluctant to have my country go into any action which would say to South Africa, "You may not do this within your own borders." I would thoroughly resent it if South Africa came over here, which she would have a right to do in the same situation, wouldn't you say?

Mr. MADDOX. Yes, indeed, Mrs. Bolton. I think all Americans would resent concerted efforts on the part of a group of nations to try to tell us how to organize our way of life or resort to sanctions in order to compel us to do so. May I add, Mrs. Bolton, to your reflections, with which I agree thoroughly, that some years ago when I was in South Africa I knew leaders in the South African Parliament, a number of them, some of one party, some of another, who in their private talks were indicating the possibility of some constructive thinking on ways and means of getting out of their racial dilemma. There was some hope then. Progressively, however, maybe I should say regressively, in more recent years, as a result of the persistent abuse and the heaps of abuse and resolutions and embargoes and boycotts which have been visited upon South Africa, the tendency has been for the people to draw together, I am speaking of those who constitute the voting and ruling class, mostly whites; they have tended to draw together and instead of continuing to find or to seek ways out of this racial impasse, they tend to feel they are now beleaguered by the outside world and must stand together as South Africans or die.

Mrs. BOLTON. I want to say I agree with you very much. I don't think I have any more questions. I think all three of you have given us a great deal to think about. You have given us a great deal to take home with us to read in the wee, small hours of the morning when the stars are out. What do the Easterners say: "When the dogs bark the Brahman meditates." It would seem to me in going away I feel a bit refreshed. I am very grateful to all three of you.

Mr. O'HARA. I wonder if I can ask the panel, all of you, whether you think that American businessmen doing business in South Africa,

and American financiers who are financing operations in South Africa and in some other quarters, are under criticism in the United States, whether you agree with me that they should appear voluntarily before this subcommittee and submit their side of the controversy? What do you all think about that?

Mr. CARTER. I think they should.

Dr. MADDOX. I think they should. I think some of them have the feeling that maybe there would be a kind of special pleading on their part if they have direct interests involved and they would prefer possibly that such evidence as is offered should be offered objectively rather than come from them. However, I know some people in the business world who could make a great contribution to the work of your committee.

Mr. O'HARA. What do you think, Doctor?

General MARSHALL. Are you speaking to me, Mr. Chairman?

I feel they should. I think they will be reluctant to because the American businessman is always loathe to come forward and take a firm stand on a political issue especially if his South African investment is just a part of the larger investment in this country. I think that attitude is perfectly understandable. There are several men who are quite prominent in our public life though and I should think that the committee should not be loathe to ask them to come forward. Maybe under a bit of pressure they would respond.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Carter, can we depend upon your influence, too?

Will you counsel American businessmen and financiers doing business in South Africa to come forward?

Mr. CARTER. I would. I think they have a story to tell and I would think they would be glad to tell it. I am a businessman in a way. If I were doing something questioned by some of my fellows outside the country I would want to tell them why I did it.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, very much.

Mr. FRASER.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. MADDOX, do you think that the United States should vote as it has in the past to condemn apartheid in the United Nations?

Dr. MADDOX. I have a feeling that these gestures mean very little, that they only mean to say to their voters back home, Ghana, or wherever it may be, "Look at some of the fine things we have done." It is an empty gesture, but it has a terrific impact on the people in South Africa just as a resolution in the U.N. which voted to condemn the United States for any of our internal policies would have a terrific impact in this country. Therefore, I would hope that somehow these resolutions in the future could be avoided.

Mr. FRASER. If the resolutions are, however, on the floor of the General Assembly?

Dr. MADDOX. I would be inclined to advise abstention.

Mr. FRASER. We have gotten into the question of Rhodesia a little bit today. What is your view of the current U.S. policy in support of the British on Rhodesia?

Dr. MADDOX. The situation is a little bit different because the United Kingdom is one of our oldest and most trusted friends. The British have a constitutional responsibility, however latent, in Southern Rhodesia and they requested our assistance. Therefore, the situation is

a little bit different and I could imagine the Department found it rather a tough one to handle. I think we have gone farther than we should. I think we might have probably done a few things. But I do not feel that these sanctions, these economic measures, are going to compel a change of attitude on the part of the dominant white in Southern Rhodesia sufficiently to bring about the kind of rapid constitutional developments that the United Kingdom Government desires; they are not going to bring about a breakdown or a collapse of the Southern Rhodesian policy. Therefore, it is a question of whether one should not continue, as I think some United Kingdom representatives are trying to do, to find a way out through continuing negotiations, through continued talks with Smith and his associates. There was not such a sharp and unbridgeable gap, it was a matter of timing partly, and I just feel that it was undesirable, despite the feeling we have in support of the United Kingdom, to have engaged ourselves so actively in sanctions measures.

Mr. FRASER. I note you suggest that we ought to persuade other African nations to curb impulsive and emotional reactions and develop qualities of restraint and long view perspectives.

Would you have offered the same advice to those who demonstrated in Birmingham?

Dr. MADDOX. I realize under certain circumstances such advice may fall upon deaf ears because of the degree of resentment and bitterness.

It is still not impossible for us to try to exercise such moderating influence as we can on such demonstrators, as well as upon the people in charge of the Governments of Africa and Asia.

Mr. FRASER. The thing that troubles me is that I am as convinced as I can be, as I sit here today, that had there not been these efforts on the part of the Negroes in the South in demonstrating that there would be no civil rights law today on the books of the Federal Government, because both political parties said they were for civil rights for years and years and years, but nothing ever happened.

Even so, you would have counseled—

Dr. MADDOX. I think this has been an interesting and a very important chapter in our social history. Despite the moderation I would have advised these demonstrations doubtless had a direct impact on our civil rights movement.

I would not, however, use that as a justification for urging African and Asian nations to demonstrate on the international platform in an active and organized way, either economic or military.

Mr. FRASER. Let me say about some of the other comments in your statement, I read history differently from you, apparently.

There appear to be problems with the expeditors, at least this is my word for it, consisting of efforts to accommodate racial and national differences in an assortment of devices, the separation of Pakistan, the Turkey and Greek Cypriots, the situation in Malaysia.

Dr. MADDOX. You are referring to the separation that I spoke of between India and Pakistan?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

It seems to me what history suggests is that it is wiser for people to try to live together as a people within a nation than to try to recognize racial differences.

Dr. MADDOX. Mr. Fraser, the question is what is a nation? A nation is not necessarily contiguous with a certain geographical boundary. There are several nations in South Africa just as there are two or more nations in other countries. Where you do have several groups fairly cohesive, pronounced in their distinguishable characteristics, and strong in their devotion to their own group interests as separate from the interest of another group, you may find it wiser to develop the method of separation.

I think of the way in which this has happened through history. What did we do after the Crusades? For practical purposes the Islam world retreated into Asia and North Africa and the Christian world into Europe.

After the Thirty Years' War, with its bloody battles on religion there was a kind of *de facto* arrangement whereby the Catholics became dominant in certain countries and the Protestants in others.

Separation does not necessarily render a final solution, but it has helped in some cases to tide over struggles in history for many years.

I have a feeling you gain time, among other things. I am not saying it is a final solution, even for the Irish. Only the Irish can judge that.

But as a practical measure separation is preferable in my mind to the domination of Irish Republicans over Northern Ireland, or the domination of the much larger and much more populous Hindu India over Muslem Pakistan. We have to accept these facts of life.

The particular condition arising from the pigmentation of the skin is a very real one. It is not something we like, but there it is, a hard fact. Can we find a way out?

Mr. FRASER. I would think this logic would have suggested that we should not have fought the Civil War, because there were differences in the South and North with respect to the attitude—

Dr. MADDOX. I don't know how you arrive at this kind of hypothetical historical judgment on my part.

Mr. FRASER. I didn't—

Dr. MADDOX. I don't quite see the point.

Mr. FRASER. There were quite different attitudes in the South and in the North on matters of some importance. There was a difference in the attitude toward the American Negro, toward his status, and on this basis it might have been easier to make two nations than to have one.

Dr. MADDOX. That was the point of view of the southerner, that we should not have fought it, that the North should not have tried to compel it.

As a native of the State of Maryland I belong in the middle. So if you ask my opinion I could argue it both ways. On the whole, I think the way it turned out was for the better. I am glad the Union was preserved and that we found ways and means of bringing about a reconciliation of the special situation in the South with the way of life in the rest of the Nation.

It is not entirely solved by any means. A century later we are still struggling with problems, but we are pointing in a direction which I think is a wise one.

Mr. FRASER. Your statement is a very good one. I think it represents a very rational, reasonable point of view. It is one, though, to me, which sort of suggests that we should accept everything as it is and not be too concerned.

I find this hard to accept. I think that when there is injustice anywhere we ought to be concerned. I think the question of how you go about remedying it is certainly open to discussion.

This is what you deal with, of course. You don't approve of apartheid?

Mr. MADDOX. I tried, near the conclusion, to point out what I thought we might do in the area of diplomatic relations. I think we can still do something. I think we have lost some opportunities because of the growing hostility, perhaps that is not the word, but the growing estrangement, of South Africa and the United States as a result of these issues.

It would help if we could show not only that we accept, but perhaps that we welcome the idea of a fully developed Transkei. It is far from being fully developed. The South African Government has not given enough money. It has not done enough to develop industry there for the benefit of the people.

Mr. FRASER. Wouldn't you agree that all of history would suggest that they will never get enough money?

Mr. MADDOX. That I can't say. I would say—

Mr. FRASER. Do you ever see governments fully respond except where the wheel is squeaking. I think of the American Indian, the American Negro. It just seems to me it is human nature that a white government will never really begin to spend on behalf of others what is really required.

Mr. MADDOX. You are speaking of American Indians as well?

Mr. FRASER. Yes. I think that is a tragic chapter. I blush when people point to that as justification for our remaining aloof from the tragedies of South Africa. I would hope that we had learned.

Mr. MADDOX. It is interesting in connection with some of the points that you raised before, Mr. Fraser, with regard to the nonwhite in South Africa proper, as distinct from those in the Transkei, that whereas there has been no political advancement in recent years and indeed some retrogression (laws are more strictly enforced), I would say that economically from the testimony that I have been able to obtain, and the records I have been able to read, the lot of the workers in Johannesburg and other industrial areas has gradually improved. I know that the white chambers of commerce even before I left, from purely practical self-interest, not necessarily humanitarian, were already trying to get action on the part of industries to undertake a gradual amelioration of wage levels. There are also some beginnings of nonwhite trade union organizations, not legal yet, but struggles to develop a modest measure of collective bargaining.

These things are hopeful. I have a feeling that political advancement in South Africa on the part of nonwhites is going to follow rather than precede economic improvement. If you want to introduce the American businessman into the picture, I certainly know of some who have tried to help lead the way in what they might do with respect

to native employees in their South African establishments. I think their presence there is useful and not at all bad as some have suggested.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much.

Mr. O'HARA. I wonder if you could give us privately, if you don't wish to publicly, the names of some of these American businessmen that you mention, that are taking a lead in South Africa?

My purpose for asking, I think they should appear before this sub-committee. I trust that you will so counsel.

The subcommittee is very appreciative to all three witnesses.

Thank you, gentlemen.

(Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.)

UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 1968

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 2:37 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn Building, Hon. Barratt O'Hara (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. O'HARA. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are happy to have with us today three witnesses. From Harvard University Divinity School—would you pronounce your name for me?

Mr. NTLABATI. Nabati.

Mr. O'HARA. It is spelled N-t-l-a-b-a-t-i.

Mr. NTLABATI. Correct.

Mr. O'HARA. Also Mr. Charles Goldmark, of the U.S. National Student Association, and Dr. Richard Stevens, of Lincoln University, Pennsylvania. Later on we will have a delegation from the Rochester University student group. There are 21 of them, Congressman Diggs, and they come from quite a number of the countries in Africa.

Mr. Ntlabati, will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF GLADSTONE MXOLISI NTLABATI, MEMBER OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

(Following is biographic data of Gladstone M. Ntlabati:)

GLADSTONE MXOLISI NTLABATI

Born: October 14, 1935, Bathurst, Cape Province, South Africa.

Marital status: Married.

Present address: Harvard University, 43 Francis Avenue, Cambridge, Mass.

I. Education:

1. Primary school: Healdtown Practising School, 1942-49.
2. High school: Healdtown Missionary Institution, 1950-55.
3. B.A. (Rhodes): Fort Hare University College (affiliated with Rhodes University), 1956-58.
4. B.A. (honors): University of Natal, Durban, Natal, 1961-62.
5. Ordination certificate: Methodist Church of South Africa, 1962.
6. Summer school: Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1964.
7. S.T.M. (master of sacred theology): Yale University, 1964-65.
8. Candidate for Ph. D. degree: Harvard University, 1965-

II. Professional experience:

Chaplain and boarding master, Boitshoko College, Vandersdorf, Transvaal, South Africa, 1960.
Minister, Memel Methodist African Circuit, Memel, Orange Free State, South Africa, 1960.
Minister, Krugersdorp Methodist African Circuit, Krugersdorp, Transvaal, South Africa, 1959.
Chaplain and boarding master, Indaleni Missionary Institution, Richmond, Natal, South Africa, 1961.
Minister, Newcastle Methodist African Circuit, Durban, South Africa, 1961.
Minister, Durban Methodist African Circuit, Durban, South Africa, 1962-63.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I want to thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today. My name is Gladstone Mxolisi Ntlabati, an ordained minister of the Methodist Church of South Africa and a member of the banned African National Congress of South Africa. I am a South African citizen, at present a candidate for the Ph. D. degree at Harvard University Divinity School.

South Africa is the only country in the world where denial of human rights and discrimination in every walk of life—based on color—is enshrined in the constitution of the land. In South Africa oppression is legal. The South African policy of apartheid has been attacked by nearly every nation in the world and in almost every session of the United Nations since 1946. In all this time, there has been no response from the South African Government except defiance and an increase in repressive, authoritarian measures reminiscent of Hitler's Nazi Germany.

The South African Government claims that its policy of apartheid or separate development is not a political system of simple exploitation by whites of the nonwhite people of South Africa. The policy of separate development is supposed to further the well-being of every racial group in South Africa, and to prepare the nonwhites for independence in the Bantustans.

My experience has been that the policy of apartheid is a systematic legal structure based on the 300-year-old racial prejudices of white South Africans designed to perpetuate and exacerbate those prejudices and to make them the justification of pitiless economic and political tyranny.

As expressed in the words of Dr. Verwoerd in Parliament on January 25, 1963, the aim of this tyranny is—

* * * to keep South Africa white. Keeping it white can mean only one thing, namely, white domination, not "leadership," not "guidance" but control, supremacy.

Those who are born nonwhite in South Africa are, in the interests of this racialist ideal, subjected to humiliation and exploitation from birth to death, and even beyond, and are not allowed to make any movement of resistance or protest their fate.

Nonwhites in South Africa live in extreme poverty. Three to four hundred African babies in every thousand die before they are 1 month old; the main cause of death is starvation. The majority of those who survive continue to suffer. Kwashiorkor, gastroenteritis, tuberculosis, trachoma, pellagra, and scurvy bring death and destruction of health.

According to the medical officer of health for Pretoria, tuberculosis kills 40 people a day (almost all Africans), and in 1961 there were 58,491 new cases reported.

These diseases not only destroy the vital organs of the body, but they result in retarded mental conditions, lack of initiative, and reduced powers of concentration. The secondary results of such conditions affect the whole community and the standard of work performed by African laborers.

The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and whites are rich, but that the laws which are made by the whites are designed to preserve this situation.

There are two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation.

The quality of education is also different. According to the Bantu Education Journal, only 5,660 African children in the whole of South Africa passed their junior high examinations in 1962, and in that year only 362 passed high school. This is presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu education about which the present Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, said, during the debate on the Bantu education bill in 1953:

When I have control of native education I will reform it so that natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them ***. People who believe in it are not desirable teachers for natives. When my Department controls native education it will know for what class of higher education a native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge.

It would be difficult enough for Africans to try to improve their social and economic situation if their attempts were not strangled by job reservation, by laws prohibiting Africans from owning property in white areas, by the migrant labor system, by laws making strikes illegal and forbidding free trade unions, by the Bantu education system which is designed to keep Africans in ignorance and subjection, by the pass laws which are meant to regulate the labor supply, and by the all-pervasive attitude of white South Africans who resent and fear nonwhites who are not servants and underlings.

Economic and political freedom are intimately connected. Nonwhites are not allowed any political voice in South Africa. In certain areas, like the Transkei, we are supposed to be free except in what concerns our security, our livelihood, our international relations and movements, our dignity, and our representation in our own Parliament.

What an African experiences in the Transkei is not very different from what he experiences in the rest of his own country. The self-governing Transkei has been governed under emergency regulations promulgated by the Minister of Justice of the Republic of South Africa since 1960. In the so-called white areas where the greatest number of nonwhites live and work political freedom is nonexistent.

The African National Congress and the Pan African Congress were banned in 1960. Leaders and members of these organizations, including the Liberal Party led by Alan Paton, have been banned, arrested without trial, forbidden to publish or attend gatherings.

Mr. O'HARA. May I interrupt you for a moment?

Our visiting South Africans are here, and I take it you would like to join us in greeting them.

Is Mr. Titus here?

Mr. TITUS. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. Would you explain, Mr. Titus, just who these people are, what countries they come from?

Mr. TITUS. Yes. They are students from the University of Rochester, N.Y.

Mr. O'HARA. You might use one of our microphones. This is Mr. Clyde Titus, director of the African Student Center at Rochester University.

Mr. TITUS. These students are from the University of Rochester in New York, and they are part of a program there called the African Student Center. They are all from southern and eastern Africa, principally Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Swaziland.

Mr. O'HARA. How long have they been in this country?

Mr. TITUS. Anywhere from 1 month to, I take it, a year.

Mr. O'HARA. Who foots the bill?

Mr. TITUS. The Department of State of the United States.

Mr. O'HARA. What is the expense to the United States per student, about \$1,400?

Mr. TITUS. Per year?

Mr. O'HARA. Yes.

Mr. TITUS. No, it is higher than that. I think it would probably run in the neighborhood of \$3,000 per year. It is a complete scholarship, which includes all their educational and support activities.

Mr. O'HARA. What subjects are they studying?

Mr. TITUS. When they first arrive they study sometimes credit courses, that are the same as any other American student would study in an American university. Sometimes they study courses set up, called precredit courses, to enable them to do the regular preparatory work in mathematics or science, a field in which they might be slightly weak. In addition, of course, they would study English language, as they come from a non-English-speaking country.

Mr. O'HARA. Are there any medical students?

Mr. TITUS. Some have been interested in medicine, yes.

Mr. O'HARA. We are very happy to have them with us. And the witness at the present time is from South Africa, studying at Yale University for his doctorate.

At this time, if there is no objection, we will put in the record a biographical sketch of our present witness.

Mr. MORSE. I would like the record to point out the witness is from Harvard University.

Mr. O'HARA. I am glad we have somebody on this subcommittee from Massachusetts.

I think my colleagues on the subcommittee will find this information interesting about the present witness:

During the 4 months I spent at Memel in 1960, I was assaulted by white civilians and the police 11 times. I took my assailants to court three times, and won my case twice and, on the advice of my religious superiors, dropped my charges the third time.

I was myself summoned to court four times, on charges ranging from common assault to crimen injuria, and was acquitted on all charges. However, I was removed from Memel by my superiors in the Methodist Church after a church commission of inquiry, appointed on the advice of the Memel magistrate, decided that my life was in danger.

In 1961 I was dismissed from Indalen Missionary Institution because the authorities suspected that I had organized a strike among the students who refused to participate in celebrations marking South Africa's becoming a republic. The boycott of Republic Day celebrations in Indalen was only one of many such boycotts in nonwhite schools—and in some white schools—and coincided with a general strike by nonwhite workers throughout South Africa.

In October 1963 I was arrested under the general amendment of 1963, popularly known as the "no trial act." I was imprisoned in solitary confinement, was not allowed to see a lawyer or any member of my family, or to have reading or writing materials. During this confinement I was interrogated every day and sometimes assaulted by the police.

In January 1964 I was charged under the Suppression of Communism Act. These charges were dropped because the state witnesses fled South Africa. As soon as these charges were dropped I left South Africa and arrived in this country in April 1964.

You are now studying for your doctorate at Harvard?

Mr. NTLABATI. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. Will you continue?

Mr. NTLABATI. Trade union leaders have been similarly harassed by the Suppression of Communism Act, the Riotous Laws Amendment Act, the Sabotage Act, and the personal intervention of the minister of justice to suppress whatever opposition these acts have not intimidated or suppressed.

Censorship, police brutality, the economic impotence of nonwhites and the social disorganization which is caused by the pass laws, the destruction of family life, and the migrant labor system also play their role in keeping South Africa white.

I have myself experienced something of the weight with which South Africa crushes the spirit of those who resist. I was imprisoned without trial and kept in solitary confinement. I was interrogated. I was assaulted. I was more fortunate than some because I am a clergyman and the South African Government is religious and claims to be defending Christianity and Western civilization. Others have been found dead in mysterious circumstances, or have committed suicide, have had to receive psychiatric treatment, have accused their white guardians of torturing them—as if solitary confinement were not torture enough.

I was also more fortunate than those who are never allowed out of prison. For under the "no trial act" the minister of justice can simply ignore acquittal and imprison the accused from the courtroom to the grave.

For example, Robert Sobukwe, the president of the banned Pan African Congress, who should have been freed 3 years ago, whose sentence for organizing peaceful demonstrations ran its course and expired in 1963, is still today being held prisoner on Robben Island. There, according to the minister of justice, he will continue to be held, until "this side of eternity."

But it is not only political prisoners who have to fear the police. Africans can be arrested at any time, even in their own homes, even in the middle of the night under the pass laws. They can be sent to work for white employers, especially farmers. It is well known that

at this work they are usually starved, beaten—some to death—tortured for the amusement of their supervisors, or merely overworked without pay.

The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of white supremacy. White supremacy implies black inferiority. Legislation designed to preserve white supremacy entrenches this notion.

Menial tasks in South Africa are invariably performed by Africans. When anything has to be carried or cleaned, the white man will look around for an African to do it for him, whether the African is employed by him or not.

Because of this sort of attitude, whites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. They do not look upon them as people with families of their own; they do not realize that they have emotions; that they fall in love like white people do; that they want to be with their wives and children like white people want to be with theirs; that they want to earn enough money to support their families properly, to feed and clothe them and send them to school. And what houseboy or garden boy or laborer can ever hope to do this?

Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in South Africa, render any African liable to police surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single African male in South Africa who has not at some stage had a brush with the police over his pass. Hundreds and thousands of Africans are thrown into jail each year under pass laws. Even worse than this is the fact that pass laws keep husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown of family life.

Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children wander about the streets of the townships because they have no schools to go to, or no money to enable them to go to school, or no parents at home to see that they go to school, because both parents, if there be two, have to work to keep the family alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to an alarming rise in illegitimacy and to growing violence which erupts, not only politically, but everywhere.

Life in the townships is dangerous. There is not a day that goes by without somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships in the white living areas. People are afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark. Housebreakings and robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death sentence can now be imposed for such offenses. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore.

The Government often answers its critics by saying that Africans in South Africa are economically better off than the inhabitants of the other countries in Africa. I do not know whether this statement is true and doubt whether any comparison can be made without having regard to the cost of living index in such countries.

But even if it is true, as far as we African people are concerned, it is irrelevant. We do not want to be compared with Africans in other countries; we want to be compared with other South Africans. Our complaint is not that we are poor by comparison with people in other countries, but that we are poor by comparison with the white

people in our own country, and that we are prevented by legislation from altering this imbalance.

In the words of the African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela, now perpetually confined to Robben Island, South Africa's Alcatraz, "Africans want to be paid a living wage, Africans want to perform work which they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable of. Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain work, and not be endorsed out of an area because they were not born there. Africans want to be allowed to own land in places where they work, and not be obliged to live in rented houses which they can never call their own. Africans want to be part of the general population, and not confined to living in their own ghettos. African men want to have their wives and children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an unnatural existence in men's hostels. African women want to be with their menfolk and not be left permanently widowed in the reserves. Africans want to be allowed out after 11 o'clock at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little children. Africans want to be allowed to travel in their own country and to seek work where they want to, and not where the labor bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa; they want security and a stake in society.

For the above aspirations, Africans have struggled through peaceful protests and demonstrations. Mahatma Gandhi influenced our nonwhite political organizations as early as the twenties and demonstrated to us the way of nonviolence. For over 50 years the nonwhite people have been dedicated to the principle of nonviolence. For over 50 years the rule of white government in South Africa has been a rule of violence.

In every instance the nonviolent actions of the African majority have been brutally and violently suppressed. Thousands of Africans have died at the behest of the god of white racialism. I could quote many instances where peacefully protesting Africans have been brutally massacred, but in the interests of brevity, I shall confine my remarks to just one: The Sharpeville massacre.

On the 21st of March, 1960, 20,000 unarmed Africans, men, women and children marched to the police station at Sharpeville to protest against the arrest of African leadership a few days before a national strike was called. The police and army shot through the crowd and killed 69 people and wounded hundreds.

This massacre clearly showed the Africans that nonviolence was a failure in South Africa and that it only worked in a situation where the opposition has a conscience. It pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence was the only way out. It showed that a government that uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it.

Since even peaceful organization is not only illegal, but is met with blood and iron, Africans feel that there is no hope that white South Africans will undergo such a change of heart that they will stop practicing apartheid of their own free will.

In our struggle for freedom and human dignity we have looked for allies in our own country and in the rest of the world. Our cause has been recognized in the honor accorded the President of the African

National Congress, our leader Chief Albert Luthuli, Nobel Peace Prize winner, who in South Africa, far from being honored, may not even be heard and is confined to an isolated rural area so that he may not spread "dangerous notions derived from the Gospels and democratic principles."

Among the whites of our own country we have found less and less understanding and tolerance of our aspirations. Even now today an election is being conducted in South Africa which excludes four-fifths of the population, an election in which Helen Suzman, the one white person who still speaks for the nonwhites in South Africa's Parliament, is probably losing her place in that parliament. If Helen Suzman is not returned to Parliament there will be no one to ask how many prisoners have died in South Africa's jails, how many arrested without charges or trials, how many starve to death, how many are endorsed without appeal out of the towns where they work.

Even if Helen Suzman is returned, she can do little more than continue to be the conscience of white South Africa and ask such questions. South Africa does not care to hear either question nor answer. The issues have already been decided. The measures accepted. The protests of the victims of apartheid ignored.

The Liberal Party of South Africa which asks for a color-blind franchise has no representatives in South Africa's Parliament, provincial councils or municipalities. In the Transkei its candidates for election were forbidden to hold meetings and even banned. There are still some whites in South Africa who believe in democracy and have some idea of what justice would call for in the political and economic life of South Africa. They are harassed and threatened and smeared with the label of "Communist."

We Africans have experienced that Communists almost alone of white South Africans have been willing to dedicate themselves completely to our struggle for dignity. But to say that we have willingly accepted Communists as our allies when we have had few other allies is not to say that we are ourselves Communists or that it is a Communist privilege alone to fight against injustice as blatant, cruel, and unyielding as that of South Africa.

Even if Africans were to become Communists it would be understandable to me for in South Africa the government teaches us to admire Communists. Everyone who identifies himself with our suffering, who struggles for the freedom and human dignity of our people, stands for a truly democratic South Africa, is labeled a Communist.

On the contrary, the South African Government does all that it does "to preserve Christianity and Western civilization." The South African Information Service describes South Africa's brutal and racial tyranny, and I quote, "as the last bastion of Western democracy in Africa."

South Africa is also described as a stable and prosperous land, a reliable anti-Communist Western country in Africa with a promise of a bright future. Let us never forget that this reliable Western country is dominated by two convicted Nazis: the Minister of Justice, Mr. Vorster, who was interned from September 1942 until January 1944, and was then placed under house arrest in Robertson in the cape until the end of the war for supporting Hitler. The Prime Minister, Dr.

Verwoerd, who according to the judgment of Justice Millin, on the 13th of July 1943, "furthered Nazi propaganda in his newspaper 'Die Transvaaler.'" In fairness to Dr. Verwoerd, he later cleared his position in Parliament by saying Justice Millin passed judgment against him because he was a Jew.

Let us also never forget that the International Commission of Jurists said in 1963, and I quote:

South Africa in its laws and procedures is copying some of the worst features of the Stalinist regime.

Is this how South Africa fights communism?

Because our situation is urgent and our sufferings intolerable and because at present we are weak and without a voice in our own country, we also look to the rest of the world for understanding and assistance.

Again, if the Communists offer to be our allies, we are in no position to refuse, because we are desperate.

When the United States engaged in a struggle against the racist ideology which was then and now remains the creed of South Africa's rulers, the United States and Britain similarly found it possible to act with Communist allies.

But by tradition, our own tradition in tribal society and our adopted traditions of Christianity and Western civilization, we have preferred and the majority of the African people still prefer to find our allies in Britain and the United States and the rest of the Western World.

But over and over again we have been disappointed. As long ago as 1919 we found our representatives at Versailles ignored. The great American ideal of representation for even minorities and small nations was not extended as far as South Africa. Repeatedly since then we have found the defenders of democracy more reluctant to help us than Communist countries. At the United Nations, Communist countries have voted to condemn and act against South Africa for her policy of apartheid. Only more recently have Britain and the United States condemned South Africa. They have both banned the sale of arms to South Africa but Africans cannot help noticing that they did this when South Africa was already virtually self-sufficient in the production of arms and had already developed the strongest army on the African Continent.

And what are we to think of an arms embargo which allows an American firm to build an atoms-for-peace plant in South Africa when South African cabinet ministers grandiosely proclaim that they might themselves join the nuclear club at will?

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, this does not mean that the African people do not appreciate what the United States is doing in providing scholarships for our refugees. We appreciate this very much, because it is a contribution to the South Africa of the future. It will provide leadership for the South Africa that we are building.

We wish this program could be enlarged. The African people have faith in the United States. They believe that the United States cannot sacrifice democracy in cooperation with a totalitarian regime that is at war with its own black people.

We are sure that if the American people realized how gravely and unjustly my people suffer, how perverted and irresistible the injustice

of their rulers, how inevitably our country slips nearer to civil and racial anarchy because more peaceful means have proved too weak; if the American people realized more fully how urgently and deeply all nonwhite people feel our cause throughout the world, they would not want to remain indifferent.

However, the South African Government and certain economic interests in the United States and other Western countries have been at pains to keep the world ignorant of the full meaning of apartheid to pretend that because some South Africans have money, have wealth, because South Africa's economy is advanced and extremely profitable because of exploiting African labor, that apartheid is not a crime against humanity.

They advertise the beauties of South Africa, in which they include such fascinating fauna as ignorant Africans, whom it is their policy to keep forever ignorant, forever quaint, forever subhuman. I am sure that this committee is not deceived by such propaganda or by the surrogate independence which will one day be attained in the Bantustans.

The importance of American opinion is far greater in South Africa than can be readily imagined. If the inquiries of this committee provoke indignant repudiation by Verwoerd's newspaper of the right of Americans to inquire into the nature of countries with which they have dealings, because South Africa considers murder a domestic problem, the inquiries of this committee equally attract the hopes of nonwhites that American ignorance about South Africa, and apparent indifference to sufferings of the majority of her people, will be diminished, and that the United States will, in time, respond to the African invitation to participate in the struggle for freedom and human dignity which has already changed the face of most of the continent.

But whatever the American people might feel, what we Africans see is that American economic interests bolster the white totalitarian, racist regime by which we are tortured and destroyed, and that the American Government seems more concerned to placate white South Africa than to defend American ideals even on American property—like American Embassies in South Africa.

The U.S. diplomatic missions have all-white staffs which have in recent years held interracial parties but the only black man employed in their offices is the man who makes tea and sweeps. Is the United States afraid of Verwoerd? Is the United States afraid of democracy in South Africa.

U.S. investors derive opulent profits from cheap black labor in a country when they are encouraged to flout the fair employment practices of their own country. If multiracial parties and verbal condemnation without action is the best that we can expect of this great Nation, I am sorry to admit that we will find it too little.

The appeasement of the South African reich may yet lead to an end as cruel and destructive as the appeasement of its German model did. However passionately the United States, Britain, or any other state may desire it, South Africa cannot go a lonely way, its human erosions sealed off at its frontiers—the very existence of white supremacy is an insult and an incitement to the peoples of the nonwhite world and to the Negro people in this country. Another racial mas-

sacre in South Africa—and who, since Sharpeville, does not expect one—or a clash between the white forces of South Africa and the black forces of other African states, may set off a color conflict throughout the world. Doubtless, the Munich mind dismisses the prospect as unprofitable. Is the world to be so wrong and so stupid again?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressmen.

Mr. O'FLAHERTY. The next witness is Mr. Charles Goldmark, of the United States National Student Association. Proceed, Mr. Goldmark.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES GOLDMARK, REPRESENTING THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION

MR. GOLDMARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a great honor to be invited to testify before this committee during these most important hearings. I hope the evidence which we bring this afternoon will make it clear to you why the United States National Student Association has for many years opposed the cruel practice of apartheid in South Africa, and has advocated action by the U.S. Government to curtail America's tacit cooperation with that system.

I am Charles Goldmark, international affairs vice president of the United States National Student Association (USNSA). I am a graduate of Reed College and will be entering Yale Law School in the fall. With me here today is Gilbert Kulick, special assistant for African student affairs for USNSA. Mr. Kulick is a graduate of the University of Texas, and holds an M.A. in African studies from UCLA.

USNSA, as you may know, is a confederation of student governments of 300 colleges and universities currently enrolling more than 1 million students.

At last year's National Student Congress, and I should explain this is the National Student Association annual meeting which democratically elects student delegates where our members meet to elect the officers and settle the policy of the association, the most hotly debated international issue, next to Vietnam, was southern Africa. The resolution adopted by that congress "strongly condemned the practice of apartheid and the deplorable political, educational, cultural, social, and economic conditions existing [for nonwhites] in South Africa."

The American students' opposition to apartheid is the natural extension of their commitment to the ideal of a free university in a free society, both in the United States and abroad. We cannot countenance American cooperation and tacit encouragement of a system such as apartheid which is the very negation of our ideals.

As students we are particularly concerned about the educational system in South Africa. In recent weeks this committee has heard testimony concerning labor conditions, political rights, and the rule of law under apartheid in South Africa. These statements have made it clear that all these institutions have been molded—or perhaps it is correct to say perverted—to insure the maintenance of control by the white minority. Thus it should come as no surprise that education is but another weapon in the arsenal of apartheid.

Before the accession to power of the Nationalist regime, education for nonwhites, though woefully inadequate in both quantitative and qualitative terms, was based on essentially the same philosophy of education as that provided for white children. In fact, the secondary school syllabus for Africans was almost identical to that of whites.

Control over curriculum, financing, and standards for students and teachers was largely in the hands of provincial governments. In addition to state schools, much of African education was conducted by the missions which generally maintained higher standards than the state schools.

However, with the advent of apartheid, the educational system underwent radical changes. In 1954 the then Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. Verwoerd, told the South African Parliament:

The previous system of education has blindly produced pupils trained on a European model, thus creating the vain hope among the Bantu that they could occupy posts within the European community despite the country's policy of apartheid.

Subsequently, the South African Parliament enacted the Bantu Education Act of 1953. Under this law, as amended, the control over all aspects of Bantu education was transferred to the Central Government under a Ministry of Bantu Education. All Bantu schools must now be registered annually with the Minister, and renewal is granted only at his discretion.

Also under this law, mission schools and teacher training colleges were deprived of state aid unless they complied with Government intentions. Some closed rather than comply. Others attempted to retain control with reduced subsidies or no subsidies at all, and all have now fallen under effective control of the Bantu Education Department.

Our long and careful study of Bantu education has led us to the following conclusions as to its true nature and intent.

1. Operating behind a carefully constructed facade, it is rather clear the fundamental purpose of Bantu education is to indoctrinate nonwhites into acceptance of apartheid and to their docile and subservient role within it.

2. A secondary purpose of Bantu education is to foster a narrow racial and tribal chauvinism which will create barriers between different nonwhite groups and preclude communication and cooperation against white supremacy.

3. Finally, whatever the ulterior motive, Bantu education is so thinly spread and so poorly financed, that its effect is to produce masses of barely literate, unskilled or semiskilled workers fit only for arduous manual labor in South Africa's mines and industry.

I would now like to deal with these propositions in somewhat greater detail.

(1) That Bantu education promotes the uncritical acceptance of apartheid and that apartheid postulates an inferior role for the African has been frankly stated by Dr. Verwoerd himself:

Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the state * * *. Good racial relations cannot exist when the education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations on the part of the native himself * * *. Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live * * *. The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labor.

Mr. Chairman, I submit we need not wait a hundred years for Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World." It exists in the old world of South Africa today.

Of course the government insists that within their "own areas" the Bantustans opportunities for African advancement will be unlimited. But the Bantustan fraud has been sufficiently exposed before this committee to merit no further discussion here by myself.

(2) Our second conclusion, as you will remember, was that apartheid attempts in sinister fashion to divide the nonwhite South African groups. A consistent theme in the ideology of apartheid is the distinctiveness and separateness of the various Bantu people. One is not sure whether this is pure rhetoric or a cover for their policy. But I doubt it really matters because the ultimate effect of the policy is the same when applied.

Along these lines, a recent half-page ad in the Washington Post stated:

The Bantu nations are quite as different one from another as are the nations of Europe, and just as intent on preserving their separate identities.

This, Mr. Chairman, is a piece of wishful thinking, a truly incredible distortion.

The fact is that the entire trend in South Africa has been toward detribalization and urbanization. Among urban Africans intermarriage between ethnic groups is almost the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, Western cultural values have profoundly influenced the lives of Africans.

Thus, Bantu education is but one element in the machine designed to arrest the process of westernization among nonwhites which white South Africa perceives to threaten its existence. As a direct consequence of these measures the use of tribal languages in African schools is now mandatory by the South African Government. Formerly used only through the fourth grade, African languages are today the primary medium of instruction through high school, and attempts are being made to impose them on the college level as well. One should note, I think, an opposition to these practices is not based on a lack of respect by Africans for their own culture, but rather on their recognition of the inadequacy of these languages for modern educational purposes, and the absence of a sizable body of written literature in them. In addition, learning of the official European languages of South Africa—English and Afrikaans—is firmly discouraged.

Not only is this system designed to foster a sense of apartness from white society, but also to divide one African group from another by depriving them of a common tongue and creating chauvinism and antagonism between the groups. In short, it is a modern application of the ancient tactic of divide and rule.

(3) In our third proposition we find the greatest example of hypocrisy on the part of the South African Government, for even if the foregoing facts about the rationale behind Bantu education did not obtain, it would stand condemned by its sheer inadequacy. A few facts and figures will, I think, demonstrate this.

In 1954, the South African Government pegged its contributions to African education—exclusive of universities—at 13 million rand, roughly \$18.2 million (1 rand equals \$1.40). They have consistently

refused to raise this amount despite the fact that the number of pupils has increased by over 700,000.

Over and above the contributions from general revenue, costs of Bantu education are borne directly by the Africans themselves. Africans have been encouraged to divert money for the feeding of schoolchildren and the building of classrooms and to pay day-to-day teachers' salaries.

Africans—but not Europeans—must pay a compulsory annual fee of R4 for secondary education. Africans must pay for most textbooks and supplies. The minimum estimated cost to parents of keeping an African child in the last 2 years of secondary school alone is R70.

Mr. Chairman, the average per capita income of nonwhites in South Africa is only 73 rands.

Despite all these measures, the annual per pupil expenditures in 1964 were approximately R120 for whites and R13 for Africans. Per pupil expenditures for Africans have declined almost every year since Bantu education was introduced in 1954. In that year the figure was 17.08 rands. With such a discrepancy in expenditures, the drastic inferiority of Bantu education is inescapable.

However, in the face of these woeful inadequacies the South African Government still likes to boast of the high percentage of African children enrolled in school. What it fails to point out is that 96.6 percent of all African schoolchildren are in the primary grades (the comparable figure for white children is 58.5 percent).

Fully half of the nonwhite pupils leave by the end of the fourth grade, and one should remember that in the United States a sixth grade education is commonly equated with literacy. This gives you some idea of the kind of education the Africans receive. Only 1 student in 200 finishes high school and of these less than 30 percent qualify for college entrance.

Up to this point I have dealt only with primary and secondary education. Most of what has been said about the theory and practice of Bantu education can be applied to higher education as well, so there is no need to burden you further with statistics. I would, however, like to give a brief account of the imposition of apartheid on South African universities.

Of the eight major universities in South Africa, four use Afrikaans as the medium of instruction. These universities have traditionally been the fountainheads of Afrikaner nationalism and hence never presented any problem to the Government in the implementation of apartheid. The English-medium universities, by contrast, have generally recognized the internal contradiction of "the pursuit of truth" in a university which runs on a segregated basis.

Historically, two of these—the Universities of Capetown and the Witwatersrand—had been "open" universities; that is, they admitted students of all races without discrimination. A third—the University of Natal—admitted non-Europeans who attended separate classes but shared the same faculty and course content.

In 1959, it was decided—over the almost unanimous opposition of the South African academic community and the usually acquiescent parliamentary opposition—to "close" the open universities. According to the provisions of the Extension of University Education Act, the Government was empowered to set dates after which nonwhites would

be barred from enrolling in the open universities. Without written permission which could be granted under certain conditions, any non-white student who enrolled in a white university could be punished under the law.

The act further provided for the establishment of colleges for non-whites including a college for colored students, a college for Indians, and three tribal colleges for Africans. At these institutions the Government exercises complete control over staff appointments and dismissals as well as over all phases of student life.

To the greatest extent possible, instruction will take place at the Bantu colleges in the native languages. The lack of autonomy and the terms of the code of discipline preclude the critical thinking that is the basis of a true university education. In point of fact, the non-white colleges are merely an extension of the system of Bantu education which I described earlier. In such a setting, terms such as academic freedom, I think, are completely meaningless.

While seemingly impossible, South Africa has been even more lacking in the case of its mandated territory. No universities exist in South-West Africa, and to the best of my knowledge there are very few places available in the South African tribal colleges for students from South-West Africa.

It is not just at the nonwhite colleges that academic freedom and university autonomy have been infringed. With the extension of the University Education Act, the Nationalist regime violated the autonomy of the English-medium universities for the first time. The attempts to impose apartheid on these universities have been vigorously resisted by administration and students alike, and this has led to a running battle between the South African Government and the English-medium universities.

On several occasions university professors have been banned under the arbitrary Suppression of Communism Act. A "banned" person is forbidden to attend public meetings, and in the case of a professor, summarily deprived of his position.

More recently the Minister of Education, Senator J. de Klerk, attacked a "conspiracy" to frustrate the Government's policy in which nonwhite, mainly colored, students were encouraged to select courses not offered at the nonwhite universities. These students then sought exemptions to enter the white universities to study these courses, thus creating, in the Minister's words, "an artificial multiracialism * * * at the English-language universities." The Minister announced his intention to introduce legislation in the next session of Parliament to make it more difficult for nonwhites to obtain exemptions.

Just today we received a notice from South Africa that the student council at Cape Town University is now under heavy Government attack because of its refusal—in keeping with its tradition of non-racialism—to recognize a student group which restricts its membership to whites only. Once again, Government reprisals have been threatened.

In the forefront of the struggle against apartheid in the universities has been USNSA's counterpart organization, the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). NUSAS's commitment to non-racialism and academic freedom has withstood constant harassment by the Government, the planting of informants, raids by the secret

police, and personal diatribes by the Minister of Justice, Mr. Vorster, who has attacked NUSAS's leadership as "the offspring of snakes."

Despite the fact that the nonwhite universities are prohibited by the Government from affiliating, NUSAS has fought to keep open the ever-narrowing channels of communication between white and non-white. Each year they hold a Day of Affirmation to reaffirm their commitment to academic and human freedom.

Their invitation to Senator Robert Kennedy to address them on the Day of Affirmation this year has, in the opinion of an influential Afrikaans newspaper "overstep[ped] the privileges of free speech and association in a free country. And if authority takes action, as it must, the one responsible is not the one who takes action, but the one who provokes it." The extent to which apartheid warps conceptions of "freedom" is clearly revealed in this incredible statement. We can only hope that the "action" referred to does not result in the demise of this valiant organization, though reasons I think for pessimism are great.

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to address myself directly to the issue which brought these hearings about—the problem of U.S. policy toward South Africa. Although our association has advocated sweeping changes in that policy, I will confine my recommendations to those having to do with education for South Africans.

Because of the virtual impossibility of Africans receiving an adequate education within South Africa, and because of the physical persecution of those who try to do so hundreds of young Africans have fled from South Africa and South-West Africa to seek an education. Many of them have come to the United States, along with refugees from tyranny in the rest of southern Africa, under the special African student program which was inaugurated by the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Department of State.

This program is, in my opinion, the most constructive and meaningful way in which the United States is at present giving substance to its verbal commitment to self-determination in southern Africa. I am certain that many of the participants in the special African student program will be among the leaders of their countries in the not too distant future.

I am very glad some of these students had an opportunity to attend these hearings today, and I certainly hope these hearings will give them some encouragement about the concern of the United States about South Africa.

However, there is a far greater need than can be met by the present program, which involves some 400 students. While we should not be motivated solely by considerations such as these it should be noted that many times this number of students are receiving training in the Soviet Union, China, and other countries of the Communist world.

We would like to recommend that:

1. The special African student program be enlarged to at least twice its present size so as to make a significant contribution to the body of educated African leadership in South Africa and South-West Africa and in the rest of southern Africa.

There is, perhaps, an even larger group of refugees who have not attained college entrance, but who nevertheless could learn a skilled trade by working in the United States for several years. At present,

such people encounter great obstacles and redtape in seeking employment in the United States, largely because of their statelessness.

2. Therefore, we recommend that special arrangements be made to enable refugees from apartheid, who wish to learn or gain practical experience in their trade or profession, to immigrate to the United States on a temporary basis. The full cooperation of the Department of Labor should be enlisted in this program.

Further, this privilege should be extended to South Africans currently studying in the United States in the event that they are unable to find employment elsewhere in Africa, for they are almost certain to face persecution and imprisonment should they return to South Africa.

3. Finally, we recommend that the U.S. representatives to the United Nations explore the possibility of further American support for the United Nations scholarship trust funds for South Africans and South-West Africans. This country must not falter in its efforts to build an educated and capable leadership for the nonracial South Africa of the hopefully not too distant future.

These three recommendations, Mr. Chairman, if implemented would go far toward removing the tarnished image of the United States among the majority of nonwhites in South Africa. Such positive and constructive action would be tangible evidence of what I believe is America's firm opposition to the principles of apartheid. Failure to take these and other actions against apartheid would be a negation of the very principles on which our country was founded and a denial of the principle of self-determination which the United States has long sought to uphold.

Thank you very much.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Goldmark, for an able and well-balanced presentation. I think our friends might be interested to know that the previous speaker is now making a broadcast in the hall outside, to be heard through the Voice of America for presentation throughout Africa.

The next witness, Dr. Richard Stevens, of Lincoln University, the vice president of which is the son of one of the dearest of my friends whose untimely death was a blow to me. Will you proceed, Dr. Stevens.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD STEVENS, LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, as the former chairman of the Political Science Department, 1962-63, at Pius XII University College in Basutoland, and a member of the college senate, I have endeavored to follow events in the High Commission Territories very closely over the past four and a half years. I am, therefore, very grateful for the opportunity of bringing the plight of these peoples, interrelated as it is with the problem of South Africa, to the attention of your committee, and hopefully to the attention of the administration.

The apartheid regime in South Africa, while primarily a tragedy for that country's nonwhite majority, also compromises the fundamental rights of its small neighbors—Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and

Swaziland. These three countries, having almost by chance escaped South African domination were known until recently as the British High Commission Territories. Historically caught up between the clash of British imperial interests and expanding Boer nationalism of the late 19th century, the tribal leaders of these peoples appealed for British protection rather than share the fate of their fellow Africans who were subjected to the declared racialism of the Boer community. Today, with preparations well underway for the withdrawal of British protection over Basutoland (Lesotho) and Bechuanaland (Botswana) this year, and from Swaziland within the next few years, the possibility that South Africa may yet control the fortunes of these peoples poses a definite threat to the cause of human freedom.

While insignificant in numbers and power influence, the Batswana, Swazi, and Basuto have tenaciously clung to their cherished freedom over the past century and have accepted poverty under British rule as the price for maintaining their human dignity. For while British rule excluded South African control, it consciously refrained from encouraging any political, economic, or social development of the territories likely to show up to disadvantage the repressive policies pursued by South Africa toward her nonwhite majority. But however dearly purchased was their national survival, these peoples have clearly demonstrated that human values can supersede the economic. Their actions also serve to refute the hollow protestations of some that international sanctions against South Africa would most adversely affect her nonwhite majority and must therefore be set aside as impractical. For it has already been demonstrated that the nonwhite population, if consulted, would accept such sacrifice as a condition for eventual freedom. But these three territories alone cannot challenge the South African monolith. Their support must be the international community and the rule of law. Their very survival requires that those states which officially profess a belief and respect for human values within the context of international law must now demonstrate their sincerity. True, these peoples are not in the limelight of the East-West struggle and support, for their rights cannot be clothed in the more fashionable garb of an anti-Communist struggle. An American commitment in their behalf cannot be justified in terms of maintaining a power position. It can, however, prove to the world and to the Negro population of the United States in particular, that the American commitment in behalf of human liberty is just as sincere in respect to South Africa as it claims to be in Cuba or Vietnam. On the other hand, if the United States does not now seek to grasp and pursue those peaceful and legitimate methods at our disposal to precipitate a change in southern Africa, this country may well pay for its moral tepidity by seeing the Communist world fall heir to the richest portion of the African Continent. At what a cost a real conflagration in South Africa would be to our own domestic institutions, one hesitates to speculate.

American interest in the plight of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland does not immediately, therefore, depend on national altruism. If, unfortunately, the American Government can only respond to a crisis threatening its world position, even here there is ample cause for strong, positive action. It is precisely in regard to these three countries that the United States, alone or through the

United Nations, can presently pursue a course of positive action, the side effects of which may indeed challenge the South African Government. For too long the specious argument has been advanced that American action vis-a-vis South Africa must be qualified by respect for the sovereignty of that state. Without regard to the merits of that position when challenged by the rights of the human person, we must at least equally defend the sovereign equality of these states embedded in the apartheid complex of South Africa, an equality which presupposes free and unrestricted access to the outside world. If the maintenance of these rights poses difficulties for the South African Government, it is nevertheless the duty of the international community to see that these rights are not sacrificed. Secured against South African encroachment, these states may then seriously undertake the creation of nonracial democracies, the example of which on South Africa's borders may serve as a leavening influence upon that Government's racial mythology. It follows, therefore, that assistance to these countries will enable them to be less dependent on South Africa and free, within the bounds of national right, to speak out in support of human values. As showpieces of democratic life, these countries may demonstrate to South Africa that there is an alternative to its present course which can only lead tragically and inevitably to race war if not race suicide.

A realistic American policy toward this area must be cognizant of South Africa's persistent demand for the incorporation of the High Commission Territories from the 1909 Act of Union, which gave birth to the Union of South Africa, until 1962, when Dr. Verwoerd, as Prime Minister, officially renounced the traditional claim. South African arguments for the incorporation of the territories always stressed that geographically, ethnographically, and economically they formed part of South Africa; an assertion which, were it not for the present minority rule in South Africa, would not be contested. But South Africa was patently not concerned with the incorporation of the territories for these reasons alone since she hardly intended to incur additional financial burdens without adequate compensation. Although on purely historic grounds it might be asserted that inasmuch as Britain prevented the Boers from acquiring these territories, their takeover would provide handsome redress for earlier Boer defeat, this motive was not in itself sufficient. Of greater importance was the belief that the protectorates were absolutely essential to the whole Bantustan concept, a plan for racial subordination especially promoted by Dr. Verwoerd. The blueprint for this scheme, as shown in the Tomlinson Report of 1956, presumed the incorporation of the High Commission Territories and thus enlarged from 13 percent to approximately 45 percent the amount of land supposedly to be set aside for the Bantustan project. Without the inclusion of the territories, territorial apartheid would remain an unconvincing project. The South African reserve areas could not provide a living for even half the Africans of the country but with the addition of the High Commission Territories the scheme, at least on paper, would gain some credibility. For the purposes of foreign propaganda, they seemed essential.

Although the incorporation of the protectorates appeared necessary for the realization of the Bantustan scheme, the Nationalist Party electoral victory in 1948 ruled out the possibility of negotiated

transfer. The failure of the South African Government to develop along liberal British lines made it impossible for any government in London to believe South Africa's assurances that the paramount interests of the peoples of the protectorates would be maintained. The departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth definitely precluded any possibility of direct transfer. Dr. Verwoerd therefore found it expedient to announce that the incorporation of the territories was "neither possible nor wise."

Despite this official change of heart, it would be perilous to conclude that South Africa has now abandoned its oft-repeated designs on the territories. Even the Prime Minister's timely offer, in September 1963, to lead the territories more quickly and with more financial assistance to full self-government than could be done by Britain was an obvious proof that the effort had not been abandoned. Crude methods calculated to effect transfer had indeed been rejected as undiplomatic and untimely. But the blandishments of immediate economic assistance and possible additions of adjacent lands in the Republic, all against the backdrop of threatened restrictions, may achieve the same object. It has also been suggested, even within South African political circles, that the independent territories will provide the basis for the "big partition" of South Africa, whereby the African reserve or Bantustan areas of the Republic will be thrust towards the territories which in turn will be tightly controlled through economic and other means. Dr. Steytler, of the South African Progressive Party, has not been alone in asking whether the Prime Minister's professed desire to establish good relations with the territories means that the protectorates must eventually accept policies similar to those of the South African Government.

In each of the territories the British High Commissioner, acting through a Resident Commissioner, was proclaimed sole legislative authority—Basutoland in 1884, Bechuanaland in 1891, and Swaziland in 1903—in a system theoretically known as indirect rule. The administrative responsibility for internal affairs was left on the whole to the chiefs, who continued to exercise their traditional political and judicial authority and in addition regulated the economic life of their people. If the inhabitants were not entirely satisfied with this arrangement, fear of their South African neighbor deflected the force of their protests. But traditional leaders, unaware of the nature of the economic forces in South Africa which were transforming their lives, and without real decision-making power, could not respond to the new challenge as it affected labor, agriculture, industry, and tribal life without major institutional changes. Yet, any fundamental change in the traditional structure of society—a condition for political advancement or constitutional evolution—seemed to invite the loosening of British protection and conversely, the encroachment of the historic enemy.

In the event, the abrogation in late 1964 of the office of High Commissioner—combined since 1961 with that of British Ambassador to South Africa—reflected the changed political status of the territories as each advanced towards independence. Already, in October 1963, the post of Resident Commissioner was upgraded to Queen's Commissioner in Bechuanaland and Swaziland. A similar step was taken for Basutoland in August 1964 and thus each territory received the

equivalent of a Governor responsible directly to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Henceforth, the British Ambassador to South Africa would be informed about aspects of the three territories' affairs affecting foreign relations or defense, but he would have no further responsibility for purely internal matters. This change, long demanded by nationalist leaders as a condition for proper political and economic advancement, was more than a symbolic act demanded by the times. Hopefully, it marked the end of an era of contradiction and uncertainty as Britain debated the relative merits of her various commitments and involvements in southern Africa.

Even before Britain undertook to bring diplomatic and political procedures governing the administration of the territories and their relationship to South Africa into line with their movement toward independence, cautious if not reluctant concessions were made toward nationalist movements demanding responsible self-government. In 1960 Basutoland became the first of the protectorates to receive a Legislative Council followed by Bechuanaland in 1961 and Swaziland in 1964. In each case, representative institutions were built upon the base of earlier tribal councils and were expanded to include, at least in theory, the evolving intellectual elite.

But while these changes were rapidly transforming the political life of the protectorates, South Africa made it clear that any action on the part of the territories likely to run counter to her own interests, as she defined them, would not be permitted. The fact that the protectorates were increasingly regarded after 1960 as places of asylum for South African refugees was embarrassing to the Republic's prestige and supposedly threatened her internal security. Thus, from early 1963, South Africa initiated a number of policies designed to impress the territories with her retaliatory powers. In place of unrestricted access to and from the protectorates, border posts, barbed wire fences and rigid passport controls were imposed. Without consulting the British Government as protecting power, railway passenger service was suddenly eliminated to Basutoland. Henceforth, passengers were required to detrain some 15 miles from the border, transfer to buses and then proceed to the border, after which they would carry their luggage by hand across the border bridge at Maseru. This humiliating action went uncontested by the British Government even though the South African Railroad was engaged in international commerce. No effort was made to challenge South Africa with retaliatory regulations affecting South African railcommunications through Bechuanaland with Rhodesia.

Additional restrictions soon followed. In September 1963, the South African Government announced that no airplanes would be permitted to fly to, from or between the territories without first landing at one of 27 designated airfields. Thus, at South Africa's fiat, interterritorial travel and access to the outside world required a valid South African travel document. As far as these countries were concerned, no direct journey could be made via Johannesburg's International Airport.

Typical of Britain's timid approach to matters involving South Africa, no public protest was made against this infringement of international right of access nor was the question brought to the attention of any international body, in terms of the Chicago Civil Avia-

tion Convention of 1944. Since Britain had obviously failed to challenge South Africa, the Republic continued, as she does today, to deny the legitimate rights of the territories. Some of the more notorious examples of this highhandedness may be cited. In mid-1965 10 Basuto students were turned back from the Johannesburg International Airport after they had arrived on a British flight from East Africa. They were refused permission to return to their own country on the grounds that they had received training in China and were without South African travel documents, documents which the South African Government then conveniently refused to grant. Without regard to whether or not the students had been in China, an allegation which they vigorously denied, their legal and moral right to return to their homes cannot be denied and in this demand they have been supported officially by the Basutoland Government. These students are presently drifting from country to country as a warning to all other travelers from the territories what their fate may be should they not meet with South African approval.

Other examples of South Africa's disregard of the rights of the territories include the refusal of a transit visa to the President of the Basutoland Senate, Dr. Seth Makotoko, in October 1965. Even a Member of the Senate from the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland (UBBS), Dr. Samuel Guma, has been refused permission to take up a teaching position in the United States or to attend Senate meetings when held in the other territories.

Although numerous examples could be cited of South Africa's interference with the rights of the citizens of the territories, the Republic has also acted to prevent citizens of other countries from enjoying free access to the territories. I might refer in particular to my own unpleasant experience in this regard. In May 1965 application was made for a transit visa so that I might visit the territories under the sponsorship of Lincoln University. Despite repeated requests and numerous direct inquiries and expressions of concern by the U.S. Department of State, no transit visa was granted. Again, in preparation for my December trip to Bechuanaland, the request was renewed and a formal proposal was advanced to fly directly by charter plane to the territories. This request was refused and, in conjunction with the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique, all access was denied. To this date the Department of State has received no reply to its inquiry concerning the access rights of Americans to the territories.

Since it is patently evident that I could not be considered a threat to the South African Government, it can only be concluded that my past public expressions on the dangers faced by the territories have led to my exclusion. If members of the American academic world are thus denied the ordinary rights of research and communication, it is inconceivable that the U.S. Government should permit, let alone foster, the presence in this country of South African researchers. This is a responsibility which the U.S. Government must assume if there is to be any hope of a free atmosphere in the territories.

Not the least of these detrimental actions against the territories is the activity carried on in the United States by South African consular and diplomatic personnel who endeavor to keep close watch over the activities of nationals of the territories. In a document which I will submit upon request of this committee, the South African consul gen-

eral in New York is instructed by his Government to maintain a watch over the activities of a national of one of these territories so that the South African Government may know if a return transit visa is to be granted.

Thus, even before the removal of British protection, the South African Government has seriously undermined the substance of independence. In the absence of any international presence or active interest on the part of those countries capable of exercising influence on South Africa, the likelihood that Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland can secure even the basic prerequisites of sovereignty is open to question. If the citizens of Berlin could be saved from a threat to their fundamental freedom, is it too much to expect of this Government that some effort should be made to preserve the liberties of these people? Again the righteous demands of all conscientious Americans, particularly Afro-Americans, requires an action consistent with past professions.

Between 1948 and 1963, as the lights of academic freedom flickered and died in South Africa, the High Commission territories were increasingly looked to by the nonwhite youth of South Africa as an escape from the nefarious Bantu education laws prevailing in the Republic. At considerable sacrifice youngsters were sent off to mission schools in the territories and in ever-growing numbers to Pius XII University College in Basutoland. In all of southern Africa, here alone students could receive a university education free of the apartheid ideology. Needless to say, the presence of South African students at the university was viewed with growing alarm by the South African Government. Consequently, when on January 1, 1964, the university passed from religious to secular control, the South African Government acted to halt the exodus of South African students. Within a short time, the student population, previously more than 50 percent from South Africa, was reduced to a fraction. In the meantime, however, the U.S. Government, through AID, began a program of financial assistance to the university.

Unfortunately, however, the U.S. Government made no effort to bring pressure upon the South African Government to permit the continued enrollment of South Africans. Here, again, it was clearly in the interest of the United States that every effort be made to induce the South African Government to permit students to attend the university. Could this matter not legitimately be connected with the accessibility of American academic facilities to South Africans, particularly inasmuch as American technology is responsible for much of South Africa's atomic research and development? Indeed, it can be further argued that unless fairly large numbers of students from various countries enjoy the right to enroll at the university in Basutoland, the atmosphere necessary for any proper university development will be lacking. Moreover, the university deserves the fullest support of the American Government so that both by reason of its facilities and its free academic atmosphere there may yet remain a true university in southern Africa. On the other hand, America's support should be contingent upon firm guarantees by the Government of Basutoland, that South African pressures will not restrict the freedom of the university community to probe the basic problems of that region.

Educational assistance to the territories should not, however, be confined to local endeavors. Rather, scholarship assistance enabling students to receive education in the United States must be vastly expanded. Although in normal circumstances the needs of the local African university might be the prime consideration, here the need for potential leaders to break through the apartheid curtain of southern Africa is at least of equal importance. Moreover, it cannot be forgotten that South African pressures operate even now to limit the opportunities of those students who might oppose existing political configurations as too dependent on South African influence.

American and international encouragement must also be given to the expansion of media of public information and communication in the territories. The development of extensive broadcasting facilities capable of piercing the apartheid curtain of South Africa will place in the hands of the territories another bargaining counter in dealing with South Africa. Although it would not be expected that the governments of these independent states would launch a radio offensive against South Africa, the objective reporting of regional and international news would offer a ray of hope to South Africans, white and black, laboring under the burden of a rigidly controlled government radio.

On the economic side, American technology is urgently required if Basutoland is to succeed in developing its most valuable assets; agriculture, water, and diamond mining. Entirely surrounded by South Africa, three of the Republic's most important rivers have their source in the mountains of Basutoland. Although the sale of water or hydroelectric power to neighboring South Africa may be a condition for short-range economic development, such projects as the Ox Bow scheme must not be postponed until South Africa sees fit to negotiate. On the contrary, the possibility of cheap electricity and water might bring some startling demands on the part of rural white South Africans that their Government make an adequate response. Considering that the rural white population has always provided the backbone of Afrikaner Nationalist strength, demands from this quarter on Pretoria might precipitate a weakening of the internal apartheid structure. Moreover, South Africa has already initiated certain projects on the Orange River without coming to a formal understanding with Basutoland where this international waterway has its source. Given sufficient external support, Basutoland, while the most captive of the territories, might be rendered more secure. The advantages in increased diamond mining are obvious since diamonds can be shipped with some facility to the world market. Intensive agricultural development would also reduce Basutoland's heavy reliance upon the export of labor to South Africa which usually totals more than 200,000 of the country's 890,000 population, or 43 percent of local adult males. Hopefully, Basutoland might once more provide the bulk of its own grain needs. Modern agriculture would also releases the potential of thousands of youngsters presently tied down to the tasks of herd boys thereby permitting them to receive formal schooling or engage in productive agriculture.

Bechuanaland's economic position is only slightly better than that of Basutoland. Larger than the British Isles, Bechuanaland is bounded by South-West Africa, South Africa, Zambia (at a point on the

map), and Rhodesia. Presuming that the illegal regime in Rhodesia is brought down, Bechuanaland will look more easily toward the north. At present, however, the country's half-million people subsist on ranching some 1,200,000 poor grade cattle amid a drought which has cost the loss of 250,000 head this past year. Still, however gloomy the situation, money and training can make a vital difference. The economic survey mission led by Professor Morse of Cornell University reported in 1960 that the additional expenditure of approximately \$8 million over the next 5 years, over and above existing minimal subsidies, would "set in motion in the Protectorate a series of processes that will gradually enable it to stand on its own feet." Scarcely more than a quarter of this amount has yet been made available by the British Government. Not only must the cattle industry be promoted, but urgent projects must be initiated to relieve famine conditions through sound agricultural planning. The exploitation of rich sodium-carbonate brines in the Kalahari and vast coal deposits along the railway line must yet be undertaken. The abundant, clear waters of the Okavango River in the northwest can be canalized to provide both irrigation water and barge transport for this desperately dry country. The Morse report suggested that the modest sum of \$210,000 would suffice for the construction of a canal without lining. The expansion of health, education, and communications will also correspondingly reduce the dependence of the country on South Africa.

Swaziland's more favored economic position has scarcely affected the ordinary Swazi and approximately 28 percent of the male labor force must still seek employment in South Africa. The very attractiveness of the country resulted in the alienation of most of the land to Europeans. Even today, after government action and Swaziland purchases, some approximately 42 percent of the land is owned by approximately 10,000 whites out of the country's total population of 280,000. One of the chief landowners, and a close collaborator with the South African Government, is Mr. Carl Todd, who also maintains an office in New York. Mr. Todd is in great part responsible for the present feudalistic, aristocratic government which governs Swaziland with South Africa's blessing.

Despite an abundance of natural resources such as asbestos, iron ore, timber, and good farmlands, profits are not even partly plowed back into Swaziland development. Leases have been made by the British Government which have not only deprived the Swazi of share holdings and effective participation in company directorship, but have even failed to provide effective guarantees for the training of Swazi in skilled work. In Swaziland, as in the other territories, education, public health, communications, and transport have been scandalously neglected. Effective economic assistance would serve not only to offset the disproportionate influence of South African capital, but would promote cooperatives and other economic activities primarily of a developmental character. Although Portuguese Mozambique offers little choice as an alternative access to the outside world, it might realistically be assumed that Portugal cannot long resist the Mozambiquan liberation struggle, at least if American support for Portugal can be eliminated. A liberated Mozambique will offer Swaziland new choices and a new role vis-a-vis the problem of South Africa.

Essentially, then, American commitments in the territories must reveal a bold and dynamic approach to the southern African area. Needless to say, if American interest in these areas is to be dictated by the inadequacy of its programs to the north, then it will be obvious that the United States does not intend to challenge the apartheid structure of South Africa. The very fact of an obvious American interest will, on the other hand, concretely demonstrate this country's repugnance toward South African policies and will encourage the political leaders of the territories to maintain their historic opposition to South African encroachment. Already South Africa has influenced to a marked degree political events in Basutoland and Swaziland. A large sum appropriated by the South African Parliament to secretly promote her interests in the territories is even now bearing fruit. Unfortunately, local British authorities, particularly in Swaziland, have reversed policy under the new Queen's Commissioner, and have encouraged, under the guise of "moderation," the combination of white South African interests and aristocratic tribal conservatism. In general, the object of the British Government has been first to reduce the bargaining power of the territories vis-a-vis South Africa before granting independence by restricting radio operations, imposing overly harsh regulations governing the right of asylum and by turning away from such external assistance as non-British groups offer. Inasmuch as British policy is clearly designed to take account of her enormous investments in South Africa, it follows that no creative or bold counters to South Africa can be expected from that source. It would be tragic if American policy, with independence, continues its present disinterestedness based on the assumption that the British Government is sincerely committed to the development of the territories. Even if this assumption were true, the United States must strike out on its own diplomatic and economic initiatives in southern Africa if we are yet to show the world's nonwhite majority that our commitment to freedom is indivisible.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Dr. Stevens, for a scholarly and provocative presentation.

This concludes the hearings for today, and very shortly Mr. Rosenthal will begin the questioning. Before that, I would like to make an announcement.

Our witnesses at the last hearing were all favorable to South Africa. All witnesses today were on the other side. The subcommittee is endeavoring to hold its hearings objectively.

As a delegate to the United Nations, apartheid was my assignment, and I made the usual American speech, "Apartheid is immoral, repugnant to every decent American concept" and yet we couldn't do anything about it.

Now the matter will come up before the United Nations again this fall, when the 21st General Assembly convenes. By that time we hope to have completed these hearings so that we can give our delegates to the United Nations the benefit of our work and such recommendations, if any, the members of the subcommittee may think proper.

I make that statement because I have never thought that the U.S. Congress has the right to inquire into some political or social affair

of a foreign country, unless there is a real American interest and an American involvement in the consequences of a political condition that holds the possibility of international repercussions.

I am also happy to announce today that covering this hearing is one of the distinguished South African newspapermen, Mr. Owens, representing one of the powerful newspaper syndicates of that country. We are glad to have Mr. Owens with us.

Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to direct my questions initially to our first witness. I wonder if you could tell me how you pronounce your name?

Mr. NTLABATI. It is pronounced "Nabati."

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Can you say that a little closer to the microphone?

Mr. NTLABATI. "Nabati." You could pronounce it "Mr. Nabati."

Mr. ROSENTHAL. On page 5 of your statement, sir, you said:

Even worse than this is the fact that past laws keep husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown of family life.

I wonder if you could elaborate on that for us, and tell us a little bit how it works?

Mr. NTLABATI. Yes. When the Government accepted their policy of apartheid, they said they had a solution to South Africa's racial policy, and they divided South Africa and gave 87 percent of the land to the whites and 13 percent of the land to the nonwhites, and declared the black areas—the 13 percent of the land black areas, and 87 percent of the land white areas.

So it is illegal in South Africa for an African to live in the white areas. He can only go to the white area as a labor unit. This means the men working in the cities have to leave their wives and children in the black areas—that is, in the rural areas—and live in hostels in the urban areas.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How long a period of time are they separated?

Mr. NTLABATI. Sometimes they meet for about 2 weeks in a year; at that time, when the husband comes home for a holiday.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You mean they are away from each other, the husband and wife are separated for 50 out of 52 weeks in a year?

Mr. NTLABATI. It happens in some cases. In cases where, for example, the husband lives away about 500 or 900 miles away from the city. Now this means that this man will not have time to go back to his family, for example, over a weekend, and even apart from this, from the salaries which they receive, they cannot afford to do this.

Now, there are cases where the wife of a man working in the city would visit this man in the city, but under the same laws she is given 72 hours to visit and she has to apply for a permit, and this permit is often given on the grounds that she wishes to conceive, and she is given 72 hours to conceive. At the end of 72 hours she has to go back from the city, and it was on this basis I said whites in Africa don't accept us as people.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What percentage of the black South Africans are involved in the apartheid system?

Mr. NTLABATI. It would be the majority of the African people. Despite the fact the apartheid is being enforced, the majority of the African people are in the cities.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What in your opinion will happen eventually in South Africa if the present policy of the Government there is pursued?

Mr. NTLABATI. If the policy of the present Government is pursued, a bloody revolution is inevitable in South Africa. Now I am a Christian clergyman, and naturally I am completely against violence, but in the case of South Africa every possible channel has been closed to us and we have been left with no other choice, unless the world intervenes in that situation, but to use violence.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Would you be prepared to give us an estimate of the timetable when that might happen?

Mr. NTLABATI. This situation in South Africa, at the present moment, is so tense that nobody can give a timetable about that situation. Nobody knew, for example, what would happen in 1960. You had a people who were going to demonstrate peacefully, and they were shot down and we had a blood bath right there. Anything might start it off, so there can be no timetable.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Why is it there haven't been any demonstrations of that type in the last 5 years?

Mr. NTLABATI. It is illegal to demonstrate, and apart from the fact it is illegal, under the sabotage law there is a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of death.

Now it would be foolish for Africans to go outside, carry a placard, or even write a slogan on their wall, knowing very well they might go to jail for 5 years and even hang for that offense. It just doesn't make sense.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In your opinion, is the situation explosive to the point that it could happen any day or any week or any month?

Mr. NTLABATI. Well, I don't think so; you see, the South African Government is powerful. I believe that if the United States, for example, had not intervened in Nazi Germany, Hitler might have been successful. Now the same situation pertains in South Africa. If there is no intervention in that situation it could continue for a very, very long time.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The big difference I see—there are many differences—but one I see concerns the population of this area. The people who support the Government are a very, very small minority of the total number of people, and so populationwise it would be easy for the majority at some time, if they had, the material and guns, to upset that, I would think.

Mr. NTLABATI. Well, yes, if we had the material and the guns and we were trained. The problem is that we don't have the material and the guns nor the military training.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it your opinion this revolution, or this explosion, could take place even without having the material or guns? Or do you think it would be successful?

Mr. NTLABATI. I believe if that explosion were conducted without materials and the guns, the black people would be completely wiped out of the face of South Africa. The whole policy of the Bantustan system is even conducted within the urban areas, in that Africans after 11 o'clock at night have to be about 13 or 14 miles away from the cities, in the townships. The white men in South Africa know after 11 o'clock at night there is no black man in the cities, and we could be wiped out overnight.

For example, just before Sharpeville, you had an army in South Africa, the army and the police. In Johannesburg, from about 10 o'clock at night to the morning they had gone through all the large townships, searching for weapons, and they just arrested thousands of people.

So that the whole system of the Bantustan system is such that it is very difficult for Africans to resist or even to plan a resistance. And under the "go day detention law," for example, anybody who is suspected of having information that may lead to the conviction of someone may be picked up without any charges preferred against him. So anybody who is suspected by any policeman can be put into jail in South Africa, and in the words of the Minister of Justice, "until this side of eternity."

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think a very strong case has been made out before the committee of the punitive nature of the laws and the impossibility of the moral survival. But I am just trying to find out if there is no change in American policy, and no affirmative development by the United Nations, is it your opinion the situation will continue pretty much as it is?

Mr. NTLABATI. My opinion is that the situation will continue for a very long time, for many years, but my opinion is that the situation will not forever remain what it is. I'm sure about the fact that we are going to win in South Africa. And my real concern about South Africa is not so much at the moment of our victory, I'm certain of our victory, but my concern is what will happen to that white minority in the future because, you see, with all that is going on, with all our suffering, we are being hardened. The Government claims it would be committing suicide by giving us political rights. I believe that there were great possibilities for a multiracial South Africa; there are still possibilities for a multiracial South Africa. But I think if that situation is allowed to continue for a long time, there will not be these possibilities. For the Government is in fact committing suicide by not giving us political rights.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Professor Stevens, I think you made an important point on the last page or two of your statement. It left me with a feeling that you felt British policy was something less than appropriate in the situation in the free territories.

Dr. STEVENS. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In other words, we have been told frequently that the United States is playing a secondary role in this area, that we are following a positive policy of the British Government which was generally on a favorable track in these precepts. Do you disagree with that?

Dr. STEVENS. I certainly think this has to be qualified. One must always keep in mind the fact that a colonial policy as enunciated in London can be an entirely different thing from a colonial policy in practice in a given area.

Now, there have certainly been several resident commissioners in the territories who made very valiant efforts to encourage a proper situation, and I still wouldn't attribute any basic malice to any resident commissioner there today. But all British policy has been so geared to British investment in South Africa, vis-a-vis these territories, that if we are going to continue simply following along British

paths, it will lead to nothing. And, of course, we will then fail to take advantage of a very real opportunity.

I think, for example, the fact that at present—I understand it is to be changed shortly—we have one American consul who is assigned to the three territories, who only recently received a secretary. Well, now, just this fact is example enough to South Africa that the United States is not serious about these territories. And unless we demonstrate a real interest in them, these entities will in practice become Bantustan. They have no alternative.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Goldmark, I read your recommendations. They are modest. I think the objective you have in mind could be attained and reached—you kept the recommendations within the limits of your subject, the educational part. I want to get into a larger area.

Do you think that sanctions would be justified?

Mr. GOLDMARK. In the use of economics, perhaps; military sanctions against South Africa?

Mr. O'HARA. Sanctions invoked as best we can.

Mr. GOLDMARK. That is a very difficult question. I should say, No. 1, approximately 250 student delegates at our last Congress very strongly examined this question, and came to the decision, yes, economic sanctions could be applied quite well to South Africa, but it would take a very firm policy on the part of the U.S. Government, but that it could be done. I think some things mentioned here today underline ways in which this can begin. The denial of access to territories, Basutoland, Swaziland, can be reciprocated by denial of a number of South Africans in this country. This is one way.

In addition, I think our Government has the responsibility of discouraging further American investments in South Africa, and encouraging, where possible, withdrawal of present American investors in that territory. It is a very difficult question, one that is presuming to judge upon the internal practices of a political regime, but I think one has the responsibility to assess very carefully how much one contributes as a country to the success of those internal practices. And it is in these areas I think we can take steps, so that we are both economically and perhaps morally disassociated from the policies of apartheid, which are imposed on the South African Government.

Mr. O'HARA. The question is certain to come up again in the United Nations. Will the United Nations declare apartheid as a menace to world peace and security? It is the security council of the United Nations that must make that determination. If you were a member of the Security Council of the United Nations would you vote that apartheid holds such a threat to world peace or security, "yes" or "no"?

Mr. GOLDMARK. I would like to ask one of my staff members, Mr. Kulick, to answer this question, because he has a number of ideas that would pretty well express my own position and the association's position as well on this question.

Mr. KULICK. Thank you, Mr. Goldmark.

Mr. O'HARA. Will you identify yourself, please?

STATEMENT OF GILBERT KULICK, ASSISTANT FOR AFRICAN STUDENT AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION

Mr. KULICK. My name is Gilbert Kulick, and I am assistant for African Students Affairs for the National Student Association.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KULICK. The objection most commonly brought up about sanctions against South Africa usually by people who are in favor of certain policies against South Africa, is that they would not work because it would be impossible to police and it would be impossible to prevent people breaking the sanctions imposed on South Africa.

But I think if one examines what is proposed by sanctions, one can see that they are indeed practicable. If, in fact, all members of the United Nations do subscribe to these sanctions, and are prepared to enforce them within the area of the activities of their own citizens, then the argument about impossibility of enforcement would seem to be invalid.

I think what people are really saying, is countries will not vote for it, not that, once voted for, they won't be enforced.

In answer to your original question, would we vote to regard apartheid as a threat to international peace, I think it is quite clear that apartheid is such an affront to the African states that even if the South African Government were to make no overt, aggressive actions toward these territories and I think it's probably safe to say South Africa is not now planning to invade Namibia, or planning to invade the territories to the north, the very nature of the system in South Africa is such a provocation that it could very well lead to action on the part of those very states against South Africa out of a feeling of solidarity with their fellow Africans in South Africa, and a need to assert their freedom, to free these people from apartheid.

Mr. O'HARA. You know, of course, the African states, most of them, disagreed with the British Government, and wanted force used in Rhodesia?

Mr. KULICK. Yes, and I think at this point there are probably a great number of people, who even within British circles, were wishing that had been done. I think they now realize it could have accomplished, far more simply, and far more efficiently than the course which was actually undertaken.

Mr. O'HARA. Dr. Stevens, what is your thought on that? If you were a member of the Security Council of the United Nations would you vote that apartheid offers such a threat to international peace and security as to warrant sanctions?

Dr. STEVENS. I would.

Mr. O'HARA. You would vote that way.

How about you, Reverend?

Mr. NTLABATI. I certainly would.

Mr. O'HARA. Then sanctions probably will carry this panel. But it is a serious question. Now I have another question, and I am going to ask you first, Dr. Stevens: To what extent can the American Government regulate the practices of American capital and business, in foreign lands?

Dr. STEVENS. Well, first, let me admit, Mr. Chairman, that I am not all that familiar with business procedures and the controls that our Government can exercise under any situation, but I immediately think of the fact that in the Cuban situation, the U.S. Government certainly imposed restrictions on American business dealings with Cuba. I do not think it offered any impossible barrier. So I should think that if we are really determined, the U.S. Government can also force the American business community to exercise—to follow the same practices in South Africa as it does here.

Obviously this means a confrontation with the South African Government, but I do not think South Africa—the South African Government would exist for a day, as it is, unless, or were it not for the fact that big business in South Africa lends its tacit support. Of course, this is primarily, as far as foreign investment is concerned, a British investment, but with all of the complexity of interlocking directorates, and so forth, it is probably very difficult to disentangle them. But I certainly think the United States should, as a starter, begin to insist that American businesses follow fair employment practices, and that they be made to do exactly the same in South Africa—there are many things American employers could do right now. I know that there are certain positive programs which are even permitted within the very restricted sphere of South Africa, programs which American employers could implement right now to better the working conditions of their employees, and they are not doing them. They are simply taking advantage of the situation. And I think that there should be a very positive demand on the part of this Government that there be consistency.

Mr. O'HARA. What is your thought on that, Reverend?

Mr. NTIBABATI. My own opinion is that the great Western Powers, Britain and the United States, will not sacrifice trade and profit in favor of fighting for a democratic form of society in South Africa.

I remember Henry P. Van Dusen, the president emeritus of the Union Theological Seminary, went to South Africa. One of the South African leading businessmen said to him, as long as the United States supports, we can go on.

Now, one of the reasons I, as an African, insist that the United States should withdraw their economic interests in South Africa, it is because the United States is supporting South Africa, it is giving moral support to the Afrikaaner people. Whenever the Afrikaaner people say to their own Government that South Africa cannot afford to be isolated, the Government always refers to U.S. votes at the United Nations, and say no, we are not isolated. The United States abstained from voting against us, or the United States voted in favor of us. And this gives support. And this is why I say the United States is involved in the apartheid system, and that the United States is a partner in apartheid, and it is on this basis that I plead with the United States to withdraw their economic interests from South Africa.

Also, I do a lot of speaking in this country, and I have met some of the businessmen in this country. It is not every businessman who has no conscience. I think there are businessmen with a conscience. But these businessmen have said to me, "Our own Department of Commerce tells us that the situation in South Africa is stable, and that South Africa is a good country to trade with."

Now, this is American policy. Some of these businessmen say, we will not get out of South Africa as long as our Government doesn't say we should get out. But the day our Government says we should get out we will get out. And they will cite situations as in Communist countries, where the United States either told the businessmen to get out or discouraged trade with these countries.

Mr. O'HARA. I think our objectives are the same. I think there is no defense of apartheid and I think we do have a moral responsibility. But what are the means open to us and what are its limitations.

In your statement I sensed you had some doubt as to the sincerity of the United States in refusing to sell arms to South Africa. Let me assure you that the United States not only has a ban on sale of arms to South Africa, but it has refused \$60 million in orders on commercial goods, that possibly could have been diverted to wartime uses.

Since the hearings started we were told that our Government was considering the sale of some passenger airplanes to South Africa, and this subcommittee objected to that sort of thing, and the sale was not consummated.

There is a question in my mind, and a serious question, How far a government can go in controlling American money in foreign investments? I have an open mind. I think it is a matter of interest and concern to all the people of our country. We wish American capital and American capital to accept full partnership in building the American image, but just how far compulsion can be used is something that requires examination. I think American businessmen that have foreign investments, and American financiers who have money at work in South Africa, should appear before this subcommittee, and I am hopeful they will before these hearings are concluded.

Now, I want to hear from you, Mr. Goldmark, what do you think on this matter?

Mr. GOLDMARK. Most of the ground has already been covered. I would like to add a recent example which I think demonstrates our Government's power to control American business, to control what enters this country, even as American products. I don't know whether you follow the wig market. If you have, you will notice the bottom fell out of the entire wig industry in Italy, because the U.S. Government banned the importing of Italian wigs on the ground they were being manufactured from Chinese hair—red Chinese hair at that.

I think, as Dr. Stevens pointed out, our Government's ability to regulate American commerce internationally has been used in the past in the case of Cuba, and in other areas. There exists, and I think, for example, the same logic which compels us to put a ban, as you say, on the sale of military material to South Africa, would compel us to cease the sale of all goods to South Africa, for in a modern economy the mobility of capital and labor, with some bottlenecks, is very great. And industries that do not have to be used in the manufacture of domestic goods, because they can be imported from elsewhere, can be freed for the manufacture of military material.

What I am saying is the convertibility of this, if one accepts the logic of a ban on military instruments, one would also insist on a ban on all others, as well. So therefore, I think not only the logic which would force you to the previous position, but also I think your Govern-

ment's past experience in this area would demonstrate not only these sanctions can be applied, but that they should be applied.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Morse had to leave a little while ago, but he wanted me to tell the witnesses how much he appreciated the opportunity of listening to them, and he regrets he has been called away on a matter he had to take care of.

Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate being called on. I haven't heard enough of the discussion so I don't want to cover the ground that has already been covered. I will have an opportunity to read the statements. I am sorry I wasn't here for the full hearings.

Mr. O'HARA. With your understanding of the subject generally, I know you have some questions. They covered the subject very thoroughly. I think you can ask questions on any point.

Mr. FRASER. I might, Mr. Chairman, question Mr. Stevens about the high commission territories. What is the date on which they will become independent?

Dr. STEVENS. Bechuanaland, I believe, is scheduled to become independent September 30, and Basutoland October 4, both this year.

There has yet to take place an independence conference in London or Swaziland. It is expected within the next few months. And estimates are that Swaziland would be independent probably within 2 years.

Mr. FRASER. Until I read your paper I hadn't realized the problems associated with their problem of access and the other restrictions South Africa is placing on their country.

Can an airplane fly into these countries today without landing in South Africa?

Dr. STEVENS. No, any plane must land at one of these designated air-fields. This means, then, that the charter company will not take anyone on a flight unless he can first produce a valid South African transit document, so that when they do land in South Africa, they will not be embarrassed. There are certainly provisions of the Chicago Convention of 1944 which, to my mind, are violated by this practice. Of course there are a number of articles there, perhaps which might lend some support to what South Africa has done, but certainly this is an international matter, and it has been dealt with very, very shabbily. And it is a matter of great significance, because these territories, as I contend, do offer this Government, at the moment, the most positive means by which we can really do something in Southern Africa, and we can do it directly by helping these people.

Mr. FRASER. I noted some reference to AID support in education.

Dr. STEVENS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. To what extent does AID have programs in these territories?

Dr. STEVENS. I certainly don't have all the facts. It is a minimal program. I know at the university they grant approximately \$100,000. This is paid out in the form of scholarships, part of which go to reimburse the university for the overhead.

But I was extremely disappointed that when AID became involved in the university, it did not really utilize this opportunity, for political

leverage. There seemed to be no concern, as far as I could gather, on this score. Consequently, the number of South Africans, and it is the South Africans who would need the scholarship money, the South Africans aren't there. Whereas perhaps if the U.S. Government granted scholarships directly to students in South Africa who had been admitted to the university, this would then pose a confrontation with the South African Government on every single student. Instead, it is students from the territories who are receiving the scholarships, and this is Britain's responsibility to provide money for those students to attend the university.

Mr. FRASER. When they get their independence, is there any reason why they shouldn't have all the attributes of sovereignty?

Dr. STEVENS. Well, as things are going now, South Africa has really made it very obvious that they must, to a certain degree, toe the South African line, or else there can be positive economic restrictions. In fact, recent elections have shown a very noticeable South African presence with money, material, and so forth. So you see you can retain the formal structure of independence, but in reality the real substance of sovereignty, can be continually eroded and this is what South Africa is doing. This is to a less degree in Bechuanaland, of course.

Mr. FRASER. You may have covered this in the statement, but the people who live in these territories I assume are dependent on employment in South Africa?

Mr. STEVENS. That is right, to the greatest extent in Basutoland. And this is a reality that must be faced, and any government in Basutoland, however nationalistic, must certainly take account of this fact. However, there are positive steps that a government, even in the most captive state, Basutoland can take, to bring in an international presence, so that the country is not so heavily dependent simply on British support.

If there is more outside interests, the possibility that South Africa can act against these hostage countries is considerably reduced. And of course if we can show that we have an interest in these areas, and help these people to really develop, I think it would certainly be the most fruitful means by which we can demonstrate our whole concern for the whole area.

Mr. FRASER. What about the leverage South Africa would get by denying access into South Africa for purposes of holding jobs?

Mr. STEVENS. Of course, this is a two-sided sword. The Basuto, while needing employment in South Africa, are also desperately needed by the mining industry of South Africa. If, for example, tomorrow all Basuto miners were to stay in Basutoland, there would be a crisis in South African mining.

Mr. FRASER. Would they have resort to other labor?

Mr. STEVENS. There would not be this immediate labor, no. Of course, South Africa is trying to hasten mechanization as rapidly as possible, but there are certain things that simply cannot be mechanized and the South African industrial world depends heavily on this labor. And in fact, if these territories were sufficiently sure of themselves, sufficiently sure of other avenues for economic development, they might, among themselves, concert to insist on a certain minimum wage that would again give these areas greater bargaining power.

They don't really have it at the moment.

Mr. FRASER. In effect, what you are saying is the British, by inaction, have allowed these to slip into essentially the status which South Africa proposes for the Bantustans, which is that they have a right to self-government, but with no right to deal with external affairs, and they are otherwise subject to the control of South Africa?

Mr. STEVENS. Yes; it can be reduced to this eventually, if patterns continue. Of course, wherever South African political influence is the greatest, the financial influence is also the greatest. This is true at the moment in Swaziland, where South African investments are making very handsome profits. I do not think the present government—and by this I mean the British administration—is really endeavoring to promote a modernization of the political structure.

There is a tribal aristocracy in power, which has worked hand in glove with the South African Government. Its constitutional advice has all been provided by an Afrikaner nationalist lawyer, a member of the Bruderbund, and so forth. Politically the thinking of the King is the same as the thinking of the United Party of South Africa, as on the question of race federation, in fact, this is where he got his idea.

The present British government is actively showing the aristocracy how it can continue to retain power, and there are documents available that do demonstrate this, reports of council meetings that weren't quite so secret as they were thought to be, and reveal the Queen's Commissioner, pointing out what must be done if the government is to be maintained.

Mr. FRASER. What kind of a presence of U.S. personnel is in the territories?

Mr. STEVENS. Well, there is an American consul who has sent, of course, quite belatedly to the territories, only perhaps a year and a half ago, something like that, a fine man, but from the outset totally crippled, without even a secretary. What kind of programs can he offer to these governments? Nothing—only a few tokens. There has not yet been demonstrated any positive American interest in these territories.

Mr. FRASER. Is this one consul for all of the territories?

Mr. STEVENS. One consul for all three of the territories. This will of necessity change when they become independent. You have to have embassies. But with this background I hate to think of what will take his place.

Mr. FRASER. What is the population of these territories, if you know?

Mr. STEVENS. Bechuanaland has about 560,000 people, slightly over half a million. Basutoland is now approaching perhaps 900,000 to a million. Swaziland perhaps about 280,000 people.

Mr. FRASER. So to summarize what you are saying, the British and the United States have neglected them?

Mr. STEVENS. The United States really had no knowledge of these territories until recently—I mean the creation of the High Commission Territories desk in the State Department is a very recent phenomenon.

Mr. FRASER. When was that done?

Mr. STEVENS. I am not sure, I think a year and a half ago or perhaps 2 years.

Mr. FRASER. We had no one responsible for looking at the situation in the area?

Mr. STEVENS. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have any reason to believe that the Department today is looking at it?

Mr. STEVENS. I know there are people in the Department of State who have a very keen interest in this area, and who would like to see more positive policies pursued, but the matter of fact is there is no support. It is just a blank wall. Again it demonstrates our real lack of concern for the area. We are missing opportunities.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Culver?

Mr. CULVER. I have no questions.

Mr. O'HARA. The Chair announced we had a visiting group of students from Rochester University. There being no objection, we will insert in the record at this point the names of these students and the countries from which they come.

(The list referred to is as follows:)

ROCHESTER STUDENT PROGRAM

Onesmus Akuenje, South-West Africa.	Sebilletso Mokone, Bechuanaland.
Samuel Bakasa, Rhodesia.	Shakespeare Mshunga, Rhodesia.
Keboemetsi Bareki, Bechuanaland.	Lubasake Muyondwa, Mozambique.
Ngoni Chldeya, Rhodesia.	Mzukisi Ndulula, South Africa.
Matthew Dauramanzl, Rhodesia.	Antoine Nsingi, Angola.
Joaao D'Almeida, Angola.	Timon Nyandoro, Rhodesia.
Livingstone Gwishiiri, Rhodesia.	Antoine Nzima, Angola.
Gaylord Kambarani, Rhodesia.	Nametso Phirinyane, Bechuanaland.
Kumbiral Kangai, Rhodesia.	Solomon Simelane, Swaziland.
Tobakane Loeto, Bechuanaland.	Joseph Sithole, Mozambique.
Victorine Mbende, South-West Africa.	Selwyn Soqulnase, South Africa.
Kufakunesu Mhizha, Rhodesia.	

Accompanying the group: Mr. and Mrs. Richard White; Mr. Clyde Titus, director, African Student Center.

Mr. O'HARA. The session now stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

